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Abstract 
 
Cornelius Van Til is known for his work in the field of apologetics. His distinctive approach 
emphasized consistency between methodology and theology in order to defend the Christian 
faith. Though often neglected, his doctrine of God provided the foundation for his methodology. 
The nature of who God is informs how we know him and how we interpret his word. The three 
most prominent contours of his doctrine were: the Creator-creature distinction, 
incomprehensibility, and the ontological Trinity. The value of these particular emphases is that 
they are key touchpoints for diagnosing apologetic methods and affirming the Christian system 
of truth. The nature of his assessment of methodology at the worldview level along these 
contours has wide-ranging implications for other disciplines, including hermeneutics. The 
following study explores the relevance of Van Til’s doctrine of God for contemporary biblical 
hermeneutics in terms of consistency between method and theology proper as revealed in the 
Bible. Van Til’s doctrine of God is relevant for contemporary hermeneutics both, in how 
‘hermeneutics’ has come to be defined and in terms of how its relationship to metaphysics has 
been understood. In the former, there has been movement toward a more explicitly holistic 
definition, one that provides a general theory of understanding involving worldview 
assumptions. In the latter, the relationship between hermeneutics and metaphysics has been 
unavoidable. It has also been unstable and inconsistent. Van Til speaks to each of these trends 
from a self-conscious, Christian worldview. His work focused on worldview considerations and 
presuppositions, including metaphysical and epistemological concerns. It is argued that Van Til’s 
contributions are not only relevant for evaluating hermeneutical methods, but also contribute to 
some concerns of recent developments in the field. Two such developments which have 
influenced evangelical hermeneutics are Speech Act Theory (SAT) and Theological 
Interpretation of Scripture (TIS). Van Til’s contributions strengthen the effort to give due 
consideration to the divine author in discussions of meaning and method, but also serve to help 
critically evaluate and round out both. Lastly, the relevance of his theology proper is seen 
regarding the contemporary hermeneutical issue of the NT use of the OT. This provides a brief 
case study concerning a prominent contemporary issue in evangelical hermeneutics. Van Til’s 
contribution asks deeper questions regarding method and meaning which further the discussion, 
and detects flaws in some attempts to make sense of how the NT uses the OT.  
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Summary of Portfolio 
 
Cornelius Van Til is somewhat of a controversial figure in reformed theology. Beyond the 
reformed world, he is virtually unknown and often misunderstood. That said, he was a proponent 
of the presuppositional school of apologetics. Treatment of his work has largely focused on his 
apologetic methodology in particular. However, by his own admission, his methodology is 
merely an extension of his theology, especially his doctrine of God. This point has often been 
overlooked. Van Til sought consistency between method and theology. Among his 
contemporaries (even those in the reformed tradition), he saw what amounted to inconsistency 
between theology and method, which he sought to remedy by asserting certain emphases in his 
doctrine of God. These emphases (Creator-creature distinction, incomprehensibility, and 
ontological Trinity) were creatively summarized by Van Til to provide a fitting defense against 
certain strains of thought that had crept into apologetic methods which were inconsistent with 
reformed theology. Many of those who followed Van Til’s general approach have sought to 
clarify and develop it in the field of apologetics. However, the application of his thought in other 
spheres has often been merely implicit and cursory. Yet, due to his emphasis on foundational 
philosophical categories (metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics), it would seem that his work 
has a much broader relevance than what has been explored in the past. In light of contemporary 
hermeneutical issues within evangelicalism and influences from without, it would seem fruitful 
to seek the same level of consistency that Van Til pursued in the field of hermeneutics. Van Til’s 
doctrine of God may help to contribute to, critique, and clarify the dialogue at the 
presuppositional level. For Van Til, apologetic methodology should be consistent with the 
theology it seeks to defend. An important extension of that principle is that hermeneutical 
methodology should also be consistent with theology—especially regarding the doctrine of God. 
His creatively summarized emphases in theology proper may also prove to be fit for the task of 
defending the Christian system of truth and exposing strains of thought that have crept into 
evangelical hermeneutics which are inconsistent with Christian theology.  
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"From where, then, does wisdom come? And where is the place of understanding? It is hidden 
from the eyes of all living and concealed from the birds of the air. Abaddon and Death say, 'We 
have heard a rumor of it with our ears.' "God understands the way to it, and he knows its place. 
For he looks to the ends of the earth and sees everything under the heavens. When he gave to the 
wind its weight and apportioned the waters by measure, when he made a decree for the rain and 
a way for the lightning of the thunder, then he saw it and declared it; he established it, and 
searched it out. And he said to man, 'Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to turn 
away from evil is understanding.'" 
 
Job 28:20-28 
 
 
 
Whoever trusts in his own mind is a fool, but he who walks in wisdom will be delivered. 
 
Proverbs 28:26 
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Preface: Cornelius Van Til & Hermeneutics 
 Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) was a theologian and apologist who served on the faculty 
of Westminster Theological Seminary (1928-1972). He was, apart from Calvin, strongly 
influenced by the Dutch reformed tradition (Kuyper, Bavinck, and Vos). However, he was also 
controversial in the sense that he wrote polemically, and he creatively summarized reformed 
doctrines in new ways to meet the challenges of his day. This led to a strong polarization among 
those who interacted with his work, both positively1 and negatively.2 This was, in part, due to his 
interaction with philosophy and borrowing philosophical concepts, which he redefined according 
to the Christian worldview. His ideas have often been misunderstood and even misapplied.3 Yet, 
he saw his own work as merely presenting and applying ‘generic Calvinism,’ and confronting 
opposition to Christ and his church.4 
 Perhaps his most significant contribution to the field of apologetics was his self-
conscious determination to construct a biblical, full-orbed Christian worldview, which did not 
merely focus on proximate arguments, but ultimate commitments. He sought to present a 
Christian system of truth in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Moreover, he saw a 
great need to evaluate apologetic methodology in order to discern whether one’s method was 
consistent with this system of truth. Underlying his apologetic method and worldview was a 
                                                          
1 Wesley A. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Dutch Reformed Theology (ed. David F. Wells; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1989), 73; John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, N.J.: 
P&R Publishing, 1995), 44; John R. Muether, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman (Phillipsburg, 
N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2008), 16. 
2 John Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth (Jefferson, Md.: Trinity Foundation, 1986); 
Gordon R. Lewis, “Van Til and Carnell—Part I,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy 
and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (ed. E. R. Geehan; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1980), 361; Clark 
Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Evidences,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 422; Gordon H. Clark, The Trinity (Jefferson, 
Md.: Trinity Foundation, 1985), 88. 
3 Cf. William White, Jr., Van Til: Defender of the Faith (Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 1979), 14. 
4 Van Til’s ‘generic Calvinism’ and ‘reformed tradition’ consisted of the summary of doctrine found in the 
following creeds: Belgic Confession, Heidelberg Catechism, Canons of Dordt, and especially the Westminster 
Confession of Faith (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith [4th ed.; ed. K. Scott Oliphint; Phillipsburg, N.J.: 
P&R Publishing, 2008], 1, 277). References to ‘reformed tradition’ in this work are consistent with this notion.   
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strong emphasis on the doctrine of God. This emphasis has often been overshadowed by 
misunderstanding, terminological confusion, and idiosyncrasies in his thought. 
 Sharing the same theological heritage with Van Til, expressed primarily in the 
Westminster Confession of Faith (along with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms), we share the 
same fundamental theological presuppositions. I see his work largely as a positive and fruitful 
contribution to articulating a Christian worldview. That said, his work does display some areas of 
weakness. Two particular areas stand out in this regard and will be touched upon in the pages 
that follow. First, he is unclear at points and begs further elaboration. Second, he can tend to 
paint some of his opponents in an unfair light (even if his criticism has some merit), creating a 
‘straw man’ of sorts. In the end, however, I find his work to be fertile soil for exploring 
theological consistency in a number of fields.  
In what follows, we will attempt to apply Van Til’s logic to hermeneutics and investigate 
potentially fruitful applications. Just as Van Til evaluated apologetic methodology in terms of the 
doctrine of God, hermeneutical methodology can also be evaluated along the same lines. A 
distinctly Christian hermeneutic should be consistent with a Christian doctrine of God. 
 In Part One, we will examine three important foundational matters in order to establish 
Van Til’s relevance for contemporary hermeneutics. First, we will evaluate how Van Til has 
been perceived in relation to the hermeneutical discussion (chapter one). Second, we will 
examine how ‘hermeneutics’ has come to be defined and understood today (chapter two). Third, 
we will look at how the relationship between metaphysics and hermeneutics has been articulated 
in terms of being compatible with a Christian worldview, especially as it relates to the doctrine 
of God (chapter three).  
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 Part Two will introduce Van Til’s doctrine of God as a self-conscious, Christian response 
to the issues raised in Part One. His doctrine of God will be discussed along three main contours 
emphasized by him in his work in apologetics: the Creator-creature distinction (chapter four), 
incomprehensibility (chapter five), and the ontological Trinity (chapter six). From our discussion 
of each, we will consider general hermeneutical implications for the contemporary scene. 
 In Part Three, we will apply Van Til’s doctrine of God to a particular contemporary issue 
within evangelical5 hermeneutics: the NT use of the OT (chapter seven). This will provide a brief 
case study of how Van Til’s theological emphases speak to questions of meaning and method. 
Our aim will be to assess gaps in the debate related to worldview considerations at the level of 
presupposition.  
The concern throughout is to probe the level of consistency that exists between theology 
and method in hermeneutics. The content of Scripture should be used to establish method, if we 
take that content seriously. It is hoped that this study will stimulate further consideration of Van 
Til’s thought for hermeneutics.        
 
  
                                                          
5 This term has become increasingly hard to define in terms of consensus. This is due to differing criteria 
and tools used to measure whether one fits the pre-constructed category of ‘evangelical.’ Perhaps the most helpful 
definition of ‘evangelical’ involves a biblical-theological approach, which is tied to scriptural emphases related to 
the gospel (e.g., Christological, biblical, historical, theological, apostolic witness, and personal), going back to the 
first century (cf. John Stott, Evangelical Truth: A Personal Plea for Unity, Integrity, and Faithfulness [Downers 
Grove, Ill.: IVP, 1999], 13-34).This is opposed to more sociological approaches which tend to see ‘evangelicalism’ 
as a late development in the history of the church. A biblical-theological approach to defining ‘evangelical’ would 
distinguish between and affirm the formal principle (authority of scripture as the ‘norming norm’) and the material 
principle (what is considered as the content of the gospel). My references to ‘evangelical’ and ‘evangelicalism’ have 
this biblical-theological approach in mind, as well as an awareness that some claim to be ‘evangelical,’ though they 
do not actually fit into this definition. Incidentally, Van Til had a much narrower working definition of 
‘evangelical.’ He used this term to refer to non-Calvinistic (sometimes referred to as ‘inconsistent Calvinism’) 
protestants, often paring them together with Romanist apologetics in contrast to Reformed apologetics (Defense of 
the Faith, 54, 93, 277, 309-310, 322, 340). 
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Part One: What Does Van Til Have to Do With Hermeneutics? 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Introduction 
It was the early apologist Tertullian who uttered the famous words, “What indeed has 
Athens to do with Jerusalem?”1 He penned those words in the context of opposing all attempts 
which he saw as muddying the waters of Christianity through an unstable hybrid of Greek 
philosophy and the gospel. Van Til certainly acknowledged an appreciation for his emphasis on 
the distinction between believing and unbelieving thought.2 Not surprisingly, the sole formal 
festschrift for Van Til bears the very title, Jerusalem and Athens.3 The title of the present chapter 
points us in a different direction, though the underlying issues associated with it remain. 
 What does Van Til have to do with hermeneutics? Taking a cursory glance at his body of 
work, one will find only one book directly devoted to the issue of hermeneutics—The New 
Hermeneutic.4 Yet, this work, while dealing with the New Hermeneutic of Ernst Fuchs and 
Gerhard Ebeling in particular (among others), will perhaps disappoint those looking for a more 
direct and extensive treatment of the hermeneutical issues raised—at least according to the 
standards of more contemporary work in the field.5 For example, Gadamer, who many consider a 
giant in philosophical hermeneutics, is given a mere seven page treatment, largely taken up with 
his philosophical influences (R. G. Collingwood in particular).6 Gadamer is seen not as an 
                                                          
1 Tertullian, On Prescription Against Heretics 7 (ANF 3:246). 
2 Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1969), 83-109. 
3 E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of 
Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1980). 
4 Cornelius Van Til, The New Hermeneutic (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1974). An example of a 
more indirect treatment can be found in his evaluation of Jewish interpretation of Christ and the Old Testament 
(Christ and the Jews [Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1968]). 
5 E.g., Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1980); New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1992). Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is 
There a Meaning in This Text? (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1998). 
6 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 82-88. 
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innovator, but as merely being symptomatic of deeper philosophical undercurrents—hence, his 
brief treatment. Van Til’s treatment takes on much of the same form and tenor of his forays into 
the field of apologetics. These forays demonstrate his characteristic presuppositional / 
transcendental method. In short, Van Til argued for the truth of Christianity from the 
impossibility of the contrary.7 The only ‘proof’ for the Christian position is that unless its truth is 
presupposed there is no possibility of ‘proving’ anything at all.8 God himself is the source of 
possibility, intelligibility, and applicability.9 Van Til remarks elsewhere that “unless one offers at 
the outset the totality interpretation of all reality as given in Scripture as the presupposition of the 
possibility of asking any intelligent question, one has not really offered the Christian position for 
what it is.”10 In spite of appearances, Van Til appeals to an inner-logic in his evaluation of the 
philosophical currents active in and around the New Hermeneutic. His assessment reveals a 
different emphasis, if not an expected one. Writing about his general presuppositional approach, 
he says: “to argue by presupposition is to indicate what are the epistemological and metaphysical 
principles that underlie and control one’s own method.”11 Clearly, he is engaging in this type of 
argumentation in the New Hermeneutic. Rather than arguing according to the emphases as 
dictated by hermeneutical philosophy, it is primarily the doctrine of God which drives his 
critique of such figures as Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and the New Hermeneutic. 
Macro-Hermeneutics  
                                                          
7 Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1969), 204-205; Greg 
L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1998), 6. 
8 Van Til, “My Credo,” 21. 
9 Cornelius Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture (Philadelphia, Pa.: den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1967), 
131. 
10 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 13.  
11 Van Til, Christian Apologetics (2d ed.; ed. William Edgar; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2003), 
128. “Christianity not only has its own methodology, but also that only its methodology gives meaning to life” 
(Case for Calvinism [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1979], 106).  
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 Van Til, while directing his attention elsewhere in terms of apologetic method, often 
makes macro-hermeneutical12 assertions throughout his works which have potentially vast 
implications for biblical interpretation. However, many of these implications are left unnoticed 
and undeveloped.  
Consider the following cross-section of statements scattered throughout Van Til’s works. 
First, in introducing the doctrine of God for his theology and apologetic method, he emphasizes 
that who God is precedes that God is.13 In other words, we must know something of the nature of 
God in order to discuss and reason concerning his existence.14 Hence, who God has revealed 
himself to be must necessarily affect how we think about him (i.e. ontology informs 
epistemology).15 Van Til argues that:   
Christianity offers the triune God, the absolute personality,16 containing all the attributes 
enumerated…the conception of God is the foundation of everything else we hold 
dear…For us everything depends for its meaning upon this sort of God.17 
 
All our interpretive efforts are ultimately rooted in our notion of the nature of God.18  
Second, he often emphasizes God’s pre-interpretation of all created things as they exist 
in the plan of God. Consider the following statement in his discussion of God’s omniscience: 
                                                          
12 I.e. a broader philosophical description of what constitutes understanding versus merely focusing on 
particular interpretive rules. 
13 Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (4th ed.; ed. K. Scott Oliphint; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R 
Publishing, 2008), 30; Christian Epistemology, 118. 
14 Cf. Van Til, Christ and the Jews, 4. 
15 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 55. He insightfully points out that, in the fall narrative, Satan, in effect, 
said that Eve should decide the question, ‘how do we know?’ without asking the question, ‘what do we know?’ 
(Defense of the Faith, 47). 
16 I.e. God is both absolute and personal. 
17 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 34 (emphasis mine). 
18 Cornelius Van Til, Christianity and Idealism (Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1955), 85. 
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God’s knowledge of the facts19 comes first. God knows or interprets the facts before they 
are facts. It is God’s plan or his comprehensive interpretation of the facts that makes the 
facts what they are.20 
 
The category of interpretation precedes existence. In other words, for God, interpretation 
precedes creation. The reality of God’s pre-interpretation of all things necessarily makes man’s 
interpretation, “correspond to the interpretation of God…our thought is receptively 
reconstructive” of God’s thoughts (to be correct).21 “God is the ultimate category of 
interpretation.”22 Man’s interpretation is a response to God’s pre-interpretation. Indeed, the Bible 
needs to be interpreted by man, yet only with divine enablement (Holy Spirit) and according to 
divine pre-interpretation. Elsewhere, Van Til expresses this principle in terms of the ‘self-
attesting Christ’—“In all things, and in every field, man must live by the previous interpretation 
of Christ as God...The self-attesting Christ is the presupposition of all intelligible predication.”23 
In the words of Bahnsen, “According to Van Til only Christ can testify to himself and interpret 
His acts and words.”24 Since the fall, there are essentially two opposing interpretive principles at 
work: 
                                                          
19 Van Til generally regards a ‘fact’ in two important, but differing senses. First, in a positive sense, 
referring to created, revelatory facts pre-interpreted by God which combines both the universal and particular—
making them ultimately intelligible. Second, in a negative sense, referring to what he called ‘brute facts’— 
uninterpreted by God, man, or both—making them unintelligible (cf. Cornelius Van Til, Christian-Theistic 
Evidences [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1978], 54-58; Christian Epistemology, 1-10, 118; An Introduction to 
Systematic Theology [2nd ed.; ed. William Edgar; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2007], 37, 40; Defense of the 
Faith, 140-141, 167; Theory of Knowledge, 34-37; John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought 
[Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1995], 77-78, 180-183, 272-275, 308, 313, 314). In this particular case, he is 
referring to ‘facts’ in the positive sense.  
20 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 32 (emphasis mine). 
21 Van Til, Christianity and Idealism, 9, cf. 127. 
22 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 67. 
23 Cornelius Van Til, Is God Dead? (Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1966), 39, 41 (emphasis mine); 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: Evolution and Christ (Nutley, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1966), 32, 38, 44. By 
‘predication,’ he simply means making an assertion (attaching a predicate to a subject). 
24 Greg L. Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ: The Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” in Foundations of 
Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective (Vallecito, Calif.: Ross House Books, 1976), 237 
(emphasis his). 
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The Christian principle of interpretation is based upon the assumption of God as the final 
and self-contained reference point. The non-Christian principle of interpretation is that 
man as self-contained is the final reference point.25 
 
Human autonomy “distorts the doctrine of Scripture itself by finding the ultimate exegetical tool 
in the subjective experience of human freedom” rather than acknowledging the authority of 
Scripture and the Holy Spirit to confront the souls of men.26 The real issue is whether sinful man 
will recognize and submit to God’s pre-interpretation as original or not.  
 Third, he often speaks of the nature of Scripture in the very terms he uses to describe the 
nature of God. Rather than seeking a general concept of revelation from which to reason back to 
God, “When we seek to determine the nature of the Christian-theistic concept of revelation we 
turn again to our concept of God.”27 With a view to special revelation, for instance, he relates the 
self-attesting nature of Scripture to “the self-sufficient and self-explanatory character of the 
Triune God.”28 When setting forth a distinctively Christian epistemology concerning the 
necessity of Scripture for illuminating both the object and subject of knowledge, he states that:  
…the concepts of an absolute God, an absolute Bible, and absolute regeneration go 
together. The concept of absolute Scripture as a necessity for the illumination of the 
object of knowledge and of the subject of knowledge go together.29 
 
Tied to the absolute nature of both God and the Bible is the absolute authority with which God 
speaks to us in and through Scripture. Van Til is quick to point out that dealing with an absolute 
authority necessarily involves ‘circular’ or ‘spiral’ reasoning on man’s part.30 Interestingly, this 
creates a situation which parallels discussion in contemporary hermeneutics concerning the 
‘hermeneutical spiral’ and the nature of reading and interpretation as a ‘dialogue.’ In terms of the 
                                                          
25 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 44; Cf. Cornelius Van Til, Psychology of Religion (Phillipsburg, N.J.: 
P&R Publishing, 1971), 145, 150. 
26 Van Til, “My Credo,” 9. 
27 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 117. 
28 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 19. 
29 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 167 (emphasis mine), 221. 
30 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 12.  
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subject-object relationship (another key issue in hermeneutics), Van Til observes that since 
nothing has “existence and meaning independently of God, it is impossible to think of the object 
and subject standing in fruitful relation to one another that they actually do unless God is back of 
them both.”31 In another place, he addresses the issue of allowing men to interpret ‘facts’ without 
God as the Achilles heel in apologetics, and argues to the contrary:  
The real issue is whether God exists as self-contained,32 whether therefore the world runs 
according to his plan, and whether God has confronted those who would frustrate the 
realization of that plan with a self-contained interpretation of that plan. The fact that 
Christians…can never do more than restate the given self-contained interpretation of that 
plan approximately does not correlativize that plan itself or the interpretation of that 
plan…the self-contained circle of the ontological trinity is not broken up by the fact that 
there is an economical relation of this triune God with respect to man. No more is the 
self-contained character of Scripture broken up by the fact that there is an economy of 
transmission and acceptance of the word of God it contains.33 
 
I will address particular emphases exhibited in this lengthy quote in later chapters, but at this 
point it is sufficient to highlight how Van Til speaks of God, Scripture, and God’s interpretation 
almost seamlessly, with a view to their unique shared quality of complete self-sufficiency, even 
as they come into contact with man and man’s interpretation. At the same time, he maintained a 
nuanced understanding of the unity and interplay between general and special revelation, both 
being revelation of the same God:   
…it is, according to Scripture itself, the same God who reveals himself in nature and in 
grace…revelation in nature and revelation in Scripture are mutually meaningless without 
one another and mutually fruitful when taken together.34 
 
                                                          
31 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 123. 
32 I.e., completely self-defined, self-sufficient, and self-interpretive, independent of creation (cf. Cornelius 
Van Til, The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1971], 74). 
33 Cornelius Van Til, “Introduction,” in Benjamin Breckenridge Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of 
the Bible (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1948), 22-23 (emphasis mine). 
34 Cornelius Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” in The Infallible Word (2nd ed.; ed. N.B. Stonehouse and Paul 
Woolley; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1967), 266, 269 (emphasis mine); cf. 266-277; Paul at Athens 
(Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1954). 
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For Van Til, both general and special revelation exhibit corresponding qualities of: necessity, 
authority, sufficiency, and perspicuity.35 As far as special revelation is concerned, these 
attributes are so important that if any were missing, we would have none of them. “The whole 
matter centers on an absolutely true interpretation that came into a world full of false 
interpretation.”36 A genuinely Christian philosophy of history must not only recognize a 
distinction between the two (general and special), but also must not separate them. Indeed, 
history is not properly self-interpreting, but rather needs special revelation (even more so, since 
the fall) in order to complement and interpret it. Again, he explicitly ties these corresponding 
attributes of general and special revelation to the nature of God who reveals both.37 God is self-
interpreting and so is Scripture.38 If Scripture was dependent upon any other principle for its own 
interpretation, then it would not be ultimately authoritative. Likewise, if God were dependent on 
anyone or anything other than himself for his own self-explanation, he would cease to be the 
ultimate authority. 
 Fourth, Van Til often speaks of the necessity of Scripture after the fall,39 with a view to 
redemptive history. Consider the following statement:    
…no valid interpretation of any fact can be carried on except upon the basis of the 
authoritative thought communication to man of God’s final purposes in Scripture, as this 
                                                          
35 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 264, 269.  
36 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 227. 
37 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 265-267. Elsewhere, he states that “…only on the basis of a world in 
which every fact testifies of God can there be a Word of God that testifies of itself as interpreting every other fact” 
(Systematic Theology, 179). 
38 Cf. Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 104-105; The Great Debate Today (Nutley, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 
1971), 33; Systematic Theology, 60; Christian Epistemology, 123; Scripture, 40; “Introduction,” 34-35. 
39 Though, in many places, Van Til follows his mentor, Geerhardus Vos in affirming the presence and 
necessity of special (verbal) revelation prior to the fall (cf. Geerhardus Vos, Biblical Theology [Carlisle, Pa.: Banner 
of Truth, 1948], 27-40; Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel [Nutley, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1977], 
69; Systematic Theology, 126; Theory of Knowledge, 30; Reformed Pastor, 69, 71; Jeffery K. Jue, “Theologia 
Naturalis: A Reformed Tradition,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics [ed. K. Scott 
Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2007], 168-170).  
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Scripture sets forth in final form the redemptive work of Christ. Every fact must be 
interpreted Christologically.40 
 
In particular, he presupposes the storyline of Scripture as the context for understanding its 
message as a whole, implying that this message functions as an interpretive lens through which 
fallen man must view interpretation in general. Interpretation must be exercised in light of the 
telos of the redemptive-historical message of Scripture.41 He urges that “Scripture must be 
interpreted in analogy with Scripture itself…all interpretation must be subordinated to Scripture 
as a whole.”42 In response to an essay by Richard Gaffin on the hermeneutical value of Vos’ The 
Pauline Eschatology, he says that after receiving revelation from God, man must submit all his 
reasoning “at every point to the teleology of Scripture.”43 Moreover, opposing the claim of 
Howard Roelofs and Jesse De Boer that the facts and redemptive-historical interpretation 
recorded in Scripture are inherently ambiguous ‘pointers’ to ‘the Christ,’ Van Til affirms that 
“Scripture gives an infallible interpretation of the events it records.”44 In the same context, he 
makes reference to the “interpretation found in the canon of the Old and New Testaments,” 
which men (like Roelofs) wrongly seek to stand above and judge by the criterion of their own 
reason.45 This speaks of a distinct canonical awareness in Van Til’s interpretive approach. 
                                                          
40 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 98 (emphasis mine). Elsewhere, in a sermon on “Christ and Scripture,” he 
argues that Christ placed “himself before the Jews as the one through whom their Scriptures alone received their 
meaning” (Cornelius Van Til, The God of Hope [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1978], 8). 
41 Discussing pre-redemptive special revelation, Van Til makes the same point that “history cannot be seen 
for what it is at any stage, except when viewed in relation to its final end” (Systematic Theology, 126).  
42 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 240. 
43 Cornelius Van Til, “Response by C. Van Til,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 243; cf. Christ and the Jews, 35. 
44 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 218; cf. Cornelius Van Til, “The Christian Scholar,” WTJ 21.2 (1959): 
172; Systematic Theology, 225. Van Til, discussing verbal inspiration, also makes mention of the Spirit’s necessary 
and authoritative role in giving the correct interpretation of the facts of redemption. He also asserts this point in 
opposition to Roman Catholic interpretation which he sees as seeking an infallible interpretation in the human 
interpreter rather than in Scripture itself (Systematic Theology, 233, 250). 
45 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 219; cf. Psychology, 148-149.  
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 Fifth, he emphasized the exhaustively personal and covenantal environment in which 
man exists and interprets.46 Likewise, God’s revelation, both general and special, is exhaustively 
personal and covenantal.47 As we shall see later, this idea is rooted in his doctrine of the Trinity, 
in which the three persons are ‘covenantally’ related.48 However, for now, consider the 
implications for biblical interpretation. For example, Van Til insists that “covenant theology 
furnishes the only completely personalistic interpretation of reality.”49 This means that a biblical 
ontology is ultimately personal and covenantal, and must inform one’s epistemological approach 
to interpreting Scripture. Hence, reflecting the Trinity, theology and hermeneutics are inherently 
ethical activities. Either one interprets as a ‘covenant keeper’ or as a ‘covenant breaker’ in 
relation to the Triune Creator.50 All of this resonates with issues in contemporary hermeneutics 
which center on whether the reader has an ethical obligation to the original author,51 and if so, 
what is the nature of that obligation?  
Lastly, and closely related to the previous category of statements, there is a persistent 
concern in Van Til’s writings that men must submit to the pre-interpreted word of God or else 
they will only mean what they want it to mean.52 He vividly brings this point home when 
discussing the room left open for human autonomy in the hermeneutics of Bultmann, Fuchs, and 
Ebeling. Ultimately, these theologians, regardless of their particular emphases, are “following 
the example of Adam…modern theologians demythologize the voice of God and reduce it to 
                                                          
46 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 176 
47 Van Til, Scripture, 24, 27, 67; Defense of the Faith, 113-114. 
48 Cf. Lane G. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God: Trinitarian Theology in the Thought of Cornelius Van 
Til,” (PhD diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 2004), 141; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 78, 96, 102; 
Theory of Knowledge, 207; “Introduction,” 28. 
49 Cornelius Van Til, “Covenant Theology,” in Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge 
(ed. Lefferts A. Loetscher; 2 vols.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1955), 1:306; cf. Christian Epistemology, 98, 100; 
Common Grace, 69-70. 
50 This is a characteristic Van Tillian depiction of the ethical antithesis between believing and unbelieving 
thought (e.g., Defense of the Faith, 257-260; Apologetics, 62-63; Systematic Theology, 161, 189, 274).  
51 E.g., Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 81, 367-378, 383, 436-437. 
52 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 75. 
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ventriloquism.”53 It is clear that his concern parallels that of many contemporary evangelicals in 
response to postmodern trends in hermeneutics.54 
Many more statements like these, appearing in various apologetic contexts, could be 
added to the list. However, my immediate concern here is not to be exhaustive, but rather 
suggestive of macro-hermeneutical trajectories in his thought. As the above quotations show, 
Van Til repeatedly made reference to the concepts of meaning and interpretation in his writings, 
albeit in ways uncommon to most contemporary treatments. 
Hermeneutical Response to Van Til  
 The general hermeneutical response to Van Til’s ideas has been lackluster to say the 
least. He has either received decidedly short and mixed reviews among some scholars, or from 
others, no review at all. Most fall into the latter category. In what follows, we will mention how 
Van Til has been spoken of and attempt to provide a succinct evaluation and response. Our aim 
here is not to be exhaustive, but to paint a picture in broad, but accurate strokes.  
 First, let us consider a few examples of those who bring Van Til’s name up in 
hermeneutic discussion, yet are quick to dismiss his relevance for one reason or another. At the 
outset of his seminal work, The Two Horizons, Anthony C. Thiselton seeks to defuse possible 
objections to his explicitly philosophical approach to hermeneutics. He argues that such an 
approach is fitting due to the wider issues that have become part of the hermeneutical 
discussion.55 Curiously, after helpfully providing examples of this significant shift, he singles out 
Van Til as one who would oppose “any attempts” at such an endeavor. While agreeing that 
                                                          
53 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 69. He speaks of a similar tendency in Western philosophy (e.g., Spinoza) 
which he labels as ‘monological’ (versus man inherently in dialogue with his Creator) (Christ and the Jews, 38).  
54 E.g., Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical 
Interpretation (2nd ed.; Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2006), 480. 
55 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 5. 
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Christian revelation must have preeminence for all aspects of life, Thiselton warns against 
rejecting philosophical categories (apparently including Van Til as a proponent of such a view) 
in New Testament interpretation.56 He argues that to borrow certain conceptual tools from 
philosophy does not necessarily entail a subscription to a philosopher’s particular worldview.57 
 In response to Thiselton, it would seem that his fears, though understandable, are 
ultimately unfounded. Even a cursory glance at Van Til’s writings reveals a thorough working 
knowledge of philosophical categories and actual use of many ‘conceptual tools,’ as Thiselton 
calls them. In particular, Van Til borrows largely from Idealism in service of his theological 
formulation—e.g., concrete universal, limiting concept, implication, and linear inference.58 One 
example of a philosophical emphasis found in Idealism which he found to be particularly helpful 
was that there needs to be comprehensive knowledge somewhere for there to be any true (partial) 
knowledge anywhere.59 He even articulates an interesting corollary to this thought related to the 
issue of ‘dialogue’ between God and man in discussing the thought of Martin Buber: “One 
cannot find signs of God’s address to man anywhere unless one finds them everywhere and 
unless one finds them as controlling the whole of history from its very beginning.”60 To be sure, 
Van Til self-consciously re-defined such terms and concepts on the basis of a Christian 
worldview, but if anything, he sought tirelessly after a comprehensive Christian philosophy, 
covering the same ground as any nuanced secular system in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, 
                                                          
56 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3, 9, 47; cf. Anthony Thiselton, “The Use of Philosophical Categories in New 
Testament Hermeneutics,” Chm 82.2 (1973): 87-100. 
57 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 10, 47. 
58 Frame, Van Til, 21. One clear example of this is found in Van Til’s unpublished essay, “Evil and 
Theodicy,” in which he explicitly borrows Hegelian terminology (overcoming “through negation of the negation to 
the affirmation”) in order to argue for both election and reprobation as means to God’s glorification (Eric D. 
Bristley, “A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til, 1895-1987,” n.p., The Works of Cornelius Van Til, 1985-
1987 on CD-ROM. 1992-2006). 
59 Van Til, Idealism, 15-16; Defense of the Faith, 65; Scott Oliphint, “The Consistency of Van Til’s 
Methodology,” WTJ 52 (1990): 27-33. 
60 Van Til, Christ and the Jews, 36. 
15 
 
and ethics.61 After all, in order to challenge unbelief at every point where it is found and function 
consistently with the precedent set in Scripture (cf. 1 Pet. 3:15; 2 Cor. 10:5), apologetic method 
must address all legitimate categories. He even defined ‘apologetics’ in the following manner, 
“…the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of the non-
Christian philosophy of life.”62 He argued that due to the comprehensive nature of what is 
involved in stating and vindicating a Christian theology, one necessarily must state and defend 
an entire Christian philosophy.63 Van Til did emphasize the antithesis between Christian and 
non-Christian thought, yet not in a way which ignored conceptual tools, but rather in a way that 
involved the very use of them. He explicitly states that it is not wrong to make formal use of 
categories of thought from any thinker.64 Van Til did not shy away from philosophy, even as he 
confronted it. Due to his extensive interaction and borrowing of philosophical terminology, he 
was often accused of following and endorsing those very schools he opposed. For example, he 
has been labeled by his critics as Kantian,65 an Idealist,66 and a follower of Kierkegaard.67 This 
at least shows that he truly engaged philosophically with differing views, even to the point of 
being accused of following them. 
 In discussing the rise of postmodernism and its impact on the field of hermeneutics, D. A. 
Carson considers various Christian apologetic responses. He mentions Van Til as coming out of 
                                                          
61 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, xiv-xv. 
62 Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 17. 
63 Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 55-56. 
64 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 57. 
65 Owen Anderson, Benjamin B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and 
Function in Apologetics (New York: University Press of America, 2005), 46, 48; James Daane, A Theology of Grace 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1954). 
66 J. Oliver Buswell, “The Fountainhead of Presuppositionalism,” TBT 42.2 (1948): 48; Cecil DeBoer, “The 
New Apologetic,” The Calvin Forum 19 (1953): 3; Jesse DeBoer, “Professor Van Til’s Apologetics, Part I: A 
Linguistic Bramble Patch,” The Calvin Forum 19 (1953): 7-12; Clark H. Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian 
Evidences,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 423; Robert D. Knudsen, “Crosscurrents,” WTJ 35 (1973):308-310. 
67 Stephen Evans, Faith Beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 
1998), 103. 
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a form of the ‘fideist’ school, which he associates with Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and more 
generally, with all forms of reformed foundationalism. He cites the classroom experience of John 
Cooper’s presuppositionalist attack on modernism as evidence of the practical futility of such an 
approach in a postmodern world. In short, Cooper’s impassioned focus on presuppositions is met 
by an unimpressed Paul Ricoeur, who merely asks Cooper to validate his own presuppositions.68 
Carson goes on to say that in light of the unique challenges of postmodernism, standard 
apologetic approaches (e.g., evidentialism and presuppositionalism) “simply do not touch the 
committed deconstructionist.”69 
 What is ironic about Carson’s dismissal of the usefulness of Van Til’s approach is that he 
proceeds to articulate a number of reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of postmodernity 
which evoke certain Van Tillian emphases. For instance, he applauds postmodernity’s concern 
with modernism’s disregard for the finitude of man and the ‘noetic’ effects of sin which distort 
data and make the data fit into our self-serving grids.70 Carson observes that both Christians and 
non-Christians are under the influence of their own interpretive communities.71 In addition, in 
the face of the New Hermeneutic and deconstructionism, he insists that true knowledge of the 
meaning of the text and intent of the author is possible, even if exhaustive knowledge is not.72 
Later, he highlights how often deconstructionists “insist on either absolute knowledge or 
                                                          
68 D.A. Carson, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 
1996), 95-96; cf. John W. Cooper, “Reformed Apologetics and the Challenge of Post-Modern Relativism,” CTJ 28 
(1993): 108-120. Carson does recognize that Cooper’s expression of presuppositionalism might not satisfy some 
presuppositionalists. 
69 Carson, Gagging of God, 96. 
70 Carson, Gagging of God, 98; cf. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 129; Systematic Theology, 56. Carson 
calls for a proper corrective to the dispassionate and impersonal approach of modernity to ‘truth’ (Gagging of God, 
101-102). This mirrors Van Til’s own concern (cf. Van Til, “Covenant Theology,” 1:306; Doctrine of Scripture, 24, 
27, 67; Common Grace, 69-70; Epistemology, 98, 100; Defense of the Faith, 113-114).   
71 Carson, Gagging of God, 126-127; cf. Cornelius Van Til, Why I Believe In God (Philadelphia, Pa.: 
Committee on Education of the OPC, 1948). 
72 Carson, Gagging of God, 102-103, 121; cf. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 65-66, 268-270. 
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complete relativism.”73 Van Til repeatedly made reference to this very point. He emphasized the 
limits of human knowledge in terms of the Creator-creature distinction.74 Without such limits, 
man either seeks to know everything or claims to know nothing. In the end, Carson wants to 
assume God’s existence from a Christian worldview and to “explore how God’s existence affects 
our understanding of understanding.”75 In doing so, he argues that from a Christian view of 
finitude, there are valid insights to be appreciated from both modernity and postmodernity, yet 
being careful not to succumb to the worldview of either one.76 These points explicitly fall in line 
with Van Til’s primary concerns in apologetics. 
 There is another striking parallel between Carson’s emphases and that of Van Til 
regarding the doctrine of God. Even in his evaluation of Descartes’ epistemological influence in 
hermeneutics, Carson underscores that the Cartesian disjunction between subject and object 
stems from not taking God into account. A view which includes an omniscient God from the 
start would understand that from God’s view, “all human beings are ‘objects,’ and all their true 
knowing is but a subset of his knowing.”77 Elsewhere, he affirms the essential relationship 
between biblical theology and systematic theology and the fact that everyone assumes a 
systematic theology (a doctrine of God in particular) as they begin to employ any method of 
theology or use of critical tools in the process. All of this affects, among other things, what data 
is permitted and on what basis it is permitted, which is also tied to the issue of authority.78 In 
discussing the bible’s plot-line and the importance of interpreting scripture according to a 
redemptive-historical framework, he highlights particular attributes of God—consciously 
                                                          
73 Carson, Gagging of God, 107 (emphasis his). 
74 E.g., Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 47-51. 
75 Carson, Gagging of God, 130.  
76 Carson, Gagging of God, 132. 
77 Carson, Gagging of God, 59. 
78 D. A. Carson, “Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: The Possibility of Systematic Theology,” in 
Scripture and Truth (eds. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1992), 77-79, cf. 91. 
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following John Frame’s emphases:79 the Creator-creature distinction,80 God as absolute 
personality,81 and the Trinity, showing God to be inherently personal.82 The fundamental “I-
thou” relationship is found in God himself.83 Citing Colin Gunton, he argues for pairing the 
ontological ‘otherness’ of God to his ‘relationality.’ God is both ‘other’ than creation and in 
crucial relation to it at the same time.84 Granted, there is much overlap here between these 
emphases, but they are mentioned with a view to combating religious pluralism.  
Three important observations can be made about Carson’s treatment. First, he brings the 
doctrine of God into an interpretive discussion, involving redemptive history and its 
contemporary hermeneutic relevance. Second, like Van Til, he argues that approaching Scripture 
depends on who God is.85 Third, his emphases happen to be very similar to those of Van Til,86 
who also was interacting with and combating unbelieving philosophy and inconsistent 
methodology, albeit in the realm of apologetics. Perhaps, Carson may have some use for Van Til 
after all.  
More recently, Kenton Sparks has brought Van Til’s name into his discussion concerning 
the relationship between hermeneutics and epistemology. He argues that there have been 
essentially two ‘modern’ responses to postmodernism among evangelicals, presuppositionalism 
and the propositional approach.87 In each case, there is an ‘epistemic optimism’ which outstrips 
                                                          
79 Carson, Gagging of God, 194; cf. John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction 
(Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1994), 34-50. 
80 Carson, Gagging of God, 194, 201, 202, 204, 223, 229. 
81 Carson, Gagging of God, 223-224. 
82 Elsewhere, he argues that God is not merely an impersonal ‘ground of being’ (D.A. Carson, Collected 
Writings on Scripture [compiled by Andrew David Naselli; Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2010], 19, 21). 
83 Carson, Gagging of God, 226-228. 
84 Carson, Gagging of God, 229. 
85 Carson, Collected Writings, 22. 
86 Cf. Frame, Van Til, 51-88. 
87 Curiously, he says in passing that both are inspired by the Common Sense realism of Thomas Reid, who, 
he argues, was more nuanced in his thought than representatives of either of these approaches (Kenton L. Sparks, 
God’s Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship [Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker, 2008], 44). However, Sparks provides no evidence in support of such a claim (especially with regard to Van 
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both the pessimism of antirealism and the optimism of practical realism. ‘Practical realism,’ 
which Sparks seems to endorse, is characterized by a postmodern awareness (e.g., value of 
tradition and limits of human knowledge), yet also by a guarded optimism.88 With regard to 
Presuppositionalism, especially of the Van Tillian variety, Sparks particularly objects to the 
notion that “the only healthy way to interpret anything is via a special hermeneutic that 
presupposes the truth of Christian belief.”89 He argues that epistemologically, 
presuppositionalists are “strong Cartesian foundationalists” in that they start with basic beliefs 
necessary to reach truth, which are supernatural gifts only available to Christians.90 In the end, he 
sees Van Til’s ideas as endorsing a view of interpretation in which God miraculously gives 
Christians success and that only they are able to provide the right interpretation.91 
Though much could be said in response to Sparks’ accusations, I will restrict my 
comments to the following. Again, we have a mixture of misunderstanding and later 
endorsement of ideas which mirror Van Til’s own. As for misunderstanding his ideas, it will 
suffice to say that Sparks has completely ignored the basis for the epistemological ideas he 
cites—namely, Van Til’s two-level ontology (i.e. Creator – creature distinction). This is an 
integral aspect of his thought which cannot be missed. It is directly related to the idea of the need 
for comprehensive knowledge in order to have true partial knowledge. Without this grounding, 
Sparks understands Van Til as setting up an unstable ‘rule’ by which man must decide between 
pure rationalism and pure irrationalism (i.e. either man knows all or he knows nothing in 
                                                          
Til). In fact, Reid’s influence appears in varying degree, consistently or inconsistently, in two apologetic approaches 
which Van Til argued explicitly against, namely ‘Old Princeton’ and that of Joseph Butler (Frame, Van Til, 134n7, 
273; cf. Jason B. Hunt, “Bavinck and the Princetonians on Scripture: A Difference in Doctrine or Defense?,” JETS 
53.2 [2010]: 330-331; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 162). 
88 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 44-47. 
89 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 45. 
90 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 45. 
91 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 46. 
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‘reality’). Ironically, this is Van Til’s persistent critique of all non-Christian epistemology, 
certainly not something he himself endorsed. In a footnote to the accusation of ‘Cartesian 
foundationalism’ mentioned above, he faults Van Til for what he sees as an inconsistency in 
claiming that we must think God’s thoughts after himself, but that we must also think 
‘analogically.’92 Sparks argues that these two are mutually exclusive ideas—either God tells us 
everything in order to think God’s thoughts after him or we think analogically, which means we 
approximate them, but do not really think them.93 However, one need not look any further than 
the immediate context of the very passage that he cites (in favor of driving a wedge between true 
and analogical knowledge) for correction. Van Til states that: 
The system that Christians seek to obtain may, by contrast, be said to be analogical. By 
this is meant that God is the original and that man is the derivative. God has absolute 
self-contained system within himself. What comes to pass in history happens in accord 
with that system or plan by which he orders the universe. But man, as God’s creature, 
cannot have a replica of that system of God. He cannot have a reproduction of that 
system. He must, to be sure, think God’s thoughts after him; but this means that he must, 
in seeking to form his own system, constantly be subject to the authority of God’s system 
to the extent that this is revealed to him.94…If one does not make the human knowledge 
wholly dependent upon the original self-knowledge and consequent revelation of God to 
man, then man will have to seek knowledge within himself as the final reference point. 
Then he will have to seek an exhaustive understanding of reality. Then he will have to 
hold that if he cannot attain to such an exhaustive understanding of reality, he has no true 
knowledge at all. Either man must then know everything or he knows nothing. This is the 
dilemma that confronts every form of non-Christian epistemology.95 
 
Sparks makes a glaring omission here. It is God alone who has comprehensive knowledge of 
creation—rooted in his exhaustive self-knowledge.96 This same God reveals truth to man in part, 
alleviating any instability in terms of man’s finite capacities. As for his contention that Van Til’s 
presuppositionalism leads to affirming that only Christians are able to provide the right 
                                                          
92 Basically, Van Til’s notion of ‘analogy’ emphasized the ontological and epistemological differences 
between God and man, based on the Creator-creature distinction. 
93 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 45n55 (citing Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16). 
94 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16 (emphasis his). 
95 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 17 (emphasis his). 
96 Cf. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 371-375. 
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interpretation, there seems to be an oversimplified ‘straw man’ present. Van Til explicitly 
recognizes that “followers of the self-authenticating Christ always disclaim infallible 
interpretation.”97 Rather, only the self-authenticating Christ has the infallible interpretation as 
God. As for his comments citing a disregard in Van Til for what he calls ‘general hermeneutics’ 
(i.e. interpretive practice, Christian or not),98 he displays a very superficial understanding of Van 
Til’s nuanced view of the unbeliever’s knowledge of God, general revelation, and common 
grace.99 Space will not permit an extensive treatment here, but in short, unbelievers cannot help 
knowing truth about God, being in the image of God and living in God’s world, and can arrive at 
truth, even if ultimately inconsistent with their own unbelieving commitments.  
Not unlike Carson, Sparks ends up mirroring Van Til’s emphases later in his discussion. 
There are two particular examples in which this is seen. First, he argues that the fall narrative 
underscores the Creator-creature distinction. The Creator alone knows all and the creature does 
not. The serpent essentially tempted Adam and Eve to subvert this distinction, which has 
important implications for epistemology and hermeneutics.100 Indeed, the fall narrative functions 
significantly in Van Til’s works, as he sees this as the origin of all unbelieving epistemology, 
especially in light of the Creator-creature distinction.101 However, as Sparks nuances certain 
implications of the fall for epistemology, he also diverges from Van Til at certain key points.102 
                                                          
97 Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 145. 
98 This is Sparks’ definition. 
99 Cf. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 190-199; Common Grace, 5; Systematic Theology, 117-189; Greg L. 
Bahnsen, “The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional Apologetics,” WTJ 57 (1995): 1-31; Van Til’s 
Apologetic, 442-460. For example, using a helpful and creative illustration, Van Til refers to the unbeliever’s 
faculties functioning like a ‘buzz saw’—which may work efficiently, but in the wrong direction, making faulty use 
of his created equipment (Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 97, 105). 
100 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 49. 
101 E.g., Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 47-49; Christian Epistemology, 20-23; Defense of the Faith, 36-37; 
Christian Apologetics, 33-34, 42-43, 79, 154-155. 
102 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 49-50. For instance, Sparks exaggerates what Adam and Eve did 
not know and seems to confuse finitude with sin. The latter confusion is expressed in saying that, “only an infinite 
being—God himself—is able to perceive reality without distortion…our epistemological success is limited by 
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However, he at least sees the need to consider these issues in relation to epistemology and hence, 
interpretation. Second, he emphasizes that man, being in the image of God, has the ability to 
‘succeed’ as an interpreter. This seems to mirror Van Til’s notion of analogy, though again, not 
without its divergences.103 However, Sparks’ rightful concern for man’s ability to have 
interpretive success is plagued by confusing finitude with sin and rooting epistemology in the 
reliability and probability of man to get things right, even if imperfectly so. While Sparks 
exhibits obvious misconceptions regarding Van Til’s epistemology, he does show concern for 
issues he sees as having an important relation to hermeneutics, which mirror Van Til’s own. 
 Our brief survey of Thiselton, Carson, and Sparks’ interactions with Van Til has 
ironically highlighted his relevance for contemporary hermeneutics rather than providing reasons 
for his dismissal. Rather than succeeding in downplaying his relevance, each has actually opened 
the door for a further investigation into it.  
 There are others, however, who have seen the positive relevance of Van Til for 
hermeneutics and have explicitly mentioned him in their work. Rather than proceeding in a 
chronological fashion, we will begin with those who give indirect, passing attention and then 
progress to those who give more direct attention. 
 D. Clair Davis, in an essay on inerrancy and Westminster Calvinism, argues that Van Til 
brought a helpful shift in apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary, from focusing 
merely on detailed refutation of liberalism to a focus on the integrity of a Christian methodology. 
This is due to Van Til’s self-conscious aligning of method with theology—specifically, God as 
                                                          
finitude” (God’s Word in Human Words, 50). This raises questions concerning what is epistemological ‘success’ for 
finite man and whether man’s thinking is inherently distorted due to his finitude. 
103 Sparks, God’s Word in Human Words, 50-51. This seems to contradict his earlier dismissal of Van Til’s 
concept of analogy (cf. God’s Word in Human Words, 45n55).  
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Creator.104 While no theological model can exhaust the revelation of the Triune God, our model 
and method should seek to approximate God’s ‘system’ set forth in Scripture. He specifically 
cites John Frame, Vern Poythress, Edmund Clowney, and Richard Gaffin as deriving from Van 
Til’s theological emphases and methodology, and expanding their application beyond his own 
scope, including hermeneutics. For example, Gaffin delves into Berkouwer’s criticism of Van 
Til’s lack of exegesis by providing explicit exegetical support for the latter’s emphases in 
epistemology, which have significant implications for interpretation.105 This coincides with the 
fact that while Princeton and Westminster’s focus was on the doctrine of Scripture, the current 
focus has become biblical hermeneutics. He suggests that Van Til would have welcomed this 
shift and applied his distinctive approach accordingly.106   
 Vanhoozer, a key contributor to the current hermeneutical discussion, mentions Van Til 
briefly in an essay on the interplay between theology and hermeneutics in interpreting not only 
the Bible, but culture.107 He apparently commends Van Til for stressing that “created reality does 
not exist as brute, uninterpreted fact…it is already meaningful because it is interpreted by 
God.”108 Hence, the task of the human interpreter is to “think God’s thoughts after him.”109 After 
such an endorsement, it is surprising that he makes no further mention of Van Til. This is even 
more peculiar as he proceeds to discuss such topics as presuppositions and conflicting 
worldviews, even concluding his discussion with the observation that “culture is the fruit of a 
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theology or worldview.”110 Whatever the reasons for not giving Van Til a more prominent place 
in the dialogue,111 Vanhoozer does employ a few important ideas in Van Til’s thought in service 
of the interplay between theology and hermeneutics.112 
 Richard Pratt mentions Van Til when discussing the personal dimension of interpretation. 
Elsewhere, he more explicitly endorses Van Til’s approach to apologetics,113 but here, in this 
context, he is very brief.114 However, what he speaks of is significant. Earlier he had argued that 
sanctification and interpretation are interdependent.115 In the midst of that discussion, Pratt says 
that we must “‘think God’s thoughts after Him’ if we are to interpret properly.”116 In other 
words, sanctification involves not only our behavior and emotions, but our thinking as well.117 
His direct mention of Van Til expands on this earlier reference in the form of a quotation 
summarizing the point that our whole being (mind, emotions, and will) must be in submission to 
God in a manner of consistency found in God himself.118 Man’s interpretation of Scripture 
involves applying it to our whole existence. This holistic thrust is in keeping with contemporary 
                                                          
110 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 326. 
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Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology [3 vols.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1973], 2:99-101, 244; 3:16, 35-36). 
118 Pratt, He Gave Us Stories, 395; cf. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 387. 
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hermeneutical concern for both the horizon of the text and of the interpreter as it relates to 
meaning.      
Michael Horton discusses the legacy of Van Til’s apologetic in terms of the present 
context of postmodernism. He highlights Van Til’s all-encompassing vision which governs our 
view of reality (ontology) and our access to it (epistemology).119 He applauds Van Til’s 
emphasis on a covenantal epistemology which shows that the deep problems of apologetics “are 
not final intellectual, but ethical.”120 Horton sees these points to be especially relevant to a 
contemporary situation where rationalism and empiricism have crumbled. Postmodernity has 
now adopted the ‘myth of neutrality’ as a by-word and assumed the stance of truly coming to 
grips with ‘horizons,’ ‘language games,’ and ‘paradigms.’ One will recognize these terms as 
regular verbiage in contemporary hermeneutics. In Horton’s opinion, Van Til’s approach is 
uniquely equipped to deal more adequately with such issues, and to confront the ethical rebellion 
lurking behind unbiblical notions of them.121 
More directly, albeit much more briefly, William Edgar introduces the second edition of 
Van Til’s Christian Apologetics with the call for not only providing more detailed applications of 
Van Til’s pioneering work, but also to apply his thought to other fields besides apologetics. In 
particular, he believes more work must be done in the area of philosophy in order to engage 
contemporary issues. He specifically asks, “How does [Van Til’s] approach work its way into 
discussion…with hermeneutical philosophies?”122 
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 In a critical discussion of Van Til’s concept of ‘analogy,’ James Emery White raises the 
question of how one is supposed to “determine the correct analogical correspondence in light of 
the subjective interpretation of the text?”123 He claims that particular weaknesses in Van Til’s 
ideas, such as a lack of clarity in knowing how and when our interpretation coincides with 
God’s, and general a neglect of the hermeneutical problem of subjective interpretation, 
contribute to endorsing an ‘infallible hermeneutic’ for the regenerate (similar to Sparks). Again, 
there seems to be some confusion present throughout his argument, evidenced by the fact that 
White at one point associates Van Til with Gordon Clark124 (an outspoken opponent of Van Til’s 
epistemology), and at other points cites and endorses accusations of ‘fideism’125 and 
‘Kantianism.’126 Regardless of these particular misconceptions, what is interesting for our 
purposes is that all of this leads White to conclude: “Put simply, Van Til leaves no room in his 
concept of truth for the serious hermeneutical issues his system generates.”127 Even if White 
ultimately disagrees with Van Til’s system, and his ability to provide adequate answers for the 
‘issues’ raised by it, there remains at least the acknowledgment of its relevance for hermeneutics. 
 J. I. Packer, in an essay for Van Til’s festschrift, speaks of the inherent relations between 
biblical authority, inerrancy, and hermeneutics. He observes that “it appears also from the fact 
that every hermeneutic implies a theology…where a false hermeneutic operates the Bible will 
not in fact have authority, whatever is claimed to the contrary.”128 This observation clearly 
parallels Van Til’s own insistence upon apologetic method assuming either the truth or the falsity 
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of Christian theism as its starting point.129 More specifically, “every bit of exegesis of Scripture 
already involves a view of the nature of Scripture.”130 Packer laments the tendency of latter-day 
evangelical separation of interpretive principles and the conditions and means of 
understanding.131 Again there is a similar concern in Van Til’s emphasis on deeper philosophical 
presuppositions and preconditions related to knowledge and method. 
Krabbendam, comes to many of the same conclusions Van Til does in his work on the 
subject.132 He also locates the New Hermeneutic within the larger hermeneutical stream running 
from Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Gadamer, and theologians, such as Bultmann and Barth. It is 
Krabbendam’s “transcendental appraisal of the New Hermeneutic” which particularly resonates 
with Van Til’s own critique. He sees the fundamental failure of the New Hermeneutic, and 
modern hermeneutics in general, in an assumed Kantian dualism which provides its basic 
framework.133 This nature-freedom dialectic of Kant is expressed in terms of the ‘subject-object’ 
relation (nature) and a transcendence of that relationship (freedom). There exists a fundamental 
opposition between the two realms, while at the same time a presupposing of one another. There 
is a necessary ‘subject-object’ relationship, yet that relationship must necessarily be transcended 
in order for true hermeneutical understanding to be achieved.134 The New Hermeneutic’s failure 
comes into focus amidst the backdrop of such dialecticism. It is not interested in traditional rules 
or techniques of interpretation because such are merely carried out in the realm of nature. 
Epistemologically, it seeks understanding in the non-objectifiable realm of freedom. Yet no 
matter how much they try to achieve such understanding via the so-called ‘language event,’ 
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objectifying assertions remain inescapable. True understanding remains a perpetual mirage. It 
allows higher critical methods to have the final authority in the nature realm regarding Scripture, 
and assumes that the language of the Bible is “metaphysically deficient,” failing to transcend 
objectification (i.e. the language of Scripture is inadequate and incapable of expressing its own 
subject matter). Seeking to bridge the gap between objectifying and non-objectifying 
understanding, the New Hermeneutic only succeeds in further objectification.135 Krabbendam 
insists that it is this assumed and unquestioned dialectic which must be confronted in order to 
expose its true nature—rebellion against the God of Scripture.136 Specifically, this presupposed 
dialectic is symptomatic of fallen man in general, who seeks to interpret creation from an 
autonomous vantage point—one not in submission to Scripture, but rather one which suppresses 
it. 
It is important to note how Krabbendam brings Van Til’s own critique of the New 
Hermeneutic into view, while endorsing the scope of its application beyond it. First, he seeks to 
confront a presupposed framework of metaphysics and epistemology underlying the more salient 
features. Second, he seeks to expose the unstable mix of rationalistic and irrationalistic elements 
of the dialectic which undermine its own claims and goals. Third, he identifies the New 
Hermeneutic with the ethical rebellion of the would-be autonomous man against the God of 
Scripture. He and Van Til both understand the search for the transcendence of the ‘subject-
object’ relation as a sinfully evasive move.137 Fourth, he argues that the dialectic underlying the 
New Hermeneutic is merely symptomatic of fallen man’s attempt to conceive of reality and 
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knowledge apart from Scripture. Hence, the critique leveled at the New Hermeneutic by Van Til, 
it is argued, is fit for biblically evaluating other hermeneutical approaches and philosophies.       
Bahnsen has identified a search for epistemological certainty among twentieth-century 
philosophers.138 He surveys three key figures representing the schools of both pragmatism and 
linguistic analysis: Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Austin. The latter two are particularly notable 
because of their association with contemporary hermeneutics. Wittgenstein’s concept of 
‘language games’ and Austin’s ‘speech-act theory’ have become common parlance in the field. 
None of the three is ultimately able to escape skepticism regarding certainty, because, according 
to Bahnsen, they never started with the only presuppositions fit for the task.139 After noting the 
necessity of addressing epistemological problems, justification, objectivity, and the need for a 
self-attesting worldview which will ground certainty, he turns to Van Til for clarity.140 The key 
issue boils down to the relation of the human mind to the divine mind and with respect to how 
the human mind attempts to interpret reality.141 Perhaps more pointed is the question: “which 
mind, man or God’s, is to be taken as original and epistemologically ultimate?”142 Christian 
epistemology, he argues, is “revelationally transcendental in character.”143 Bahnsen asserts that 
modern philosophy is encumbered by a ‘phenomenalism’ wherein all methods of interpretation 
have become anchored in the mind of man as an autonomous thinker, who seeks to impose order 
on an ultimately chaotic, irrational reality.144 What of Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Austin? In spite 
of helpful emphases in terms of epistemological awareness, they too are entangled in the 
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dialectical tensions between rationalism and irrationalism, leading to ultimate skepticism.145 
Clearly, Bahnsen sees a direct relevance of Van Til’s thought for broader issues which 
necessarily affect hermeneutics. 
In a different, but relevant context, Beale brings up Van Til as he interacts with Peter 
Enns concerning his book, Inspiration and Incarnation. Beale asks whether we should allow 
extra-biblical ancient Near Eastern texts to dictate the genre of Genesis or let it speak for itself. 
Beale opts for the latter, for only then can we rightly seek to understand its relation to extra-
biblical texts. He criticizes Enns’ use of these texts as a lens through which to understand the Old 
Testament, as well as his endorsement of Second Temple Jewish hermeneutics as a lens through 
which to understand the hermeneutics of the New Testament authors.146 Ironically, Enns claims 
to be coming from a “reformed, specifically presuppositional, theological, and epistemological 
starting point.”147 Beale acknowledges his own indebtedness to Van Til and argues that Enns has 
got it all backwards. Van Til would first start with Scripture and judge all things by Scripture.148 
He would seek to understand the self-interpretation of Scripture first and then judge all ancient 
Near Eastern texts and Second Temple Jewish methods accordingly. What is intriguing is that 
Van Til is considered relevant to a hermeneutical discussion of which he never directly wrote 
about.149   
 Somewhat perplexing, however, is Beale’s mention of Van Til in another, yet related 
hermeneutical context. This time he is dealing with postmodern questions regarding the New 
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Testament use of the Old Testament. Beale seeks to explain a biblical epistemology in which 
“we can sufficiently, but not exhaustively, understand the meaning of the biblical authors’ 
writings.”150 Specifically, he is responding to Moyise’s view that what is important is not 
whether the New Testament author respected the Old Testament context, but how the Old 
Testament context interacts with the New Testament context, sometimes creating new 
understandings which can redefine and distort the original context by placing it in a new one.151  
Contrary to Moyise’s subjectivist hermeneutic, Beale favor’s N. T. Wright’s “critical realism”152 
which seeks to avoid the extremes of objectivism and subjectivism.153 Beale seems to adopt an 
epistemology which is essentially based on probability and a horizontal frame of reference, 
rather than one consistently in relation to God.154 Yet, this is clearly something that he wants to 
avoid, as is evident later, when he grounds his epistemology and meaning in the transcendent 
God of Scripture.155 He then suggests that Wright’s epistemology of “presuppositional 
verification” as being very close to that of Kuyper, Van Til, and Gordon Clark, as well as the 
‘commonsense’ hermeneutical validation of E. D. Hirsch.156 The key observation to be made at 
this point is twofold. First, Beale lumps Van Til in with some strange bedfellows—namely, 
Wright, Clark, and Hirsch.157 This will become more apparent later, but there seems to be vast 
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generalization and a neglect of epistemological differences among these individuals, especially 
in relation to Van Til. Second, Beale has rightly underscored the need for a distinctively 
Christian epistemology in order to clarify and properly evaluate a key issue in contemporary 
hermeneutics (i.e. New Testament use of the Old Testament). In doing so, he brings Van Til into 
consideration, yet in a way which begs for more elaboration. Moreover, he has recognized that 
the stability of ‘meaning’ can only be found in an omniscient, sovereign, and transcendent God. 
This implies that not only do we need a distinctively Christian epistemology for hermeneutics, 
but a Christian ontology as well. 
 McCartney and Clayton have also cited Van Til favorably in their work on biblical 
interpretation.158 Much of their general approach implicitly resonates well with many of Van 
Til’s particular emphases. There is a clear emphasis on the doctrine of God and its relevance for 
interpretation. For instance, they see God’s comprehensive knowledge, among other things, as 
the ultimate solution to many of the common postmodern objections against absolute truth. Our 
knowledge is limited and partial in relation to this comprehensive knowledge, yet grounded in 
it.159 God provides the basis for interpretation which is both truly objective and subjective. God’s 
‘horizon’ comprehends all horizons in the interpretive process.160 They also emphasize both 
God’s personal nature (in terms of the ontological Trinity) and his ultimate authority in 
determining meaning.161 They clearly root the goal and method of hermeneutics in God. He must 
point us to the goal of interpretation primarily in terms of the Bible’s own interpretation of itself, 
from which method naturally flows. This involves having sensitivity to both systematic and 
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biblical theology.162 Since methods are determined by the hermeneutical goal, there is no 
neutrality in interpretation163—not just with respect to the presuppositions we bring to the text, 
but their relation to God as the determiner of the goal. 
However, they explicitly make reference to Van Til when discussing the foundations of 
understanding. Unbelievers, in seeking to make an absolute judgment concerning truth, yet 
denying the Christian system of truth found in Scripture, must essentially put themselves in the 
place of God as omniscient.164 They argue that human reason can only function effectively as a 
tool to comprehend language and other created things if it is conceived of according to the 
Creator-creature distinction. This is also rooted in how Scripture speaks of man’s constitution 
and the created world around him (Rom 1:19-21).165 When discussing the relationship between 
general and special revelation as it relates to interpretation, they argue that ‘facts’ only have 
meaning in relation to other ‘facts.’ Hence, there are no ‘brute facts’ (i.e. no fact exists apart 
from the meaning the Creator has given to it). “No fact or predication about reality can be 
known, let alone stated, without a framework of understanding.”166 Similarly, when discussing 
the underlying issue in using Scripture in evangelism, they bring up the deeper issue of 
epistemology. Any use of Scripture involves applying it to particular situations. This is a part of 
interpretation or seeking its modern meaning. They stress that we must acknowledge God as the 
self-existent, original, and complete fact which makes sense of all other created facts. God is the 
starting point for understanding and argumentation.167 Though rather esoteric at first glance, 
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these points are brought up in such practical contexts as the relationship between general and 
special revelation in interpretation and use of Scripture in evangelism. 
Moisés Silva, in two outstanding essays concerning issues related to contemporary 
hermeneutics, cites Van Til in support of a number of significant points. First, in evaluating the 
debate over whether scripture is essentially clear or obscure (and its effect on hermeneutical 
method) in the history of interpretation, Silva asserts that we must bring any hermeneutical 
approach “under the searching light of Scripture itself,” whether ‘evangelical’ or not. No matter 
how ‘scientific’ methods or tools appear, none are completely neutral with respect to faith 
commitment.168 He says this in the immediate context of the discussing the role of scholarship 
related to the historical gap between the time and culture of the biblical writers and that of the 
contemporary reader. Indeed, the bulk of the history of biblical interpretation could be described 
as an attempt to bridge this gap in terms of meaning.169 Silva explicitly mentions his influences 
here—namely, Kuyper and Van Til, both of whom insisted on the differing starting points of 
believing and unbelieving science.170 Though both types can appear to have the same general 
character, they actually move in different directions based on their assumed starting point.171 
However one seeks to traverse the historical ‘gap’ in biblical interpretation, it must be done in 
submission to scripture, as it is being traversed.  
In another essay, Silva argues that in order to apply linguistic principles to biblical 
hermeneutics, one must not only ask what the Bible says about language in general (e.g., its 
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relation to creation, sin, and redemption), but also submit to its authority.172  In other words, we 
need a meaningful framework shaped by God’s revelation in order to evaluate linguistic theories 
and methods appropriately.173 He cites both Kuyper and Van Til in support of this point, even 
quoting the latter with respect to ‘facts’ being ultimately defined in the context or system in 
which they are found—either Christian or non-Christian. Both systems claim all the facts.174 
Silva helpfully reminds us that a distinctively Christian hermeneutic should be in submission to 
Scripture even as it seeks to interpret it. A distinctively Christian hermeneutic should not rely on 
notions of ontology and epistemology in general, but rather on how they are defined in Scripture. 
 In another essay, Silva addresses the often maligned and fractured relationship between 
theology and exegesis.175 He stresses the close, mutually informing relationship between biblical 
interpretation and systematic theology. His appreciation for Calvin’s hermeneutics includes an 
awareness of common grace, which enabled him to draw from other branches of ‘secular’ 
learning, such as philology and literary analysis, and put them to use in service of interpretation 
and theology.176 He specifically cites how the Dutch tradition helpfully worked out the 
implications of Calvin’s notions of common grace, epistemology, and sin. He mentions Van Til’s 
relevance for biblical hermeneutics in three ways. First, his emphasis on presuppositions and the 
denial of neutrality has obvious value in light of contemporary concerns. Second, Van Til 
stressed that man, far from being a detached neutral observer, actually suppresses the truth in 
unrighteousness (Rom 1:18-23) and that the fallen condition finds its characteristic expression in 
seeking to subvert the Creator-creature distinction. Third, unbelievers make true intellectual 
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progress only on ‘borrowed capital’—taking advantage of the very truths which contradict their 
own unbelieving presuppositions.177  
In light of these realities, Silva argues that “it is not feasible to separate biblical 
interpretation from theology…systematics should influence our exegesis.”178 Later he says 
plainly, “my theological system should tell me how to exegete.”179 There are three important 
implications stemming from these conclusions. First, the very nature of systematic theology is 
that of contextualization. In other words, theology involves seeking to formulate the teaching of 
Scripture in ways that apply that teaching to our present context, categories, and concerns.180 
Hermeneutically, theology involves traversing the gap between what a text meant and what it 
means. Second, the evangelical presupposition concerning the unity of Scripture requires that the 
whole Bible be the ultimate context for any one part. This, of course, is based on the conviction 
that the whole of Scripture comes from one divine Author. Lastly, whether explicitly stated or 
not, all interpret the Bible with theological presuppositions. Better to recognize and evaluate 
them in light of Scripture than to proceed in a naïve fashion, blind to the exegetical assumptions 
involved in the process.181 
   So we see that in Silva’s hermeneutical considerations, Van Til’s influence can be 
detected across a number of important issues, mirroring Van Til’s own use of systematic 
theology as the basis for his apologetic method and his primary critique of other rival 
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methods.182 First, presuppositions are not only to be acknowledged and recognized, they are to 
be evaluated and used properly—according to Scripture. Also, we need biblical categories for 
understanding unbiblical presuppositions in relation to the doctrines of sin and common grace. 
Secondly, he stresses that whatever hermeneutical method is used to bridge the historical gap 
between the text and the interpreter, it must be evaluated in terms of its starting point (i.e. 
presuppositions related to ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions).183 Thirdly, 
whatever hermeneutical concepts we are dealing with, they must be defined according to the 
Christian system of truth. Lastly, systematic theology not only has significant influence on 
exegesis whether one admits it or not, it should influence.  
Graeme Goldsworthy reiterates many of Silva’s observations and extends the application 
of VanTil’s ideas in the direction of biblical theology.184 In doing so, he explicitly makes the 
connection between the fields of apologetics and hermeneutics in terms of presuppositions and 
starting points.185 He rightly points out that the varying definitions of ‘hermeneutics’ that 
scholars have offered over the years carry with them differing theological stances and 
presuppositions, which are not neutral in nature.186 Moreover, these assumptions regarding the 
key elements in communication (i.e. sender, message, receiver)187 “either directly or indirectly 
deal with the question of God.”188 Who God is affects one’s conception of the sender, the nature 
of the message, and the nature of the receiver—every important aspect of communication 
involved in interpretation. The Bible itself provides not only the proper presuppositions required 
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for a full-orbed worldview, but it also supplies its own hermeneutical principles. He recognizes 
the challenge of maintaining evangelical presuppositions amidst potentially conflicting ones 
found in modern philosophical hermeneutics.189 
What are the basic evangelical presuppositions that Goldsworthy suggests are integral to 
a biblical hermeneutic? They are essentially theological. They are best summarized by four of 
the Reformation Solas: grace alone, Christ alone, Scripture alone, and faith alone.190 What is 
even more significant, however, is that these four “really take their essential characteristics from 
God as Trinity.” None can exist without the others. They are what they are “only because God is 
the kind of God he is.” Goldsworthy particularly highlights the nature of God in terms of the 
ontological Trinity.191 He summarizes that the basic presupposition which affects the way we 
think of every fact available to us “is thus an ontological one concerning the being of God that 
establishes the ontology of the universe and every creature in it.”192 This resonates with Van 
Til’s own emphasis on the doctrine of God as the basic presupposition in developing and 
evaluating apologetic method.193 In sum, “basic Christian doctrine, then, becomes the 
presupposed basis for the evangelical interpretation of Scripture.”194 Granted, there is a 
hermeneutical ‘spiral’ involved in which presupposed doctrine influences interpretation and 
interpretation refines doctrine. Scripture, however, as God’s word, is the ultimate authority in 
this dialogue. Presupposing doctrine, argues Goldsworthy, necessarily involves the redemptive-
historical character of that doctrine in interpretation. Indeed, this is the main thrust of his book—
biblical theology is particularly suited, as a hermeneutical model, to fit the worldview of 
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Christian theism.195 At the same time, there are what he calls ‘ground rules’ for communication 
established by God, consisting of a biblical ontology and epistemology. There is an ontological 
priority of God properly expressed in the Creator-creature distinction and as Trinity. This means 
that we cannot simply set this priority aside and ignore it while engaging in interpretation. 
Epistemologically, who God is and who we are in relation to him brings both objectivity and 
subjectivity together in harmony—as opposed to one trumping the other as seen in forms of 
modern and postmodern hermeneutics. In sum, Goldsworthy has brought in Van Til’s ideas in 
service of formulating a distinctively Christian hermeneutical model. 
Vern Poythress has probably brought Van Til’s thought to its widest and most creative 
application in the field of hermeneutics. He does this in at least four main ways. First, he 
acknowledges the value of Van Til’s general presuppositional approach for hermeneutics. In 
particular, Poythress has highlighted the insights of Thomas Kuhn in the history and philosophy 
of science196 which has helpfully drawn attention to the role of presuppositions and lack of 
neutrality, paralleling Van Til’s own insights in apologetics.197 Kuhn claimed that progress and 
change in knowledge comes not through mere piecemeal addition, but primarily through the use 
of frameworks, composed of basic assumptions, standards, and values.198 These insights, if 
biblically defined, are of particular relevance in evaluating hermeneutical methodologies, such as 
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the historical-critical method,199  forms of literary criticism,200 and Speech Act theory.201 
However, he also points out that the primary subject matter is different between science 
(creation) and biblical interpretation (Creator). In the case of biblical interpretation, due to God’s 
infinity and the nature of his relation to creation, no one analogy, theory, or model could ever 
define or ‘capture’ him.202 This idea of ‘capturing’ God in a theoretical framework involves 
reducing God to the limits of creation, thereby confusing the Creator-creature distinction. 
In discussing different types of biblical theology and its relationship to exegesis and 
systematic theology, he argues that, rather than hindering, all three disciplines enrich one 
another. He mentions that Van Til and recent philosophical hermeneutics have recognized that 
“‘circularities’ are inevitable for finite human beings.” For example, exegesis necessarily 
involves making assumptions about the nature of reality and the presence or absence of God in 
the Bible. If presuppositions are inevitable, the question becomes, where are they taken from—
from systematic theology or secular philosophy? Here, Poythress expresses a distinctly Van 
Tillian concept of antithesis. The only alternative to systematic theology influencing exegesis is 
the “corrupting influence of hermeneutical assumptions rooted in human rebellion against God 
and desire for human autonomy.”203  
Besides presuppositions, other related Van Tillian ideas appear in various interpretive 
contexts. Poythress brings up his idea of ‘brute facts’ to argue that no event or reality as a whole 
exists prior to and independent from any perspective, knowledge, or interpretation of it. All 
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reality and events are ultimately meaningful to God prior to creation and hence, our knowledge 
is dependent on this backdrop of divine knowledge.204 Interestingly, this comes up in the context 
of a hermeneutical discussion of the fourfold Gospel account of the person and work of Christ. In 
another related context, the idea that there could be such a thing as ‘mere’ events of history 
“without God’s word commanding them and interpreting them” is a counterfeit illusion—
imposing our meaning upon that which is assumed to have no previous meaning.205 Historical 
investigation cannot avoid prior commitments about the nature of reality and meaning.206 The 
question becomes, which ‘god’ or metanarrative is assumed?  
Discussing God’s relationship to language, he mentions that unbelievers actually depend 
on God in order to rebel against him.207 He sees Van Til’s ideas of ‘antithesis’ and ‘common 
grace’ as helpful in making sense of the effects of sin on language and communication. The 
former refers to allegiances between believers and unbelievers, which manifests itself in 
ultimately different worldviews. The latter refers primarily to the fact that unbelievers are not as 
bad as they could be—holding onto fragments of truth, though inconsistently so (at least 
according to their unbelieving assumptions).208 Both ideas are used by Satan to endorse 
counterfeits of truth—having ‘formal’ similarity, yet meaning something very different. These 
counterfeits are rooted in and aided by a faulty view of the Creator-creature distinction, 
expressed in terms of a false transcendence (God is unknowable), false immanence (God 
identified with creation), or an unstable combination of the two. Modernism tends toward a false 
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immanence, whereas postmodernism tends toward a false transcendence, though both feed off 
one another and display an unstable mixture of both.209 
In addressing key tenets of postmodern deconstructionism, he cites Van Til in opposition 
to Derrida, who infamously asserted that, concerning meaning, “There is nothing outside the 
text.”210 Though not absolutely denying the existence of things outside a text in principle, 
deconstructionists emphasize that all we have are processed and assimilated human 
constructions. All we have access to with regard to God are such constructions. However, from a 
biblical worldview, meaning is not ultimately generated by man, but by God. God, as Creator, 
defines reality and there is no meaning that doesn’t come from God—“no existence that does not 
depend on his signifying word…we never get outside God’s meanings.”211 Here, Poythress 
explicitly employs Van Til’s emphasis on all facts and meanings of those facts being derived 
from being in relation to God and his all-encompassing plan. Indeed, there are no ‘brute facts,’ 
but only that which exists in the “text” of God’s plan.212 Ironically, deconstructionism does have 
some affinity with Van Til’s transcendental apologetic. Both are interested in critically 
examining assumptions. However, deconstructionism seeks to undermine a text through 
exposing assumptions made concerning background issues of language and thought. These 
background assumptions, it is argued, are of an unfathomable, universal nature, of which man 
cannot have comprehensive knowledge.213 Hence, these assumptions undermine explicit 
assertions made in the text. Van Til, to the contrary, would argue that the grounding of all so-
called ‘unfathomable’ knowledge is the comprehensive knowledge that God has of his creation, 
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in relation to his own comprehensive self-knowledge. Texts are only undermined insofar as the 
author (or reader), through the text, assumes an autonomous epistemological stance, independent 
of God.      
Second, he endorses his own brand of perspectivalism, which he consciously derives 
from Van Til, Frame, and Kenneth Pike.214 That said, we will focus primarily on his more 
conscious use of Van Til.  
Poythress argues for the Triune character of meaning, relying on both, Van Til’s 
formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity and his concept of analogy (based on the Creator-
creature distinction, with human knowledge as derivative, dependent, and genuine).215 Similarly, 
he emphasizes that the nature of God affects how we know him and his revelation.216 Moreover, 
Poythress, like Van Til, speaks of the nature of God and Scripture in similar terms. One may 
view the meaning of Scripture as tri-perspectival, analogous to aspects of the Trinity. He 
suggests a triad of attributes of God which reflect the diversity, relational communion, and deity 
of each person as a ‘perspective’ on the entire Godhead.217 They can be seen as corresponding to 
certain attributes of Scripture with regard to meaning: instantiational (particular text), 
associational (connections or relations with other texts), and classificational (stable meaning). 
While each person of the Trinity has all three of these attributes, each is particularly associated 
with an attribute: the Father with classificational, the Son with instantational, and the Spirit with 
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associational.218 In sum, when seeking the meaning of a text of Scripture, it is important to 
appreciate the Trinitarian qualities of it as the word of the Triune God.  
Poythress goes on to argue that various non-Christian philosophies are guilty of exalting 
one particular perspective at the expense of others. In terms of ontology, he observes that the 
realist-nominalist categories have suffered from an unbiblical exaltation of unity (tendency of 
realism) and diversity (tendency of nominalism), which are actually equally ultimate in the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, he argues for other philosophical tendencies: rationalism 
exalts the classificational aspect, empiricism exalts the instantational aspect, and subjectivism 
exalts the associational aspect.219 Each is ultimately an assault on the Triune nature of God. Van 
Til’s notion of the non-Christian rationalistic and irrationalistic tendencies is used to expose 
ontological assumptions present in unbelieving philosophy which subvert the Creator-creature 
distinction.220 He sums up his argument for Trinitarian logic by admitting and embracing its 
circularity, in accordance with Van Til.221 He uses Trinitarian logic in order to argue for it. This 
is something unavoidable in light of the ultimate authority and ontological status of the Triune 
God. There is no possibility of neutral reasoning in this respect.222 Van Til’s ontological 
emphases are used to evaluate various philosophies relevant to hermeneutics. 
Another relevant way in which Poythress applies his Van Tillian-influenced Trinitarian 
ontology to hermeneutics is through its relation to another triad—concerning verbal 
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communication.223 In redemption, the persons of the Trinity perform particular roles analogous 
to roles seen in God’s verbal communication: the Father as author, the Son as text and the Spirit 
closely associated with the reader. The practical effect is that the ultimate archetype behind all 
human communication, in terms of its key categories (author, text, and reader), is the Trinitarian 
being of God. This accounts for seeing an ultimate unity and diversity concerning all three. 
Consequently, we must avoid Trinitarian heresies present in certain conceptions of the 
communication triad. For example, Unitarianism would evidence itself in collapsing author, text, 
and reader into one ‘meaning,’ thereby stripping away the essential complexity of human 
communication. Polytheism, on the other hand, would evidence itself in multiplying meanings 
related to each aspect of the triad, thereby driving a wedge between each, resulting in at least 
three separate, potentially contradictory meanings.224     
Third, Poythress uses Van Til’s ideas in articulating the fullness of meaning found in 
biblical interpretation. Seeking to do justice to the divine meaning of Scripture, he considers the 
relationship between the God and the human authors in terms of the incarnational analogy. Just 
as in the Chalcedonian definition regarding the two natures of Christ, the human and the divine 
must not be identified or separated in terms of meaning. Ultimately, meaning is what God 
intended through the various human authors to their intended hearers.225 However we conceive 
of this complex process, we must keep the Creator-creature distinction intact when considering 
the roles of the human and divine author in the interpretation of Scripture. For example, the 
divine message cannot be ‘trimmed down’ to the limits of human reason.226 God’s speech is at 
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the same time, propositional, personal, and perspectival.227 It is rooted in God’s Triune nature 
and knowledge. 
Since the fullness of meaning is rooted in God, it follows that the meaning of Scripture, 
whether looked at narrowly or canonically, is infinite in its fullness.228 Unless this fact is 
recognized, there is a tendency toward reductionism, especially if comprehensive precision is 
sought in such areas as historical understanding,229 language, or philosophical theology.230 As we 
are confronted with the divine author at every point in interpreting the Bible, we must avoid the 
false ideal of exhaustive comprehension of meaning, either in the human interpreter or human 
author.231 Only in this way will we preserve the Creator-creature distinction. It is important to 
recall the necessity of perspectives as Poythress sees it. They are necessary because no single 
human model or viewpoint can exhaust or capture God’s intended meaning through Scripture, 
since it is rooted in his infinite self-knowledge. Multiple perspectives are needed to appreciate its 
fullness. Hermeneutical techniques do not exhaust this meaning. God is not a “prisoner of 
mechanism,” nor can he be reduced to mechanical calculation.232 After all, even the most 
apparently sterile scientific study is not mere technique, but involves many vital assumptions.233 
After surveying such modern theories of meaning as symbolic logic, structural linguistics, and 
translation theory, he concludes that reductionism is present wherever scientific ‘rigor’ 
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(undergirded by unbiblical presuppositions) is enforced.234 If human language and 
communication are intelligible only against the backdrop of intra-Trinitarian communication, 
then “the category of mystery accordingly belongs to meaning and to hermeneutical reflections 
on meaning,” and reductionistic approaches must be critically evaluated.235  
Lastly, Poythress discusses hermeneutics in terms of God’s Lordship and Christ’s 
redemption. The Enlightenment desire for neutral, self-sufficient interpretation is impossible in 
understanding the Bible’s message (or anything else for that matter). God is sovereignly and 
personally present in all interpretive endeavors. Consequently, our thoughts in these matters are 
ethically related to God, under his authority.236 “We ought to have God as the standard in 
judging all rules in interpretation.” Without his standard, our interpretation is unintelligible.237 
Moreover, his communication to us is inescapable, as it is expressed through general and special 
revelation—a point Van Til also emphasized.238 In short, our interpretation of the Bible must be 
a re-interpretation of God’s interpretation, according to his standard of that interpretation.  
A key characteristic of non-Christian hermeneutics is a denial of God as the stable source 
and standard of all aspects of the communication process, which not only contributes to 
interpretive difficulties and alienations, but also opens the door for hermeneutical idolatry.239 
Without God behind the communication process as the authority, sovereignly in control, and 
present in all, there is no way to hold its vital components together.240 Whatever approach is 
taken, there is an inevitable deification of creation, where one aspect of the communication 
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process is emphasized in order to ground the whole thing.241 By leaving God out of the equation, 
this grounding is done merely on a human level. The end result is reductionism, in which one 
aspect of the process (e.g., interpreter) is ‘deified’ as the autonomous ground of meaning, 
trumping the others. Yet, “each must fail because none can exist without the others.”242 By 
ignoring God’s role in the interpretive process, there is an inevitable blurring of the Creator-
creature distinction. However, by acknowledging God’s lordship over interpretation, one can 
avoid this tendency. The various pitfalls associated with each component in terms of success in 
communicating truth can only be established on the bedrock of the Trinitarian communication of 
God, who is infinite.243 Poythress concludes: “God’s Lordship is the necessary presupposition 
not only of the interpretation of the Bible but interpretation of all human communication.”244 
Emphasizing the redemption of interpretation, Poythress argues that Christ alone is the 
savior of the author, discourse, audience, and the hermeneutical circle. From a biblical 
worldview, interpretation cannot be separated from redemptive history. The effects of sin must 
be recognized and its solution taken seriously, even in the realm of hermeneutics. Poythress sums 
up the situation well: 
Just as there is no metaphysical interpretive standpoint free of the Lordship of God, and 
just as no moment in interpretation escapes his exhaustive mastery, so no human 
standpoint is free of the conflict of sin and redemption, and no moment in interpretation 
escapes the penetrating influence of our relation to Christ’s life, death, and resurrection. 
There is no neutrality. There is no “objectivity” even, in the sense of which 
Enlightenment rationalism dreams. The only ultimate objectivity is also an exhaustively 
personal subjectivity, namely the eternal objective fact of intra-Trinitarian communion in 
truth, power, and personal fellowship.245 
 
For both Van Til and Poythress, these theological realities necessarily direct hermeneutics. 
                                                          
241 Poythress highlights three general movements in his discussion: rationalism, empiricism, and 
subjectivism (“God’s Lordship,” 37-39). 
242 Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 37. 
243 Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 43-58. 
244 Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 63. 
245 Poythress, “Christ, the Only Savior,” 321. 
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I will close this survey of Van Til’s influence on those explicitly using his ideas in 
hermeneutics with Royce G. Gruenler. Though neither as extensive, nor as innovative in his 
application as Poythress, he nonetheless provides a fitting conclusion to our discussion. In his 
response to Krabbendam’s article on the New Hermeneutic, he affirms Krabbendam’s 
assessment and proceeds to apply what he calls “Van Til’s presuppositional hermeneutic” to 
Gadamer and representatives of the New Hermeneutic.246 In short, there is nothing ‘new’ about 
the New Hermeneutic. He describes in broad strokes what this Van Tillian hermeneutic entails. 
First, we do not impose a set of dogmatic assumptions upon ‘brute’ or unknowable ‘facts,’ 
following Kant. Rather, God has already pre-interpreted and created the facts and their relation to 
his redemptive plan in Christ. “Common grace and special grace find their union in him.”247 He 
affirms Van Til’s assessment of the New Hermeneutic, noting the value in his presuppositional 
approach—exposing the underlying assumptions being made by Fuchs and Ebeling. Various 
forms of human autonomy are detected and exposed as non-Christian. There is an “axe to 
grind”248 among non-Christian hermeneutics in which hidden agendas stack the deck in favor of 
certain interpretive outcomes. Only an explicitly Christian hermeneutic is sufficient for this task. 
Any attempt to separate one’s Christian faith from a purely descriptive, historical interpretation 
will fail to do justice to the content of Scripture. Gruenler explains:  
This is precisely Van Til’s point and the awesome challenge of his hermeneutic. Only in 
humble acceptance of God’s own special interpretation of history in Jesus Christ can one 
properly use the tools of historical research…the search for the real meaning of facts in 
the created world of nature and history can only be achieved by the aid of God’s own 
“canonical” interpretation of those facts.249 
 
                                                          
246 Gruenler, “A Response,” 575-576. 
247 Gruenler, “A Response,” 576. 
248 Cf. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 257, 302; Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 442. 
249 Gruenler, “A Response,” 587. 
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God’s self-disclosure in Jesus Christ and the inscripturated word “is his own interpretation of the 
deep grammar of nature, history, and of human existence.”250 It is paramount to evaluate 
hermeneutical method on the level of presuppositions regarding these matters, getting them out 
in the open, in order to evaluate them from a Christian worldview.  
 Elsewhere, Gruenler calls this Van Tillian hermeneutic, “Biblicial Realism.”251 He makes 
it clear that interpretation cannot be isolated from how one broadly interprets the world.252 
Macro-level concerns press in at every point. Ultimately, this involves God and his pre-
interpretation of the world. This pre-interpretation is shared among the persons of the Trinity.253 
As he puts it, “It is my conviction that hermeneutics is first of all the enterprise of God…truth-
bearing ideas are always underwritten by the reality of God.”254 Not only has Gruenler brought 
Van Til and his ideas into the hermeneutical discussion, he has also identified Van Til’s 
approach as a hermeneutic—one that has great value in effectively evaluating and diagnosing 
hermeneutical methodologies. 
Conclusion 
 Because of Van Til’s controversial reputation in some circles, he has often been 
dismissed without sufficient consideration. Therefore, it was necessary, albeit at some length, to 
demonstrate his relevance for contemporary hermeneutics for those who have tended to dismiss 
him, and for those who have used his ideas in the field. For the most part, Van Til has been 
relegated to a mere footnote in the contemporary discussion. In light of the above survey and 
evaluation, perhaps he should be allowed to have a more prominent voice. If so, what is his place 
                                                          
250 Gruenler, “A Response,” 588. 
251 Royce Gordon Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding: The Philosophical Framework for Biblical 
Interpretation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1991), 169-173. 
252 Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, xiii-xiv. 
253 Cf. Royce Gordon Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God: Biblical Faith and the Challenge of Process 
Theism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1983). 
254 Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, xvi. 
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in the current discussion? In order to establish the place where his voice can be heard most 
clearly and helpfully, we need to survey the current field. It is to this that we now turn.  
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Part One: What Does Van Til Have to Do With Hermeneutics? 
Chapter Two: Surveying the Field – Part I 
Introduction 
In order to understand the appropriate intersections between Van Til’s thought and 
contemporary hermeneutics, it is necessary to get an initial ‘lay of the land.’ What are the issues 
and gaps in the hermeneutical literature which Van Til can most appropriately speak to? 
Admittedly, this is a daunting task. The prospect of trying to engage in a large-scale analysis of 
even one aspect of the contemporary landscape, due to the complexity and diversity involved, 
according to Craig Bartholomew, is “like trying to do analysis with a club, where one requires a 
scalpel.”1 Presuming to provide a detailed analysis of contemporary hermeneutics (c. 1960 – 
present)2 would be largely reductionistic.3 Hence, our aim and scope will be tailored according 
to particular criteria. First, any mention of key figures and movements will be presented 
according to scholarly consensus regarding their thought and distinctive contributions. Subtle 
differences and variations among interpreters of such figures will only be noted if relevant to the 
discussion.4 Second, the primary focus will be on contemporary hermeneutics according to the 
degree of its influence on biblical hermeneutics. Third, the survey will be conducted with an eye 
toward Van Til’s emphases in order to make appropriate connections. In this chapter, we will 
                                                          
1 Craig G. Bartholomew, “Babel and Derrida: Postmodernism, Language, and Biblical Interpretation,” 
TynBul 49.2 (1998), 306. 
2 The boundary here, admittedly, is a bit arbitrary, considering prior influences and their bearing on the 
present-day scene. Hence, we will not restrict the discussion to only this particular period, but the emphasis will be 
on this period. 
3 For more comprehensive treatments, see: Thiselton, Two Horizons; New Horizons; Richard Palmer, 
Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969); Roy J. Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current 
Theories of Understanding (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982); Donald K. McKim, ed., A Guide 
to Contemporary Hermeneutics: Major Trends in Biblical Interpretation (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 1986); 
Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?.  
4 This does not preclude general consensus regarding significant shifts in the thought of various figures. 
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highlight particular trajectories concerning the shifting nature of how hermeneutics has come to 
be defined. 
Defining ‘Hermeneutics’ 
 One general trend present in the literature is a shift in how ‘hermeneutics’ has come to be 
defined. It must be said from the start that the terminology used and distinctions made by various 
scholars present a unique challenge. For example, more ancient writers tended to treat ‘exegesis’ 
and ‘hermeneutics’ as overlapping concepts.5 Some treat ‘interpretation’ and ‘hermeneutics’ 
interchangeably,6 while others distinguish between ‘exegesis,’ ‘interpretation,’ and 
‘hermeneutics.’7 Thiselton prefers to lump ‘exegesis’ and ‘interpretation’ together as 
interchangeable and sees ‘hermeneutics’ as a deeper-level discipline.8 Rather than getting lost in 
these various distinctions, the following discussion will concentrate on concept-level 
considerations in order to avoid confusion. 
Earlier definitions generally reveal a narrower conception in terms of their scope and aim. 
For example, Berkhof, though more nuanced than others exhibiting this earlier notion, states that 
“hermeneutics is the science that teaches us the principles, laws, and methods on interpretation.”9 
Similarly, Ramm defines it as a ‘science’ and an ‘art’—the former because it is guided by 
systematic rules and the latter because those rules are applied with a certain skill (not 
                                                          
5 Bruce Corley, Steve W. Lemke, and Grant I. Lovejoy, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive 
Introduction to Interpreting Scripture (2d ed.; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2002), 3. 
6 E.g., W. Randolph Tate, Biblical Interpretation: An Integrated Approach (3d ed.; Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 2008), 1. 
7 E.g., Merold Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation? Philosophical Hermeneutics for the 
Church (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2009), 17-26. 
8 Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009), 4; cf. I. 
Howard Marshall, “Evangelicals and Hermeneutics,” in Beyond the Bible: Moving From Scripture to Theology (ed. 
I. Howard Marshall, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Stanley E. Porter; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2004), 11-12; Richard 
S. Briggs, “What Does Hermeneutics Have to Do with Biblical Interpretation,” HeyJ 47 (2006): 55-74. 
9 Louis Berkhof, Principles of Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1950), 11. 
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‘mechanically’).10 The same focus on ‘hermeneutics’ as a set of rules for interpretation is still 
endorsed among many contemporary evangelicals, although for perhaps different reasons. For 
instance, Thomas, self-consciously relying upon two older works,11 argues for ‘hermeneutics’ as 
a set of principles which are to be used in exegesis. He does so in opposition to what he sees as 
confusion in evangelical hermeneutics due to the adoption of newer and different principles 
which unnecessarily expand its scope.12 Porter and Stovell suggest that one could divide the 
literature on biblical interpretation into two main categories—those which give step-by-step 
instruction and tools for interpretation and those which introduce a variety of methods, usually 
involving a diachronic look at the history of interpretive method.13 In sum, the general consensus 
is that earlier evangelical treatments of hermeneutics at least emphasized methodology and rules 
by which a proper interpretation of a text could be obtained.14  
 These earlier definitions do not necessarily ignore larger questions related to the 
interpretive endeavor, but they often do not explicitly state their presuppositions. These 
presuppositions function to determine what questions and what issues are considered relevant to 
the interpretive task. Many of these assumptions revolve around two key questions: Where is 
                                                          
10 Bernard Ramm, Protestant Biblical Interpretation: A Textbook of Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker, 1970), 1, 11; cf. Henry A. Virkler, Hermeneutics: Principles and Processes of Biblical Interpretation (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1981), 16; Cf. A. Berkeley Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1963). 
11 Milton S. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testament 
(1885; repr., Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1947); Ramm, Protestant Biblical Interpretation. 
12 Robert L. Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics: The New Versus the Old (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 
2002), 27; cf. “Current Hermeneutical Trends: Toward Explanation or Obfuscation?” JETS 39.2 (1996): 241-242.  
13 Stanley E. Porter and Beth M. Stovell, “Introduction: Trajectories in Biblical Hermeneutics,” in Biblical 
Hermeneutics: Five Views (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Beth M. Stovell; Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2012), 10-11.  
14 Cf. Silva and Kaiser, Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics, 17; Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 21; 
Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 19, 23; Thiselton, Two Horizons, 11; J. Julius Scott, Jr., “Some 
Problems in Hermeneutics for Contemporary Evangelicals,” JETS 22.1 (1979): 67; Iain Provan, “How Can I 
Understand, Unless Someone Explains It to Me? (Acts 8:30-31): Evangelicals and Biblical Hermeneutics,” BBR 
17.1 (2007): 2-3. 
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meaning found? What is the goal of biblical interpretation?15 These questions indeed involve a 
host of other important questions as well. For instance, what authority determines where 
meaning is found and the goal of interpretation? Earlier works on biblical interpretation tended to 
assume certain categories and distinctions to one degree or another. Such issues as the subject – 
object distinction between the reader and the text,16 meaning found in the original author’s 
intent, the goal of allowing the author to speak through the text, and readers inductively allowing 
the meaning of a text to emerge, were often assumed rather than discussed.  
In some cases, these older treatments proceeded on certain modernist assumptions and 
goals.17 This of course does not mean that in older works a modernistic agenda was pursued. 
Rather, certain criteria were assumed and seen to be consistent with a Christian approach. The 
question is whether consistency is present and to what degree. Perhaps most indicative of this 
type of thinking are those with an especially strong polemical thrust to their work, who sought to 
guard against certain pitfalls in interpretation. Two examples will suffice. In The History of 
Interpretation, Farrar argues that the history of biblical interpretation, from its rabbinic roots 
onward, is largely a sad affair, often darkening the true meaning of Scripture rather than 
elucidating it.18 He reserves his highest praise for aspects of the grammatical-historical and 
especially the historical-critical method of the Enlightenment.19 It is here that interpretation 
reaches its zenith and comes into its own, where scientific and historical precision trump diluted 
                                                          
15 Cf. William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard, Jr., Introduction to Biblical 
Interpretation (rev. and enl. Ed.; Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 2004), 6; Robertson McQuilkin and Bradford 
Mullen, “The Impact of Postmodern Thinking on Evangelical Hermeneutics,” JETS 40.1 (1997): 71; Robert H. 
Stein, “The Benefits of an Author-Oriented Approach to Hermeneutics,” JETS 44.3 (2001): 454; Goldsworthy, 
Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics, 25. 
16 Cf. D. A. Carson, Gagging of God, 64. 
17 Cf. Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996); Craig 
Bartholomew, “Post / Late? Modernity as the Context for Christian Scholarship Today,” Them 22.2 (1997): 25-38. 
18 Frederic W. Farrar, The History of Interpretation (1886; repr., Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1961), 8-9. 
For a helpful corrective to Farrar’s conception, see: Silva, “Has the Church Misread the Bible?,” 17-87. 
19 Farrar, History of Interpretation, 397-437. 
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eisegesis. Farrar’s emphasis is clearly horizontal—the level of human history and scientific 
methodology. Overall, he prefers Enlightenment methods, yet endorses Christ’s interpretation of 
the OT.20 However, are these two approaches compatible? 
More recently, Thomas has argued for ‘traditional’ hermeneutics (i.e. focused on 
propositional truth) in opposition to what he sees as postmodern subjectivism.21 In particular, he 
faults various contemporary scholars for redefining hermeneutics to include such elements as 
theological presuppositions and modern meaning. To the contrary, we must set aside any pre-
understanding of doctrine until the exegetical task is finished. He goes on to cite works on 
hermeneutics prior to the 1970’s where he sees the traditional quest for objectivity in 
interpretation—a quest similar to his own. Like Ramm, he is against allowing subjective 
considerations to become part of the interpretation process.22 With Terry, he is opposed to any 
pre-conceived hypothesis, whether it is correct or not. This would include one’s own dogmatic 
conceptions, whether or not they are seen as an essential part of divine revelation.23 He claims 
that Terry’s only assumption was that he was dealing with an inspired book.24 Concerning 
‘objectivity,’ it seems as though Thomas equates objective certainty with knowability.25 
Believers have a “divinely-enabled objectivity” via the Holy Spirit.26 According to Thomas, 
saying that neutral objectivity is nonexistent (i.e. acknowledging understanding to be subjective 
and partial) is to affirm that God is nonobjective.27 Westphal argues that this type of 
hermeneutical objectivism (which he sees running through the work of Betti, Habermas, and 
                                                          
20 Farrar, History of Interpretation, 434-436.  
21 He lays much of the blame on Thiselton’s work for endorsing such subjectivism (Evangelical 
Hermeneutics, 18, 124). 
22 Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 46-47. 
23 Cf. Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 48; Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics, 171-172, 583-584. 
24 Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 48. This, however, is no small assumption.  
25 Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 48-49. 
26 Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 53. 
27 Thomas, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 53. 
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Hirsch), seeks an ‘absolute’ in reaction to any notion of ‘relative’ which borders on forgetting the 
difference between Creator and creature.28 Throughout Thomas’ discussion, there is an emphasis 
on detached objectivity and precision, especially as it relates to the historical side of 
hermeneutics for there to be true understanding in interpretation.29 Moreover, one might add that 
even amidst such a supposedly detached approach, assumptions about the morality of knowledge 
are unavoidable. In such an enlightenment-like pursuit, doubt is considered a virtue and credulity 
a vice.30 Hence, neutrality is undermined. Granted, both Terry and Thomas are on the more 
extreme end of the spectrum. They more self-consciously exhibit certain modernist notions and 
values present in some older work in the field. 
Another highly influential work in evangelical hermeneutics is E. D. Hirsch’s Validity in 
Interpretation.31 Hirsch was a secular literary-critic32 who argued for the existence of objective 
meaning in literary works. Perhaps most significant and influential is his distinction between 
‘meaning’ and ‘significance’ and its effect on the nature of meaning and relevance for the 
contemporary reader.33 For our present purposes, it is important to point out two influential 
                                                          
28 Merold Westphal, “The Philosophical / Theological View,” in Biblical Hermeneutics: Five Views, 82. 
29 ‘Precision,’ as a concept, is highly subjective and complex (e.g., how much ‘precision’ makes it 
‘precise’?) (cf. Frame, Doctrine of the Word of God, 171-174; Poythress, Symphonic Theology, 55-68; D. A. Carson, 
Exegetical Fallacies [2d ed; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1996], 45-47). Thomas’ concept of ‘precision’ is such that 
it rules out ambiguities and perhaps even legitimate uses of imprecision in everyday language. He claims that there 
is more ‘precision’ in the bible than in everyday language use. Not appreciating this, he says, leads to a loss in 
recognition of ‘propositional’ truth. Again, ‘propositional’ is a difficult term to define when considering the 
complexities of how language is used, especially in different genres and varying levels of what is considered ‘literal’ 
and ‘figurative’ in a given context (cf. Vern S. Poythress, Understanding Dispensationalists [Phillipsburg, N.J.: 
P&R Publishing, 1993]; J. I. Packer, “Fundamentalism” and the Word of God [repr.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1974], 102-106). 
30 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning?, 23. 
31 E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967).  
32 He cites his own influences as being: Saussure, Dilthey, Husserl, Keynes, Popper, Reichenbach, and 
Schleiermacher (Validity in Interpretation, xi). 
33 Hirsch softened this distinction in later years (cf. E. D. Hirsch Jr., “Meaning and Significance 
Reinterpreted,” Critical Inquiry 11 [1984]: 202-225; “Transhistorical Intentions and Persistence of Allegory,” New 
Literary History 25 [1994]: 549-567; Dale Leschert, “A Change of Meaning, Not a Change of Mind: The 
Clarification of a Suspected Defection in the Hermeneutical Theory of E. D. Hirsch, Jr.,” JETS 35 [1992]: 183-187; 
Scott A. Blue, “The Hermeneutic of E. D. Hirsch, Jr. and Its Impact on Expository Preaching: Friend Or Foe?,” 
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aspects of Hirsch’s work. First, his stated goal is to achieve ‘validity’ in interpretation, which he 
defines as probable consensus regarding the intent of the author. This is opposed to the notion of 
‘certainty.’34 Second, his work has a strong polemical thrust, seeing anything less than an 
unchanging meaning found in the author’s intent alone as necessarily relativistic. He particularly 
takes Gadamer to task for confusing the original meaning (intended by the author) and modern 
meaning of a text.35 Hirsch’s main focus is rooting ‘validity’ in the intent of the human author 
and finding objective ‘meaning’ with definite boundaries, yet through a process of probability 
and consensus, not certainty. Lundin sees a certain irony in how evangelicals have embraced 
Hirsch’s work, with its modernist premises. “In trying to counter the rationalism and 
subjectivism that threaten their faith and its sacred texts, Christian scholars turn for aid to the 
very source of the ideas and practices they so strenuously oppose.”36 This at least raises 
questions concerning the compatibility of Hirsch’s views with a consistent, Christian 
hermeneutic. 
 How has the emphasis in defining ‘hermeneutics’ shifted in more recent years? The 
general trend has been a movement toward a more all-encompassing definition rather than 
focusing merely on rules and practical methodology. To Gadamer, hermeneutics is not a method 
for understanding but an exploration of the conditions under which understanding takes place.37 
                                                          
JETS 44.2 [2001]: 253-269). However, his earlier distinction still remains his primary influence in biblical 
hermeneutics.  
34 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, ix-xi. 
35 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 255. 
36 Roger Lundin, “Interpreting Orphans: Hermeneutics in the Cartesian Tradition,” in The Promise of 
Hermeneutics (eds. Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 
1999), 37-38n79). 
37 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming; New York: Seabury 
Press, 1975), 263; cf. Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976), 3-17.  
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Understanding always involves interpretation.38 Earlier evangelical treatments have a perceived 
lack of sophistication in light of this more recent shift. Noll observes that: 
Evangelicalism…has not regularly promoted sophisticated hermeneutics. While many 
elaborate systems are at hand for extracting meaning from the biblical text, few are 
available for understanding the interpretive constraints brought to the text, or more 
specifically the cultural presuppositions which often hide under the guise of 
commonsensical interpretive techniques.39 
 
Accordingly, many have adopted an expanded definition reflective of current philosophical 
questions. Soulen suggests that the ‘older’ definition (prior to what he calls the ‘modern’ period) 
became unworkable in light of the erosion of certain theological premises.40 He goes on to say 
that: 
In its modern form, hermeneutics seeks not merely to describe rules for appropriate 
interpretation but more basically to provide a general theory of human understanding that 
can support continued claims for the contemporary meaningfulness and possible truth of 
biblical (and other ancient) texts.41 
 
Some evangelical scholars have also followed suit, though not all would go as far as Soulen. 
Thiselton sees the root of this expanded definition to be “the recognition that historical 
conditioning is two-sided.” The text and the interpreter both stand in an historical context and 
tradition and are so conditioned by that standing.42 Following Gadamer, he concludes that the 
nature of the hermeneutical problem is shaped by this dual conditioning so that “for 
understanding to take place, two sets of variables must be brought into relation with each 
                                                          
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 358. 
39 Mark A. Noll, Between Faith and Criticism: Evangelicals, Scholarship, and the Bible in America (San 
Francisco, Calif.: Harper & Row, 1986), 179-180; cf. David H. Wenkel, “A Survey of Evangelical Criticisms of 
Protestant Fundamentalist Hermeneutics: 1994-2004,” Did (Winter 2008): 113-127; Scott, “Some Problems in 
Hermeneutics,” 69. 
40 Richard N. Soulen and R. Kendall Soulen, Handbook of Biblical Criticism (3d ed.; Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001), 73.  
41 Soulen and Soulen, Biblical Criticism, 73; cf. Werner G. Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation as Categories 
of Theological Thinking (trans. Thomas J. Wilson; Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 1986), 7; William Barr, “Theology 
as Hermeneutic,” Lexington Theological Journal 12.1 (1977): 6.  
42 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 11. 
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other.”43 Ultimately, this requires a ‘fusion’ of two horizons, wherein “the interpreter’s own 
horizon is re-shaped and enlarged.”44 For this to take place there must be an awareness of larger 
philosophical issues involved. J. B. Torrance, in his preface to Thiselton’s seminal work, The 
Two Horizons, suggests that “we cannot raise the question of interpretation without raising 
questions about the nature of knowledge, the use of language, and the scientific and ontological 
presuppositions operative in the mind of the exegete.”45 
 It may be noted at this point in our discussion that certain labels put on the various 
‘stages’ of development in the history of interpretation must be given an honest assessment in 
order to avoid caricature. This can be seen in relation to the shift in defining ‘hermeneutics.’ In 
some treatments, using the pre-modern (or ‘pre-critical’),46 modern, and postmodern schema, the 
pre-modern phase is almost invariably dismissed for lacking the sophistication of later phases. 
This criticism differs from that of Noll’s cited above in that Noll is exposing the refusal to 
acknowledge complexity, while here there is a refusal to acknowledge at least an implicit 
awareness of complexity in ‘pre-modern’ hermeneutics. Upon closer examination, this dismissal 
is unfounded. Richard Muller has objected to the term ‘pre-critical’ as a label for pre-
Enlightenment hermeneutics due to the fact that medieval and Reformation commentators were 
readily aware of and actually addressed issues of philology and context. The real issue is a 
difference over critical presuppositions, not critical method.47 Zimmerman has helpfully provided 
                                                          
43 Thiselton, Two Horizons,” 16. 
44 Thiselton, Two Horizons, xix. 
45 Thiselton, Two Horizons, xi. Cf. Christopher J. Wright, “Interpreting the Bible Among the Religions of 
the World,” Them 25.3 (2000): 49. 
46 E.g., Hans Frei, The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); 
Ellen F. Davis, “Critical Traditioning: Seeking an Inner Biblical Hermeneutic,” AThR 82.4 (2000): 750.  
47 Richard A. Muller, The Divine Essence and Attributes (vol. 3 in Post-Reformation Dogmatics; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2003), 337; cf. A. K. M. Adam, “Poaching on Zion: Biblical Theology as Signifying 
Practice,” in Reading Scripture with the Church (A. K. M. Adam et al., eds.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2006), 26. 
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a corrective to such a tendency.48 Perhaps most helpful is his point that, pre-modern theologians 
not only had worldview awareness (in terms of epistemology, ontology, and ethics), but also saw 
hermeneutics as involving the interpreter.49 In fact, Zimmerman contends that the arrival of a 
more universal scope in hermeneutics is actually “a return to interpretation as worldview 
thinking that pre-Enlightenment theology already possessed to a great measure.”50 Space will not 
permit a detailed analysis of his argument in support of these points. However, it is a helpful 
reminder that in the midst of a shifting definition of hermeneutics, recent emphases are not 
necessarily new ideas. 
 In sum, hermeneutics has generally shifted from an emphasis on techniques and 
principles of interpretation to seeking to provide a general theory of understanding. The 
implications of the latter necessarily go beyond merely interpreting texts, but touch upon all 
areas of human awareness.51  This widened scope has simultaneously brought about both 
rationalistic and irrationalistic tendencies among scholars who seek to address the Pandora’s box 
of complexity. This shift raises an important question: how can one offer a general theory of 
understanding while still exercising an appropriate humility which takes into account human 
limitations?  
Reasons for the Shift?  
  
                                                          
48 Jens Zimmerman, Recovering Theological Hermeneutics: An Incarnational-Trinitarian Theory of 
Interpretation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2004); cf. David C. Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Precritical 
Exegesis,” in A Guide to Contemporary Hermeneutics, 65-77; Daniel J. Treier, Introducing Theological 
Interpretation of Scripture: Recovering a Christian Practice (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2008), 54-55.  
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Dissatisfaction with ‘Objectivity’ and ‘Neutrality’ 
So, what accounts for this shift in defining hermeneutics? Surely, the answer to this 
question is complex and involves a multitude of factors. We will briefly mention some 
identifiable, interrelated trends that at least contributed to it. It is possible to conceive of these 
particular factors as perspectives on the overall trend. These will include ones which have both 
indirect and direct bearing on biblical interpretation. 
First, growing dissatisfaction with the overall pursuit of a detached objectivity and 
neutrality in interpretation has led to a consideration of a wider range of factors, including 
presuppositions. Unacknowledged presuppositions are actually more dangerous than those 
expressly stated. For example, in what Bartholomew calls the ‘classic liberal move,’ one sets up 
a fictitious objectivity obscuring philosophical presuppositions under the veil of neutrality which 
in turn disallows any presuppositions (at least from opponents).52 Consequently, such 
presuppositions lie outside the sphere of critique and are assumed to be necessarily true. The 
focus on ‘rules’ of interpretation was not in and of itself erroneous, but incomplete. A growing 
philosophical awareness in hermeneutics may be traced back, at least more systematically, to the 
work of Schleiermacher (notwithstanding Zimmerman’s observations stated above), who argued 
that even ‘rules’ of exegesis presupposed an answer to the question of how any understanding 
was possible to begin with.53 Moreover, an explanation of a text using ‘tools’ already involves a 
selection of those tools, which is in itself an interpretive task of understanding prior to working 
with textual ‘data.’54 In fact, Gadamer criticized Helmholtz and Dilthey for not recognizing that 
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‘scientific method’ itself is a tradition of sorts—a case of modernity invoking tradition in order to 
free us from tradition!55 The inevitability of presuppositions was captured bluntly by Bultmann, 
who said, “There cannot be any such thing as presuppositionless exegesis.”56 Poythress argues 
that this point would be made with greater clarity if certain distinctions were made. For example, 
the necessity of a reference point outside the system of analysis used in addition to reference 
points within a system. We must not merely ask, “which analysis is valid?” but “which analysis 
is useful for what purposes?...according to what standards?”57 Such considerations help to 
expose the hermeneutical situation as inherently presuppositional. 
Rather than being considered a hindrance to interpretation, many have argued that pre-
understanding and presuppositions must be embraced in order for ‘understanding’ to be possible. 
Gadamer expressed dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment ideals of a perfected, comprehensive, 
and certain knowledge which is somehow detached from prejudice or tradition.58 He goes to 
great lengths to establish that “to stand within a tradition does not limit the freedom of 
knowledge but makes it possible.”59 Gadamer was opposed to what he saw as futile attempts to 
root understanding in empathy through an imaginative ‘identification’ with an historical author 
(e.g., Schleiermacher and Dilthey) or to somehow neutralize prejudice (e.g., Husserl) in order to 
                                                          
55 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 270; Westphal, Who’s Community? Who’s Interpretation?, 83-84; Joel 
Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of ‘Truth and Method’ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1985), 258-259; cf. Gerhard Maier, The End of the Historical-Critical Method (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia, 1977). 
56 Rudolf Bultmann, “Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?” in Existence and Faith: Shorter 
Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (London: Collins, 1964), 343-344 (italics his); cf. “The Problem of Hermeneutics,” in 
Essays Philosophical and Theological (London: SCM Press, 1955), 255; History and Eschatology (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1957), 113; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (trans. J. Macquarrie and J. Robinson; Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), 191-192. 
57 Vern S. Poythress, “Analysing a Biblical Text: What Are We After?,” SJT 32 (1979), 331 (emphasis 
mine). 
58 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 185, 306-307, 324, 336, 340, 446.    
59 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 324.  
64 
 
achieve ‘understanding.’60 Rather, understanding involves using our prejudice positively.61 
Along the same lines, one could also ask the question, ‘what pre-understanding is necessary to 
understand a given text?’62 Polanyi contends that “all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit 
knowledge.”63 By ‘tacit,’ he means that which is indemonstrable and cannot explicitly be stated. 
Rather, it is based on one’s conception of the ‘nature’ of things.64 Scientific measurements are 
always tacitly personal and theory-laden.65 Coming from different angle, Voelz argues that a 
purely ‘objective’ reading is not only impossible, it is undesirable—due to the fact that an 
interpreter should understand a text in light of the expectations of the author and the assumptions 
of the text.66 In other words, if the goal is to understand the intent of the author and text, then 
there should be an awareness of the presuppositional intent as well. To summarize, 
presuppositions should be acknowledged to avoid clandestine bias, and as an unavoidable 
necessity in order for understanding to take place. It is not that presuppositions are a necessary 
‘evil’ to be overcome, but are actually required. All of this raises an important question helpfully 
highlighted by Gadamer: what are the pre-conditions of true understanding in hermeneutics? 
Historical Awareness 
Another aspect of the interpretive endeavor which undermines an emphasis on objectivity 
and neutrality is the contextual nature of interpretation. There has been growing appreciation for 
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the historical-situated-ness of both, the author or text, and the reader in which man’s relationship 
to history and the world is not as a ‘user,’ but as a ‘participant.’67 Porter and Robinson claim that 
“a study of hermeneutics, like ourselves, belongs to history—to understand means to be 
historical.”68 In earlier treatments, the historical situation of the original author(s) and text 
received much of the attention, yet to the neglect of other historical aspects. Indeed, one 
characteristic tendency of modernity is a general uneasiness concerning history and tradition.69 
As one writer put it, modernity’s approach has been “not so much out of the past, indeed scarcely 
against the past, but detached from it.”70 In other words, it sought to study historical objects of 
the past from a place ‘outside’ history. Much contemporary literature, however, is focused on the 
historical-bound reader and the question of how understanding can take place between the 
author / text and reader, both being limited by their historical vantage points. “The modern 
interpreter, no less than the text, stands in a given historical context and tradition.”71 “There is no 
privileged access to a work of literature, no access that stands outside history and outside one’s 
own horizon of understanding.”72 Any notion of a ‘timeless’ author, text, or reader is considered 
utterly naïve—labeled by one as a “view from nowhere.”73 Contrary to being a barrier to 
understanding, it is argued that one’s historical horizon provides the necessary pre-understanding 
to interpret an historical text.74  
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In light of these concerns, Gadamer’s aforementioned ‘fusion of horizons’ has become 
highly influential. In order to move toward a proper fusion, one must first engage in a distancing 
in order to do justice to the historical context of the endeavor. One must take into account the 
particularity of a text before seeking to fuse with its horizon. However, this distancing and fusing 
does not take place through detachment from the text, but in dialogue with it.75 Akin to the issue 
of presuppositions, ignorance of historical distance is tantamount to ignoring pre-
understanding.76 In Gadamer’s terminology, ‘temporal distance’ (Zeitenabstand) is not an 
obstacle to be overcome, but rather helps “the interpreter to distinguish between fruitful and 
unfruitful pre-judgments.”77 Another important concept for Gadamer is “effective-history” 
(Wirkungsgeschichte), from which the interpreter cannot escape. By this, he means “the actual 
operation of history on the process of understanding itself.”78 He explains that “understanding is 
not to be thought of so much as one’s subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within the 
process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused.”79 However one may answer 
the question of how to distinguish between the meaning of a text and the meaning of a text as the 
reader understands it, he or she cannot do so without reference to tradition and historical 
‘conditionedness.’80 The historical nature of the key components in interpretation necessarily 
expands the definition of hermeneutics. 
As influential as Gadamer’s idea of the fusion of two horizons has been in some 
evangelical circles, it has not been without criticism. Bartholomew, while commending 
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Thiselton’s shift to focus more upon broader philosophical awareness,81 provides a helpful 
corrective to his endorsement of the two horizons concept. Namely, a third horizon must be 
addressed—the horizon of God and the world as his creation.82 Similarly, McCartney and 
Clayton assert that:  
God’s horizon is totally comprehensive of all horizons, which is not to say that all 
possible meanings of texts are God’s meanings, but that the determinate meaning of any 
text is exhaustively known by him. Further, God is not mutable or bound by time, and so 
the meaning which he understands of a text is unchanging.83 
 
This ultimate ‘horizon,’ biblically conceived, would necessarily inform how the other two are to 
be understood in terms of what they are, but also how they are in relation to one another. The 
implications of God and his role in the process are far-reaching. Unfortunately, this aspect does 
not receive the attention it deserves in Thiselton’s work. He grants the possible model of 
Wolterstorff concerning divine discourse, but says that this is a different subject from 
hermeneutics. He suggests that the role of the divine author is primarily an issue of how God 
inspires scripture. Besides affirming the incarnational mystery between the divine and human 
and avoiding the analogous errors of Docetism and Arianism, there is not much else to glean 
from such consideration.84 However, it would seem unnecessarily dismissive and reductionistic 
to relegate God’s role (or ‘horizon’) in hermeneutics to acknowledging ‘inspiration’ and the 
incarnational analogy. Do not even these acknowledgements have implications for 
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hermeneutics? The nature of scripture as inspired affects how we interpret it. Considerations of 
God’s voice and intent in relation to the horizon of the human author and reader are integral to a 
proper biblical hermeneutic, not merely supplementary material to consider apart from the main 
interpretive endeavor. As Zimmerman points out, “the real question is whether philosophical 
hermeneutics can offer the radical exteriority necessary to lift the self beyond its own horizon.”85 
This ‘radical exteriority’ refers to that which transcends the two horizons and grounds their very 
intelligibility and evaluation. For all its awareness of historical complexity, there is an authority 
gap in seeking to distinguish between good and bad prejudice and ultimately between good and 
bad interpretation via a fusion of the two horizons.86 As such, the dialogue with the past neither 
ends nor reaches a state of comprehension, failing to provide leg to stand on in terms of 
evaluating divergent interpretations or ‘fusions.’ 
From what it ‘Meant’ to what it ‘Means’ 
A third factor contributing to the shift concerns the relationship between what a text 
meant and what it means to the contemporary reader. Erickson says: 
We are dealing here with what I have chosen to call the problem of getting from there to 
here: how to move from the message of the Bible in the time it was given to its message 
for today. In many ways, I think the issue of contemporizing the biblical message is 
possibly the single most important issue facing evangelical hermeneutics today.87 
 
Similarly, Vanhoozer observes that the problem that has dominated scholars’ attention in modern 
biblical studies is “how to overcome the cultural and historical distance that separates present-
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day readers from the original situation of the authors.”88 Osborne suggests that “the problem of 
interpretation begins and ends with the presence of the reader.”89 Childs argues that one key 
issue arising from such consideration is whether the bible can be anything more than an 
expression of a time-conditioned culture—whether any ancient text, for that matter, can have 
determinate meaning for the present.90  
These comments from biblical scholars mirror concerns among those in philosophical 
hermeneutics. Both have come to appreciate the relationship in terms of a dialogue between the 
past and present, between author / text and reader—using the concept of the hermeneutical 
‘circle’ or ‘spiral.’ This two-way interaction is preferred over the predominant one-way emphasis 
of earlier Enlightenment interpretation. Gadamer stresses openness as being essential in the ‘I-
thou’ relationship present in this dialogue.91 In fact, he sums up this major thread in his body of 
work by stating, “It is the Other who breaks into my ego-centeredness and gives me something to 
understand. This…motif has guided me from the beginning.”92 The interpreter must take caution 
and be willing to ‘listen’ to the author / text (‘other’) in the dialogue, without the goal of either 
horizon ‘winning.’93 For Gadamer, tradition is one main bridge which spans the historical the 
gap,94 facilitating the fusion of horizons. One implication of this is that meaning is a fluid and 
ever-evolving entity, as readers from subsequent historical contexts dialogue with the text. 
Hence, Palmer argues that “meaning is not an objective, eternal idea but something that arises in 
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relationship.”95 Moreover, meaning always transcends the intent of the original author.96 
Consequently, Gadamer can say “the artist who creates something is not the ideal interpreter of 
it.”97 Meaning cannot be reduced down to merely authorial intent or merely seeking to reproduce 
that intent in one’s interpretation.98 However, most evangelicals, even if sympathetic to 
Gadamer’s notion of dialogue, have shied away from certain postmodern conclusions based on 
it. To be fair, even Gadamer and many who follow him still claim to hold onto a form of 
hermeneutical stability and deny mere relativism.99 Yet, the question remains, how? 
For others, these assertions are unacceptable, as they provide a slippery slope toward rank 
relativism. According to Hirsch, unchanging meaning is to be isolated within the original 
author’s intent, while significance is what is in relation to the reader(s) and spans the historical 
gap.100 It is not the meaning of a text which actually spans the gap, but rather the significance of 
that meaning. As Hirsch construes it, the hermeneutical problem ultimately does not include the 
need to span historical distance, but rather is the search for the verbal meaning intended by the 
author.101 Hirsch provides an antithetical alternative to Gadamer’s view of ‘application’ (what 
Hirsch calls ‘significance’). According to Gadamer, our understanding of a text is tied to the 
questions we bring to it, which are never identical to those of the original author. Understanding 
a text entails seeing how it applies to the situation and questions of the reader. Understanding 
always involves application.102 
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It would seem that the dilemma facing contemporary evangelical hermeneutics is a 
choice between two conflicting alternatives. First, in light of the complexity of historical distance 
and its relation to meaning highlighted in philosophical hermeneutics, evangelicals can follow 
Gadamer. But in order to do so, important questions must be addressed. For example, how 
should we conceive of the meaning of a text going beyond its author biblically, as opposed to 
meaning in general? Moreover, can interpretation be biblically conceived of as including both, 
the element of production and reproduction? If meaning and application are not to be separated, 
how should we conceive of the relationship between original and modern meaning?  
Second, in light of the dangers of relativism implied by Gadamer, evangelicals can follow 
the way of Hirsch. Yet again, one must address important questions. How should we define 
‘objective’ meaning and where is it ultimately grounded? How do we access it accurately if 
separated from it by historical distance? Moreover, in the case of biblical interpretation, can one 
understand the meaning of a text if one does not know how to apply it? Does not application 
presuppose meaning and vice-versa?103 More importantly, do the nature of the bible and its own 
interpretation of itself match either of the two alternative paths with regard to these issues?   
Where is Meaning to be Found? 
Fourth, as Vanhoozer points out, there has been an identifiable shift in focus regarding 
where meaning is to be found in interpretation. He describes the shift in terms of the ‘three ages 
of criticism.’ This threefold division parallels the threefold division found in philosophy—
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.104 Although Vanhoozer treats these as separate 
chronological periods (at least in terms of pedagogical expediency), we prefer to treat them as 
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emphases to avoid overgeneralization and to acknowledge the presence of each at various points 
throughout the history of the church.105 First, meaning is sought in the intent of the author (either 
human or divine). Second, meaning is sought in the text. Third, meaning is sought in the reader. 
Incidentally, there has also been debate regarding which of the three predominately functions to 
bridge the historical gap mentioned above.106 In terms of our focus on contemporary 
hermeneutics, the latter two have received the most attention. However, all three can be 
generally detected among the key figures present in the discussion. For example, Hirsch 
emphasizes the human author,107 Ricoeur seeks meaning in the text, and Gadamer focuses on the 
reader (and the reader’s dialogue with the author / text).108 It must be noted that neither Gadamer 
nor Ricoeur deny that an author exists or has relevance, but they do affirm that meaning escapes 
the limits of the author and that the author cannot provide a determinate object.109 This shift in 
emphasis has clearly widened the scope in defining ‘hermeneutics’ to include more nuanced 
consideration of both, the text and the reader. 
It is important to note that for each one of these emphases, deeper questions need to be 
raised. For instance, what is an ‘author’ or an ‘intention’? The same question could be asked 
concerning a ‘text’ and so on. The point is that even the most basic components of written 
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communication, which are often taken for granted, involve deeper presuppositions concerning 
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Indeed, the question of where meaning is to be found is 
ultimately a theological question, as it relates to the meaning of life and humanity.110 How one 
answers these questions depends on what is assumed about the nature of reality, how that reality 
is known or cannot be known, and whether one has a responsibility in how they understand that 
reality. In each case, we are confronted with the question of whether there is meaning beyond the 
human author, text, and human reader. Is there prior meaning to be found and understood in a 
text or is it dependent upon the reader to create or supply meaning? 
Vanhoozer has argued that the particular character of this shift in focus is evident in what 
he calls the ‘aesthetic turn.’ This ‘turn’ is rooted in Kant’s fundamental dualism between the 
realms of freedom and nature, but more explicitly emerging in the twentieth century.111 Various 
movements have been identified with this shift, most notably: New Criticism, structuralism, and 
post-structuralism. Even Heidegger’s own shift between his earlier and later work, it has been 
argued,112 exhibits a microcosm of this ‘turn.’113 In biblical hermeneutics, the turn can be 
detected in some forms of Narrative Theology and literary criticism.114 In short, a text is seen as 
essentially cut off from its author in terms of meaning and historical context.115 This spirit of 
‘aestheticism’ includes “the idea that the realm of art is autonomous and self-sufficient, not 
                                                          
110 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 30; cf. First Theology, 208. 
111 Bartholomew labels this general shift as the ‘postmodern turn’ (i.e. a reaction to modernism) (“Post / 
Late Modernity,” 25-38). 
112 Cf. John Macquarrie, “Heidegger’s Earlier and Later Work Compared,” AThR 49 (1967): 3-16; 
Thiselton, Two Horizons, 327-330. 
113 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “A Lamp in the Labyrinth: The Hermeneutics of ‘Aesthetic’ Theology,” TrinJ 8 
(1987): 36-37, 43-47.  
114 Andreas J. Kӧstenberger, “Aesthetic Theology—Blessing or Curse? An Assessment of Narrative 
Theology,” Faith & Mission 15.2 (1998): 27-44; David Tracy, “Literary Theory and Return of the Forms for 
Naming and Thinking God in Theology,” JR 74 (1994): 302; Vanhoozer, “A Lamp in the Labyrinth,” 47-49; cf. 
First Theology, 207-220. 
115 Vanhoozer, “A Lamp in the Labyrinth,” 25-26. 
74 
 
susceptible to non-aesthetic standards, rules, or criteria.”116 The practical effect is the concept of 
an autonomous text, which takes on a meaning of its own, apart from its author.117 However, the 
shift does not stop with an autonomous text, but has spawned the concept of an autonomous 
reader. This is seen most clearly in certain forms of reader-response hermeneutics.118 It may be 
noted that postmodern deconstructionism aims to overthrow ‘meanings’ rather than to create new 
ones. However, one may argue that such an agenda assumes a ‘meaning’ from which it seeks to 
corroborate through attempts to show how a text undermines possible meanings attached to it. 
 Vanhoozer’s survey of these shifts highlights the morality and goal of contemporary 
hermeneutics. Rather than mere neutral, changing interests, he argues that these shifts comprise a 
series of evasive ‘undoings,’ which are postmodern reactions to modernity’s faith in objective 
reason and morality. First, there is the undoing of the author. This is tied to a suspicion of 
metaphysics, often exhibited in various forms of non-realism. Characteristic of this undoing is 
the denial “that language corresponds to some non-linguistic presence.”119 For example, for 
Saussure and Derrida,120 there is no thing signified, only signs pointing to other signs.121 Hence, 
meaning is not signified by linguistic signs in texts,122 because there is nothing ultimately outside 
texts (or at least anything able to be known intelligibly).123 This introduces a ‘gap’ between 
authorial intent and verbal meaning in which intentionality is not prior to systems of language 
                                                          
116 Vanhoozer, “A Lamp in the Labyrinth,” 26.  
117 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
118 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980).  
119 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 60. 
120 For Derrida and other postmodern figures, such as Barthes and Foucault, it is not that the author is 
categorically irrelevant, but that the author is not the sole producer of meaning in a unilateral fashion (Westphal, 
Whose Community? Which Interpretation?, 57-58). 
121 Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 115-117; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 50.  
122 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 61. 
123 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (trans. Alan Bass; Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 
280. Even if something did exist outside this system of signs, it could not be expressed via those signs. If it did, it 
would no longer be what it was, being entangled and tainted by the play of linguistic differences (Grenz, Primer on 
Postmodernism, 142). 
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nor even ascertainable by the intender.124  Perhaps most significant for our purposes is that to 
whatever degree there is an undoing of the role of the author, authority is undone.125 Even in 
Gadamer, there is a recognition that the ‘birth’ of the reader is not the death of the ‘author’—
only the death of an absolute author.126 This is an especially pertinent point. The very nature of 
the bible and its subject matter testifies to its own authority to speak to the contemporary reader 
as the very word of God—with absolute authority. 
 The undoing of the text and the reader are in many ways symptomatic of the undoing of 
the author and further shows how interconnected each is in any theory of interpretation. First, let 
us consider the ‘text.’ Thiselton has observed that “the most radical question of all in 
hermeneutics concerns the nature of texts.”127 Yet, upon deeper consideration, one cannot so 
easily isolate a theory of a text which does not at the same time imply a theory about the author 
and reader as well.128 The idea of an autonomous text is (for all its helpful consideration of 
structures, metaphor, and textual trajectories) rendered empty and undone if disengaged from 
purpose and use, which can only be supplied by persons. A ‘floating’ text cannot supply intent, 
purpose, or use. How can a text ‘speak’? If it doesn’t speak, what can be conveyed by it? The 
apparent ‘sense’ of a text turns out to be merely “the sense the words would bear had we [the 
readers] been the author.”129 Moreover, if meaning is found in the text alone, how does one 
distinguish between the surface and deep grammar of a text? For example, is the question of a 
mother to a child, ‘have you finished your homework?’ merely an inquiry regarding the surface 
fact of the situation (i.e. wanting to know so she can know when to plan on eating dinner 
                                                          
124 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 78. 
125 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 86. 
126 Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation?, 82. 
127 Thiselton, New Horizons, 49. 
128 Werner Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation, 73. 
129 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?. 109; cf. Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 172. 
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afterward)? Or is her question actually intended as an imperative on a deeper level (i.e. ‘get it 
done!’)? This distinction requires the recognition of something being done with a text. 
The reader is also undone. This is true even for those readers seeking to undo authors and 
texts. After all, isn’t undoing a form of doing?130 Yet, if authorial intent is undone and authors 
cannot ‘author,’ then can a reader act as an agent if disallowed the similar prerogative of an 
‘author’? If not, how could this act of the reader be described or understood? Moreover, undoing 
the author or text does not necessarily liberate the reader in terms of meaning. With no functional 
author, can we speak truthfully about any texts? How would we know if we did or didn’t? If the 
author ‘dies,’ what is the ‘meaning’ in a text? Vanhoozer suggests that indeed the author never 
really disappears, but rather the reader simply takes over the role.131  
These evasive shifts in hermeneutics could be seen as symptomatic of man’s sinful desire 
to preserve his own autonomy and to throw off any notion of an authority over meaning in a text, 
especially a transcendent one. To borrow a word from Van Til, underneath much of the 
sophisticated philosophical dress of postmodern hermeneutics lays a sort of ‘ventriloquism’—to 
make a text say or not say what the reader wants. For example, Fish states that “the entities that 
were once seen as competing for the right to constrain interpretation (text, reader, and author) are 
now all seen to be the products of interpretation.”132 Important questions arise. What authority 
dictates which direction the interpretive process goes? Are we to establish an interpretation using 
the given data of the text or is the text already a product of our interpretation? If so, are we to see 
ourselves as pre-interpreters of all of ‘reality’?      
                                                          
130 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 185. 
131 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 89-90. 
132 Fish, Is There a Text In This Class?, 16-17. 
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One last thing must be said with regard to Vanhoozer’s assessment. Concerning biblical 
interpretation, we must ask whether we must choose among the three main ‘autonomy’ options 
exhibited in the contemporary discussion. If our response in the face of postmodern relativism is 
to anchor autonomous control over meaning in the author (as many evangelicals have done), we 
must do so with regard to the divine author rather than merely the human author—if we want to 
avoid the same pitfalls exhibited in autonomous notions of author, text, and reader. We cannot 
presume to acknowledge a ‘godlike’ human author nor replace one with a ‘godlike’ text or 
reader.133 Pitfalls persist in each case. By giving due consideration to the divine author, we will 
begin to deal with the legitimate complexities of interpretation highlighted in philosophical 
hermeneutics, and avoid such pitfalls. 
Conclusion 
All of these factors have contributed to the shift in defining hermeneutics, as it is 
understood today. This widened scope has simultaneously brought about both rationalistic and 
irrationalistic tendencies among scholars who seek to address the complexity now opened up for 
discussion. This shift also raises an important question: how can one offer a general theory of 
understanding while still exercising an appropriate humility which takes into account both, the 
complexities involved and the limits of the finite mind? Indeed, there is a deeper issue involved, 
which has been already hinted at. It not only affects each one of these factors mentioned above, 
but drives them and their respective influence upon biblical hermeneutics. This will be the 
subject of the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                          
133 Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation?, 60. 
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Part One: What Does Van Til Have to Do With Hermeneutics? 
Chapter Three: Surveying the Field – Part II 
Introduction 
An issue related to defining ‘hermeneutics’ is how the relationship between metaphysics 
and hermeneutics has been understood. Over the years, scholars have had a ‘love-hate’ 
relationship with the discipline of metaphysics.1 Indicative of this tension is Palmer, who states 
that there is “no particular need to equate hermeneutics with onto-theology, even if there is a 
markedly onto-theological dimension in hermeneutics.”2  In other words, he sees the need for 
ontological considerations, but only as a subset of a more general concept of hermeneutics.3 
Hence, he disallows onto-theological considerations as a defining factor for hermeneutics-in-
general. In doing so, hermeneutics itself becomes a functional base ontology of sorts.4 Howard 
traces the very historical migration of hermeneutics as a discipline, from being a subset of 
theology to becoming a general ‘meta-theory’ of its own.5 There has been an acute awareness of 
the need for a ground-level, even ‘transcendent,’ foundation for making sense of the 
complexities in interpretation. Usually, this has been formulated in ontological terms or in some 
cases, ironically, anti-ontological terms. In what follows, we will attempt to trace this particular 
thread through some significant figures that have influenced developments in the field. 
Curiously, evangelical hermeneutics has often failed to articulate a distinct biblical alternative. 
                                                          
1 There is a marked lack of consensus in the history of metaphysics (cf. Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics 
[2d ed.; Dimensions of Philosophy Series; Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002], 13).  
2 Richard E. Palmer, “On the Transcendability of Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics: Questions and 
Prospects (eds. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica; Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 95. 
3 Palmer seeks to define ‘hermeneutics’ explicitly in a non-theological context (Hermeneutics, 4). 
4 Others, like J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, see biblical hermeneutics functioning within a more general and 
ultimate epistemological context—one more ultimate than the Bible itself (Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology 
[Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997], 143-145). 
5 Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics, 3. 
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The question is whether the foundation provided is sufficient, accounting for the pre-conditions 
of understanding. 
Metaphysics and Hermeneutics 
 Certainly, metaphysical assumptions have been made, even if not explicitly so, in the 
earliest discussions of what has now become formally known as philosophical hermeneutics. 
However, things really started to shift in emphasis with Immanuel Kant. He has been highly 
influential in that he articulates many of the key elements and tendencies found in those who 
subsequently sought to describe hermeneutics in relation to metaphysics. Through his noumenal-
phenomenal scheme, he preserved a notion of ‘metaphysics’ (i.e. reality in itself—the 
noumenal), while at the same time, claimed it was unknowable in the phenomenal realm.6 There 
is a reality outside of us and our experience of it, but we cannot know it as it really is in our 
experience. He positioned the categories of the human mind as necessary, universal, and 
ahistorical ‘shapers’ of raw reality (noumena) into that which can be known in experience. 
Hence, the only thing known is the ‘shaped’ reality, not reality-in-itself.7 This has important 
implications for hermeneutics. First, by setting forth a dichotomy between human understanding 
and objective reality, he introduced a gap between the interpreter’s understanding of a text and 
the objective reality behind it. Second, he saw the mind as active in imposing order upon what is 
known. He seeks to bring a priori notions (categories of the mind) together with synthetic 
judgments (investigative inquiry). In a sense, the knower is a ‘creator’ of reality (as we know it) 
via the given categories of the mind. Any notion of ‘divine’ transcendence is subordinated to 
                                                          
6 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena: To Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Present Itself as a 
Science (trans. Peter G. Lucas; repr.; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), 136; Colin Brown, 
Philosophy & the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 1968), 95; cf. Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From 
Rousseau To Rischl (trans. Brian Cozens; New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 159. 
7 Westphal, “Philosophical / Theological,” 72; Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 76-77. 
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man’s autonomous rationality.8 Third, he asks the basic presuppositional question which drives 
much of the hermeneutical discussion today in terms of ‘understanding’—what are the pre-
conditions of knowledge?9 Fourth, while Kant’s ideas are similar to Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey’s notion of the hermeneutical ‘circle’ with its a priori element, he differs in that he 
suggests it is fixed and ahistorical. To the contrary, many who endorse such a ‘circle’ or 
‘dialogue’ in contemporary hermeneutics emphasize presuppositions as necessarily historical and 
changeable.10 
It is important to point out tendencies in Kant’s notion of metaphysics which resurface in 
different ways among those with a more direct influence on hermeneutics. First, he claims to 
know that a noumenal reality actually exists, but says it cannot be determinatively or 
conceptually known in any positive sense.11 Apart from our experience, there is no objective 
validity—“without sense…without meaning.”12 This highlights an irrational side in his 
thinking—inconsistently speaking of knowing something which is unknowable, and without 
content.13 Moreover, he posits ‘transcendental’ categories in the finite mind without clearly 
affirming why or how they actually correspond to the ‘real’ world outside us, to language, or 
even where they come from.14 Consideration of noumenal concepts, such as ‘God,’ involves 
                                                          
8 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (2d ed.; trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn; New York: Everyman’s 
Library, 1978), 35; Prolegomena, 29. 
9 Kant, Prolegomena, 117; Brown, Philosophy & the Christian Faith, 94. 
10 Westphal, “Philosophical / Theological,” 72. 
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (2d ed.; trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn; New York: Everyman’s 
Library, 1978), 13, 186-188; Prolegomena, 75-76, 116-124. 
12 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 182. 
13 E.g., Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 188-191; cf. Karl Ameriks, “The Critique of Metaphysics: The 
Structure and Fate of Kant’s Dialectic,” in The Cambridge Guide to Kant and Modern Philosophy (ed. Paul Guyer; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 272-273, 283; Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy (Wheaton, 
Ill.: Crossway, 2014), 244. 
14 Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 92; Ameriks, “Critique of 
Metaphysics,” 285. 
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regulative, pragmatic concerns, not actual existence.15 Second, in one sense, his whole system is 
built upon an ultimate metaphysical scheme, but in another, he suggests that man cannot 
ultimately know anything about it. He engages in a form of ‘replacement’ metaphysics—he 
assumes his own set of ‘absolutes’ in place of traditional philosophical and theological 
metaphysics:16 limits of reason and possibility (on the authority of man’s reason),17 the 
impossibility of divine meaning,18 the impossibility of divine revelation,19 and a finite, one-level 
epistemology.20 In fact, he asserts that ‘metaphysics’ must only be considered as a ‘science’ 
within this more ultimate network of assumptions.21 One could argue that, rather than making a 
distinction between Creator and creature, Kant makes a distinction within man, in terms of 
transcendence and experience. He rightly highlights reason’s deficiencies, but does so in terms of 
the autonomous ideal of man’s reason (rationalism).22 His conception of the relationship between 
metaphysics and knowledge is precarious to say the least.  
For all of Schleiermacher’s influence on author-centered hermeneutics, it is his 
repositioning of hermeneutics as a discipline which is most significant. Ricoeur has observed that 
one of Schleiermacher’s significant contributions was a de-regionalization of biblical 
hermeneutics.23 He sought a general hermeneutic, one which treated the bible like any other 
                                                          
15 Kant, Prolegomena, 130-132; cf. Michael N. Forster, Kant and Skepticism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 34; Critique of Pure Reason, 372; Ameriks, “Critique of Metaphysics,” 279. 
16 Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy (9 vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1960), 6:432-433; 
Ameriks, “Critique of Metaphysics,” 269, 280, 284-285; Cornelius Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace: An Appraisal 
of G. C. Berkouwer’s View of Dordt (Philadelphia: P&R Publishing, 1969), 21; cf. Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 113. 
17 Kant, Prolegomena, 30-31, 78, 91, 93, 117, 129, 135, 138, 141; Critique of Pure Reason, 15, 18, 37-38. 
18 Kant, Prolegomena, 94-95, Critique of Pure Reason, 182; Ameriks, “Critique of Metaphysics,” 290. 
19 Kant, Prolegomena, 15, 27, Critique of Pure Reason, 185; cf. Merold Westphal, “In Defense of the 
Thing in Itself,” Kant-Studien 59.1 (1968): 118-141; Forster, Kant and Skepticism, 34. 
20 Kant, Prolegomena, 78-79, 130,  
21 Kant, Prolegomena, 33-34, 134, 141. 
22 K. Scott Oliphint, Covenantal Apologetics: Principles & Practice in Defense of Our Faith (Wheaton, Ill.: 
Crossway, 2013), 70.  
23 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 44; cf. Frederich D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: 
The Handwritten Manuscripts (ed. Heinz. Kimmerle; trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman; Missoula: Scholars 
Press, 1977), 28-35, 95-107. 
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book, regardless of its subject matter.24 Certainly, there is a sense in which the bible should be 
read like any other book in that it is fully human, yet in another sense, it claims full divinity. 
Hence, it should not be read like any other book. Moreover, it makes truth claims which provide 
a larger framework from which non-inspired texts should be read and understood. As a result, the 
distinction between general and sacred hermeneutics must be nuanced biblically, rather than as 
mutually exclusive categories or as merely one and the same category. Commenting on this very 
point with regard to Schleiermacher, Goldsworthy observes that “the tendency of liberalism is to 
move the whole concern of the Bible into the common arena…as merely a human book to be 
treated and interpreted like any other book.”25 It is interesting to note that Schleiermacher’s 
theological views mirror this same push for a general, common denominator which provides the 
ground for particular expressions of religious truth (e.g., Christianity). Namely, he grounds 
religion in a “feeling of absolute dependence”26—which functions as a non-objectifiable and 
innate aspect to all religious experience.27 In sum, Schleiermacher and Dilthey both endorsed 
hermeneutics as a general ‘meta-theory’ of understanding life as given in linguistic expression.28 
Rather than being metaphysically neutral, this move makes a number of important 
assumptions. One’s method assumes truths pertaining to the nature of reality which makes the 
corresponding method appropriate. For instance, Schleiermacher assumed that appeals to divine 
authorship cannot settle questions of meaning.29 Rather, he relied upon the assumed ability of the 
                                                          
24 Cf. J. I. Packer, “Infallible Scripture and the Role of Hermeneutics,” in Scripture and Truth, 355; 
Dockery, Biblical Interpretation Then and Now, 162. 
25 Goldsworthy, Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics, 126. 
26 Friederich D. E. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (eds. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart; Berkeley, 
Calif.: Apocryphile Press, 2011), 12-31. 
27 Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 28. 
28 Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics, 22; Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 79; 
Thiselton, New Horizons, 318. 
29 D. DeVries, “Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst,” in Historical Handbook of Major Bible 
Interpreters (ed. Donald McKim; Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 1998), 352. 
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reader to grasp the author’s thoughts and intent as well as or even better than the author 
himself.30 Somehow the interpreter must, along with grammatical considerations,31 project 
himself or herself into the mind of the original author through empathy of consciousness. By 
reducing sacred hermeneutics to general hermeneutics, he assumed the Bible to have a purely 
human nature, a mere record of human religious experience.32 This not only produced a radical 
subjective thrust, it reversed the place of experience in traditional theology. Instead of being the 
result of doctrinal reflection (and its ontological foundation in God who reveals truth through 
Scripture), subjective experience became the source of doctrine.33 Since meaning is primarily a 
matter of an inward, subjective state of mind, the inherent circularity of understanding between 
the interpreter and the author prevents any final interpretation. In what Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey call the ‘hermeneutical circle,’ there is always an approximation to the truth, but never 
arriving at it at any given point. Theoretically, this ‘circle’ is irresolvable in terms of its lack of 
self-evident, self-contained, and certain knowledge.34 Hence, we find in Schleiermacher an 
unstable tension between seeking an almost rationalistic comprehension of the original author’s 
mind behind the text and the realization that no final comprehensive interpretation can be 
found.35 Though we may exceed the author’s understanding, we still do not have a certain, full 
understanding. Where then is understanding to be found if not in the empathy between the 
interpreter and author? This tension is symptomatic of an assumed view of reality which 
                                                          
30 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 112; Cf. Thiselton, New Horizons, 216. 
31 Thiselton helpfully points out that Schleiermacher’s ‘psychological’ emphasis was never divorced from 
grammatical concerns. Rather, both are always present in the hermeneutical endeavor (New Horizons, 206, 232). 
32 Goldsworthy, Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics, 128. This humanistic tendency is clearly evident 
elsewhere in his writings. For example, he explains that the “attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as 
denoting not something special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute 
dependence is to be related to him” (quoted in Brown, Philosophy & the Christian Faith, 111). 
33 W. A. Hoffecker, “Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst,” in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (2d 
ed.; ed. Walter A. Elwell; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2001), 1065; Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 27.  
34 Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 102-103; Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 32. 
35 Cf. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 112; Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Development of Hermeneutics,” in 
Dilthey: Selected Writings (ed. H. P. Rickman; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 259.  
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ultimately undermines the understanding sought after. Goldsworthy sums up this tension in 
Schleiermacher: 
The problematic feature is that God and Man are seen to share a common general being. 
The real distinction between God and Man is thus muted or even lost. The subject-object 
relationship will always be a dilemma until it is re-established on the basis of this 
distinction, of Chalcedon and the incarnation, and is thus grounded in the Trinity.36 
 
Schleiermacher reduced the hermeneutical situation down to the human level, and what we know 
of God is what man subjectively projects via ‘experience’—which is more ultimate and provides 
the authority and criteria by which the Bible should be interpreted. He conceives of meaning as 
grounded not in the comprehension of God but in man. In fact, God has no explanatory 
comprehension or revealed authority over such things as our notions of objectivity, subjectivity, 
or experience (even of Him). At best, God functions merely on the same ontological level as man 
(i.e. common ‘being’) in this regard, if not totally irrelevant. Yet, man cannot ultimately 
comprehend the hermeneutical situation. On the one hand, we find a principle of rational 
autonomy in man’s subjective feelings or intuition, unbound by revelation and intelligible apart 
from it.37 On the other hand, we find a principle of irrationality in that there is no ultimate 
interpretation to be found, only a continual process in the finite realm. 
 Similarly, Dilthey claimed that there was no transcendental point from which to view 
human phenomena. Rather, the most fundamental aspect of reality is its historical nature. There 
is only historical understanding. His approach assumes only one knowable reality—history, from 
which no one worldview can be established as ultimate. There is no one, objective system of 
                                                          
36 Goldsworthy, Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics, 133 (emphasis mine). 
37 In fact, Schleiermacher focused on a general act of preunderstanding which is prior to any specific act of 
textual interpretation. In doing so, he precludes the notion of biblical preunderstanding via textual interpretation 
(Bible) as the framework through which to interpret.  
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metaphysics to discover, but only attempts to unify our historical experience.38 All claims to 
transcendent realities are mere projections from within experience. For Dilthey, in the words of 
H. A. Hodges,  
the problem of the relation between God and the world is a reflection of the problem of 
the relation between the higher and lower worlds within ourselves…God is indeed no 
more than a cipher which serves self-knowledge…a projection of inner experience.39 
  
His ultimate presupposition for knowledge is demonstrable reality (i.e. experience).40 Historical 
consciousness (or history of the mind) replaces metaphysics as traditionally understood.41 
However, he, like Schleiermacher, leaves many questions unanswered. Namely, how can 
objectivity be achieved in the midst of the relativity of man’s finite experience?42 For both 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, God turns out to be a mere figment of man’s historical, inner life—
no more than his own finite existence. This ‘reduction’ down to one level of historical reality 
leaves both with rationalistic and irrationalistic tension and incoherence.  
 Perhaps more overtly than any other figure before him, Heidegger explicitly brought 
metaphysical concerns into the hermeneutical discussion. Although esoteric and often obscure in 
style and expression, certain strains of his thought seem clear regarding metaphysics. First, 
though he is said to have been opposed to metaphysics,43 he was merely opposing a particular 
type of metaphysics—traditional Western views, exemplified by Greek thought. As Thiselton has 
observed, the much-discussed distinction between earlier and later Heidegger actually displays 
                                                          
38 Cf. Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics, 17; Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 44; Goldsworthy, 
Gospel-Centered Hermeneutics, 133; Thiselton, Two Horizons, 235-240; Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 99-103. 
This, in itself, is an objective and universal claim, inconsistent with Dilthey’s point. 
39 Quoted in Thiselton, Two Horizons, 239. 
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 196. 
41 Gadmer, Truth and Method, 203. 
42 Gadamer attributed this tension in Dilthey to his Enlightenment assumptions (Truth and Method, 203-
213).  
43 Grenz, Primer on Postmodernism, 108. Heidegger was very much taken with what he deemed the 
fundamental question of metaphysics—why are there things that are rather than nothing? (Martin Heidegger, An 
Introduction to Metaphysics [trans. Ralph Manheim; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959], 1, 83-84, 201). 
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significant continuity, with an increasing emphasis on ontology, though he perhaps goes about it 
in a different manner than in his earlier work.44 In other words, the ‘turn’ in his thought was not 
a reversal, but an intensification of his earlier ideas.45 He was opposed to ways in which an 
understanding of ‘things-in-themselves’ were sought, apart from experience. Moreover, he 
opposed traditional distinctions, especially the subject-object distinction,46 seeking rather to 
overcome and transcend it.47 He sought to understand ‘being’ itself—a fundamental ontology, 
which is prior to any theory of knowledge.48 His key concept of Dasein (“being-there” or 
‘dwelling-in’ the world)49 refers to the mode of historical human consciousness, but not as an 
object or as objectifiable.50 It provides the place and occasion for the disclosure of the being 
(Sein) of beings (i.e. a window to being in general).51 It also implies an ontological circle which 
involves a knowledge of being inherent in Dasein—man’s pre-understanding of being. 
Interpretation involves knowing something of being in advance, prior to the process.52 In 
addition, the ultimate meaning of being cannot be grasped without the consideration of time—
from the perspective of Dasein.53 The meaning and disclosure of being is prior to all subject-
object relations.54 As such, Dasein is characterized more by possibility than actuality.55 In sum, 
                                                          
44 Cf. Hubert Dreyfus, “Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault,” in 
Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, 66-83. 
45 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 328-329. 
46 Cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 157-160, 174, 187, 190.  
47 Incidentally, this is a characteristic mark in much of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics (e.g., 
Palmer, Hermeneutics, 246; Neal Oxenhandler, “Ontological Criticism in America and France,” Modern Language 
Review 55.1 [1960]: 17-23). 
48 Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 60. 
49 In Heidegger’s usage, this term is almost synonymous with ‘human being.’ His notion of ‘world’ is not 
as an object of man’s consideration, but an a priori ‘given’ with Dasein prior to any conceptualization. Hence, both 
Dasein and ‘world’ are involved in one another (Thiselton, Two Horizons, 148, 154-155).  
50 He equates any objectification with depersonalization (Heidegger, Being and Time, 73). 
51 Heidegger, Metaphysics, 9, 29; Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 63-64. This is a key distinction in 
Heidegger—between being (‘ontological’) and beings (‘ontic’) (Thiselton, Two Horizons, 147, 329). 
52 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 165-166. 
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“hermeneutics is the interpretation of the being of Dasein and an event of understanding that 
cannot be reduced to method, theories of interpretation, or an empathetic projection into 
another’s life.”56 A fundamental ontology “must be sought in the existential analytic of 
Dasein.”57 This analytic is not a method as such, but rather a way of being authentic and open to 
possibility, seeking to let being disclose itself in interpretation. In other words, being is 
ultimately self-interpreting.58 
 It is important to consider the following observations regarding Heidegger’s notion of 
metaphysics. First, there must be an appropriate method of inquiry corresponding the object of 
that inquiry. Due to the nature of Dasein, methods concerning ‘objects’ or ‘things’ (e.g., 
scientific method) will not work, for Dasein does not have ‘properties’, but possibilities.59 
Dasein is personal, not propositional in nature. In short, “thought is dependent on the reality of 
being which calls it forth.”60 Second, hermeneutics is primarily concerned with the meaning of 
being through Dasein. In his later writings, he emphasizes language as having ontological 
significance, as the “custodian” or “house” of being.61 Man must let being reveal itself through 
language by speaking and listening to it.62 Palmer summarizes that for Heidegger and Gadamer, 
“language is the ‘medium’ in which we live, move, and have our being.”63 Yet, Dasein (and 
language) is historically bound in that its essence does not precede its existence. Consequently, 
man’s interpretive stance is always historical and finite. Interpretation is always incomplete.64 
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There is no complete interpretation to be found from an independent and objective vantage-
point.65 Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle allows him to speak of truth about Dasein, as well as 
truth being “disclosed through Dasein’s self-awareness and decision.”66 We only speak about 
truth as we are ‘in’ it, not searching outside of it.67 
 The key assumption that Heidegger makes in all of this is that being (though distinct in 
terms of being which is disclosed [Sein] and being as Dasein)68 is ultimately monistic. Man as 
Dasein participates in and manifests being-in-general. Both are part of the same fabric. Meaning 
must be in terms of Dasein or it has no meaning. Though he seeks transcendence through his 
concept of Dasein, it is incoherent with other aspects of his thought. For example, is truth known 
in relation to Dasein or is all truth really about Dasein (i.e. man)?69 Moreover, how can one 
presume to know this distinction with any certainty without knowing the whole scheme of 
things? While Dasein is inherently historical, Heidegger argues that man is able to transcend 
chronological time through temporality, a mode of openness toward the past, present, and future. 
As such, Dasein is transcendent through projection toward possibility, not as objective 
actuality.70 A ‘transcendence’ which only provides possibility does not provide any certainty. 
How can one determine any meaningful notion of possibility if there is no actuality which 
provides a basis for distinguishing it from impossibility—or is possibility just a guise for mere 
chance? It would seem that Heidegger sees the need for a kind of transcendence, not only in 
order to avoid sheer irrationalism and arbitrary self-interpretation,71 but seeks it through 
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distinctions made within the same level of being.72 Another example of incoherent tension is how 
he describes being as wholly indeterminate, yet at the same time, wholly definite. It is wholly 
determinate in relation to non-being, but wholly indeterminate in itself.73 It would seem that 
between these poles, Heidegger offers a relative hope to ‘progress’ in understanding the meaning 
of one’s own being (and being in general) through making distinctions within being (e.g., 
Dasein’s orientation toward future possibilities), but without ever reaching full comprehension at 
any point.74 Man’s real being is always future being.75 This reduces interpretation down to 
knowing only our own thoughts concerning ourselves and our own existence. “Insofar as it is in 
any way understood, being has meaning.”76 That is, understood by man. More authentic 
understanding of being is achieved to the degree that it is oriented toward the possibility of 
‘death’ (i.e. non-being).77 Not only is the meaning of being sought to be understood from within 
being, it is also necessarily understood in correlation with non-being.78 Here, we see a 
rationalistic aim for man to understand being, while at the same time, needing to root its 
determinacy in the concept of non-being, which is ultimately irrational and indeterminate.79  
Van Til concludes that existential interpretation (e.g., Heidegger and Bultmann) denies 
transcendence outside of man, but still sees the need for it.80 Hence, he looks for it within 
himself (e.g., in ‘being’). On the one hand, he must make a universal negative statement about 
any transcendence outside of himself (rationalism). On the other hand, he seeks a replacement 
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transcendence concerning an ultimate reference point in man’s being as authentically free and 
open toward future possibilities (irrationalism/indeterminism) and participating in being in-
general (‘transcending’ the subject-object relationship).81 However, this ‘transcendence’ is never 
absolute, but always on its way ‘home.’ As we have seen in terms of Heidegger’s being/non-
being scheme, he seeks to explain man according to both, elements of pure fate (being) and pure 
chance (non-being).82 All of this is done not merely from a universal negative, but also from a 
presupposed negation concerning the transcendent God of the Bible and any possibility of 
revelation from outside being-in-general.83 
 Bultmann and the New Hermeneutic were significantly influenced by Heidegger’s 
thought. Here, we move closer to predominately textual hermeneutics. Bultmann sought to 
bridge an assumed gap between the mythical thinking of the New Testament and modern man.84 
The goal is not to understand objective, historical facts, but rather self-understanding and 
existential authenticity.85 Prior to taking up Heidegger’s hermeneutical concept of non-
objectifying language about man, he adopts “the Neo-Kantian assumption that knowledge which 
objectifies in accordance with law is a knowledge in which man does the shaping and seizes the 
mastery.”86 He turns to Heidegger for a solution for how to talk about God without 
objectification. He essentially adopts a similar distinction in terms of being-in-general 
(ontological) and particular expressions of that being (ontic). Theology and the Bible only speak 
to the ontic existence—how to live an authentic existence, not to the fundamental structure of 
                                                          
81 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 9-10, 41. 
82 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 312-313. 
83 McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 15-16.  
84 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 218-219. 
85 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 252; Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, 232; Thiselton, 
Two Horizons, 232. 
86 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 226 (emphasis his). 
91 
 
that existence.87 In addition, it would seem that he only allows for a pre-theological 
understanding provided by general philosophy, not theology itself.88 This is one main reason 
why he can affirm that the ‘sacred’ character of the Bible does not distinguish it from other texts, 
for its ‘sacredness’ is less ultimate than his ontological assumptions about being.89 Only through 
language about Dasein can one avoid objectification in speaking of God, for in this way, truth is 
not revealed to man in order to be objectified, but rather being is revealed through man’s self-
understanding.90 Perhaps indicative of this restrictive allowance is the tension resulting from his 
curious notion of a ‘wholly other’ God who is not known through ‘revelation’ in terms of this 
world, but is to be experienced through an event of participation which somehow transcends the 
limitations of objectifying language and ‘this-worldly’ description—but only from within our 
existence.91 Again, this begs the question: how can we speak of this ‘wholly other’ at all?92 
Bultmann seems to contradict his notion of the ‘wholly other’ in his discussion of Paul, who he 
claims presents a God in relation to humanity—so much so that Paul’s theology is at the same 
time, anthropology. “Every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and 
vice versa.”93 Again, we have an unknowable, wholly other God and we have a knowledge of 
ourselves in participation with being-in-general. Though he proposed his hermeneutic of 
demythologization with regard to the New Testament, in terms of the interplay between 
metaphysics and hermeneutics, Bultmann did not go much beyond Heidegger and Kant. He was 
content to adopt Heidegger’s general scheme of being and adapt Christian doctrine 
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accordingly.94 Even his concept of demythologization contained the notion that the New 
Testament as ‘myth’ is true existentially, but not a cosmological, external reality.95 Indeed, he 
argued that “to demythologize is not to reject scripture, but…the worldview of scripture.”96 
Instead, he desired a worldview in which ‘real’ faith is freed from anything expressed in 
objective terms.97 With Kant, he retained an ontology characterized by an unstable dualism, with 
God in one realm and worldly phenomena in the other.98 Bultmann’s hermeneutic allows only 
for a dialogue of an “I-thou” relationship, not of the “I-it” variety.99 This type of encounter, he 
believes, transcends objectification. After all, Bultmann argued that at a foundational level, the 
subject and the object of historical inquiry do not exist independently from one another.100  
The New Hermeneutic, influenced more by Heidegger’s later thought, saw all as 
interpretation (hence, ‘hermeneutic’ in the singular). This holistic approach necessarily brought 
epistemological and ontological concerns into the forefront.101 Also, there is a strong emphasis in 
biblical interpretation on the Word interpreting us, not us interpreting the Word. This went hand-
in-hand with the growing emphasis on how the Bible speaks to the contemporary interpreter. 
Ontologically, the question asked is not ‘what were the facts?’ or ‘how can we explain the facts?’ 
but rather ‘what is being mediated through them?’102 The goal of hermeneutics is to overcome 
what are seen as breakdowns in language and to overcome the subject-object distinction.103 
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Hermeneutics operates on a level prior to analysis involving subject-object reasoning.104 The 
focus of hermeneutical inquiry is on the word or language ‘event,’ in which there is an 
immediate harmony between what is spoken and what is understood, prior to any thought 
process.105 Fuchs and Ebeling stress that this event, involving the Bible, is a communication and 
revealing of God’s being. To put it another way, language provides the occasion for being as an 
event.106 It is not an “understanding of language but understanding through language.”107 
Language is the presupposition and grid for how one sees and understands being. In other words, 
“language is the horizon of a hermeneutic ontology.”108 When God addresses man, the Bible is 
not a carrier of conceptual formulations, but a ‘master,’ which “directs us into the language-
context of our existence”109 (i.e. becoming a language ‘event’). The ‘being’ communicated is not 
conceptual, but a call or pledge to authentic existence.110 This ‘event’ gives “voice not to a 
fragmented set of human concepts, but to undivided ‘Being’.”111 
Various critiques of the New Hermeneutic point out flaws rooted in its assumed ontology. 
First, there is no criterion offered regarding the correctness of a given interpretation.112 As with 
Heidegger and Bultmann, we are left with being revealing itself in understanding through 
language without a separation of subject and object. The monistic nature of this being reveals 
itself especially in man’s self-understanding as a participant in it. In such a scheme, there is no 
‘outside’ standard from which to evaluate interpretation—only being becoming itself through the 
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language ‘event.’ We must just ‘let it be,’ rather than evaluate it, for that would involve subject-
object thinking.  
Second, man, in the language event, participates in the being of God in order to 
understand (supra-conceptually, that is) the being that is revealed.113 After all, there is only one 
level of being acknowledged. Being is understood only through man and his self-understanding. 
Any ‘theology’ sought after in this manner essentially reduces to anthropology.114 Whatever is 
said about God is essentially self-understanding. For instance, “Jesus is known only as his 
language addresses me.”115  
Third, there is still a persistent aim to root understanding in a general ontology which is 
somehow prior to and transcends the subject-object relationship and ‘speaks’ to the present. 
However, what is spoken? If we are not able to articulate any meaningful content or information 
via language, what are we left with, apart from mere self-expression? Also, while seeking the 
non-conceptual, non-objectifiable language event, there is objectification going on in the very 
articulation of what is considered the biblical ‘text.’ Through the historical-critical method and 
deeming the language of Scripture as metaphysically deficient (in that it does not transcend the 
level of objectification), proponents of the New Hermeneutic still engage in a form of 
objectification.116 Once the text is determined through rational, objectifying means, then the 
playing field is set—on which non-objectifying events take place.117 These two principles, 
objectifying and non-objectifying, correspond to the rationalistic – irrationalistic tension. The 
articulation of the New Hermeneutic as a whole is guilty of the very objectification that it seeks 
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to avoid. How does one articulate ‘non-objective’ speech without objectifying it? Moreover, the 
language event sought after ceases to be meaningful in terms of communication. Whatever is 
‘communicated’ is a content-less and meaningless blank. This raises the question of whether 
personal communication can be conceived of without some sense of a subject-object distinction, 
at least in terms of keeping the ‘other’ truly distinct from the subject. According to the New 
Hermeneutic, though it seeks a truly personal (I-thou) understanding, it assumes a monistic 
notion of being with which the interpreting subject shares in order to understand through the 
language ‘event.’ In doing so, it would seem that the interpreter actually engages in a functional 
monologue rather than dialogue. 
Fourth, Packer points out that the New Hermeneutic cannot adequately explain the 
relation between the historical text of Scripture and the language event in terms of meaning. It 
would seem that the only clear answer given is that it is not the text which is ultimately 
interpreted, but rather the interpreter, as the text is cut off from the constraints of any objective 
historical inquiry.118 A related problem is the tendency of the New Hermeneutic to treat the 
language of Scripture as independent and disengaged from the person who speaks it—whether 
divine or human, in terms of intentionality.119 This is another example of assuming a deeper 
ontology (in this case, ‘language’) which is more fundamental concerning the text than its author.  
Lastly, from a distinctly Christian perspective, it would seem that the New Hermeneutic, 
assumes a Kantian metaphysic: 
God is told to produce the point of synthesis that will keep him out of his own creation, 
now reinterpreted in terms of the subject-object scheme, and will guarantee man’s 
freedom, now interpreted in terms of the transcendence of the subject-object polarity.120 
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In one sense God is conceived of as wholly other and the only way in which he can reveal 
himself in this world is to do so without entangling himself in the ‘sin’ of objectification, thus 
losing himself. Yet, in another sense, he can reveal himself through the language event, but only 
in a way that reveals the interpreter, not himself as God. Man meets God in his own conscience, 
not in terms of definite teaching and instruction. In short, man privileges himself with autonomy 
over both, the objective and subjective aspects of interpretation, over what can and cannot be 
revealed. Van Til argues that for Fuchs and Ebeling, true ‘objectivity’ of faith is the complete 
correlativity of the subject and object of faith. The only alternative is each operating in complete 
isolation from one another. In other words, we are told to choose between exhaustive correlation 
and utter isolation. Faced with this ontological scheme, the New Hermeneutic endorses the 
former as the only legitimate option in order to avoid destroying the very possibility of 
knowledge.    
We have already introduced some of the main tenets of Gadamer, so our treatment will be 
relatively brief. Our focus is more specifically on how he understood ontology in relation to 
hermeneutics. There are three main aspects of Gadamer’s understanding of this relationship.  
First, it is clear that Gadamer saw the nature of understanding as primarily ontological. 
The horizons he speaks of are grounded in ‘being’ and their fusion is understood as an 
ontological disclosure of being in and through language. Though Heidegger emphasized 
understanding ontologically, Gadamer develops the ontology of understanding in terms of a 
dialogue.121 
Second, Gadamer sets forth his particular view of metaphysics while at the same time, 
self-consciously opposing a particular form of metaphysics. Namely, he is opposed to the 
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metaphysics of Descartes and various forms of the modernist-realist school which assumes the 
standard subject-object model in interpretation.122 He rejects any metaphysical traces of 
scientific rationalism and dogmatism stemming from the Enlightenment.123 However, he does 
recognize his own affinity with Kant in that we have knowledge only as it is given in space and 
time. In other words, there is no vantage point outside our experience of the world through 
language from which that vantage point could itself become an object.124 
Third, Gadamer’s nuanced view of language especially highlights his view concerning 
the relationship between metaphysics and hermeneutics. Conceptually, he sees ‘language’ as a 
universal medium through which one conceives a ‘world.’ One doesn’t manipulate language, but 
rather participates in it.125 Elsewhere, Gadamer refers to language as ‘universal being,’ going so 
far as to suggest that being is coterminous with reason and language, making it the very ground 
of any hermeneutical activity.126 Hence, language is the real medium of human ‘being,’ not 
merely of thought life.127 Language is the central point where ‘I’ and the world meet and 
manifest their original unity.128 The nature of this linguistic being is characterized by finitude.129 
At the same time, he claims that in language, the world presents itself, and that our experience of 
it through language is absolute in that it transcends all positing of being because it embraces all 
being-in-itself.130 Though the world is not itself an object of language (because it is a 
participatory medium,131 not manipulated by language as an objective tool), all objects of 
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knowledge are enclosed within the world horizon of language.132 From another angle, he asserts, 
“being that can be understood is language.”133 Interpretation is essentially the hermeneutical 
relation to being.134 Perhaps one of the most significant implications of all of this is that 
language is prior to and more ultimate than the hermeneutical situation we find ourselves in 
when we seek to interpret a text, and prior to “any pre-given system of possibilities of being, 
with which signs at the disposal of the signifying subject are associated.”135 It would seem that 
language is prior to any philosophical conceptualization. Hence, language, as a general ontology 
of being, is the necessary presupposition of any hermeneutical activity or conceptualization. 
Osborne has pointed out that being and the world structure, in Gadamer’s view, are also prior to 
authorial intent.136  
Before moving on, it is important to highlight a significant emphasis in Gadamer’s view 
of metaphysics which raises important questions. His concept of being is essentially finite—a 
one-level ontology, focused upon man’s relationship to the world. Moreover, he says, “to be 
historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete.”137 The disclosure of this 
finite being through language transcends the two horizons in their fusion, resulting in an 
emergence of something beyond merely the language of each horizon through their very 
interaction.138 This dialectical process leads to the “coming-into-language of the thing itself.”139 
This raises important questions. How does meaningful transcendence emerge from finite being 
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disclosed in the fusion of two finite horizons? How can we know that there is meaningful 
transcendence taking place if we are mired in finitude and lack of objectivity? On the one hand, 
he states that there is no ‘scientific’ certainty of truth because man is a finite and prejudiced 
participant in the dialectical process.140 On the other hand, he argues that language and 
understanding provides a universal model of being and knowledge-in-general, which enables us 
to define more closely the meaning of the truth involved in understanding.141 Yet, it is this very 
concept of ‘truth’ which has come under fire for its lack of any positive content or criteria to 
make sense of or evaluate that which contributes to its emergence.142 In the end, a one-level 
concept of being undermines his hope for any transcendence, which will lead to a progressive 
disclosure and understanding of truth. 
 Paul Ricoeur, like Gadamer, suggests that language discloses human ‘being’—in which 
participation-in or belonging-to precedes our very capacity to conceive of objects as opposed to 
ourselves as subject.143 While having a general aversion to systematic theology out of a concern 
that it ignores the character of the biblical text, he does see hermeneutics as the long route to the 
promised land of ontology.144 He states that “hermeneutics is not a reflection on the human 
sciences, but an explication of the ontological ground upon which these sciences can be 
constructed.”145 This includes his discourse with the very idea of revelation which occurs on 
ground more fundamental than any onto-theological articulation.146 Ricoeur describes his own 
                                                          
140 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 446. 
141 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 445. 
142 Cf. Thiselton, New Horizons, 315-317; Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: 
Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 15-52. 
143 Paul Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Intepretation (ed. Lewis S. Mudge; Philadelphia, Pa.: Fortress, 1980), 
101. 
144 Vanhoozer, “Paul Ricoeur,” 692; Paul Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern 
University Press, 1974), 24. 
145 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 55. 
146 Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Intepretation, 96. 
100 
 
position as ‘post-Hegelian Kantianism’—with Kant, he respects the limits of human reason and 
with Hegel, he explores reason’s many forms, both figurative and conceptual.147 It is not entirely 
clear where he is coming from theologically or what he sees as the central message of the Bible. 
However, the ultimate goal of interpretation is self-interpretation. Texts function autonomously 
in that they take on a life of their own once they are written. Interpretation is not so much 
recovering the author’s intent, but exploring the text’s trajectory of meaning. In all of this, 
Ricoeur sees biblical hermeneutics as merely an instance of a more general hermeneutics of self-
understanding. More broadly, it would seem to suggest that Christianity is just an instance of a 
more general and ultimate philosophy and hermeneutic.148 Hence, Ricoeur’s assumed ontology is 
more ultimate than Scripture and the ontologically-informing message which is conveyed in it. 
Theology is ‘before’ the text, not transcending it.149 Also ontologically significant, according to 
Ricoeur, is that the text is separated from its author and becomes autonomous in terms of 
meaning.150 The Bible and other poetic texts reveal the ‘transcendent’ in that they project worlds 
which open possible ways of ‘being in the world’ (not merely the self-expression of the 
author)—which, if appropriated, can transform the world of the reader.151 ‘Transcendent’ here 
merely means finite possibility. Elsewhere, Ricoeur says that “a text is a finite space of 
interpretations.”152 In sum, his notion of ontology and hermeneutics is reminiscent of both 
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Heidegger and Gadamer in that he seeks to preserve a notion of ‘transcendence,’ yet it is 
ultimately undermined by a metaphysical finitude. 
Ricoeur has positively contributed to the growing awareness of the literary dimension of 
texts and how it contributes to a more nuanced appreciation for the fullness of meaning. He also 
provides somewhat of a corrective to Heidegger and Gadamer’s ontological bent, which tended 
to circumvent the actual text.153  However, the lack of ontological transcendence from which to 
objectively conceive of a text and its meaning do not alleviate the anchor-less subjectivity he 
seeks to avoid. For example, his concept of a text having a ‘surplus of meaning’ (‘plurivocal’), 
which is not ascertained by scientific exegesis, but through imagination and practical wisdom is 
problematic.154 Where does the surplus of meaning come from and what is its foundation for 
intelligibility? Does it originate internally or externally to the text?155 Even if a text is about 
something, how can one achieve meaningful objectivity about this ‘something’ when there is a 
surplus of meaning without a clear means of evaluation concerning compatibility with such 
projected probabilities coming out of the text? He seems to suggest ‘logical probabilities’ and 
‘textual intention’ as criteria to be used in evaluating the validity of interpretive possibilities, but 
where does he locate his authority which defines these criteria—if they come from outside the 
text, but not from the author?156 Laughery sees no absolute certainty or uncertainty of meaning in 
Ricoeur’s thought.157 Likewise, Palmer says that Ricoeur holds to no ultimate standards for 
exegesis and only sees separate and opposing theories concerning the rules of interpretation.158 It 
would seem that he sees the need for ontological consideration in hermeneutics, but disengages it 
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from the author, embeds it into the text, assuming an ambiguous ontological finitude along the 
way. We are left with persistent questions regarding issues of transcendence, criteria, and 
objectivity. Meaning is always ‘approaching,’ but lacking ultimate proof and coherence.159    
The last main figure160 we will look at, before moving on to those in the broad 
evangelical camp, is Derrida, who in many ways is even more elusive than Heidegger. Whereas, 
for Heidegger, metaphysics became something he could speak less definitely about over time, 
Derrida seeks to erase the notion altogether.161 However, he does frequently discuss the role of 
metaphysics in Western thought. His treatment is largely negative, yet has a significant bearing 
on his view of hermeneutics. Though his views have had significant implications for 
hermeneutics, Derrida himself would not call them ‘hermeneutical’ per se, because that would 
imply there is meaning to be recovered through it.162 He denounced what he called 
“logocentrism”—a term encompassing philosophical preoccupation with language (especially 
written) as the carrier of meaning. This is connected to what he calls the “metaphysics of 
presence”—the assumption that there is at the foundation of language, a ‘presence,’ ‘being,’ or 
‘essence’ which we can come to know.163 Going beyond structuralism’s assertion that there is no 
necessary connection between words and what they signify, Derrida argues that language does 
not refer to objective reality.164 Rather, ‘meaning’ is the product of the interpreter’s free play 
with signs (or words) merely pointing to other signs. Hence, meaning is always deferred, 
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incomplete, and uncertain—without grounding.165 There is no access to “a stable, self-
authenticating knowledge.”166 There is no transcendental ‘signified’ or ‘signifier.’167 He is 
opposed to notions of God’s ‘being’ and created ‘beings.’ In particular, he rejects the theological 
nature of metaphysics.168 Yet, a distinct recognition of something ‘wholly other’ still seems to 
pervade his work.169 Though metaphysical assumptions cannot be entirely avoided, neither are 
they to be rightly accepted, for “there is no metaphysical concept in and for itself.”170 He seeks 
to show how such assumptions break down, involving a subversion of dogmatic binary 
descriptions and oppositions (always one correct truth and always a false one), showing that it is 
impossible to draw a clear line between reality and representations of it.171 Almost by default, 
Derrida and many postmodern thinkers absolutize language as the most fundamental aspect of 
reality, yet a language without ground or meaning beyond itself.172 
We see in Derrida a self-conscious attempt to deny metaphysical realities in connection 
with a text in opposition to those who would define meaning in a rationalistic or univocal way 
(focused on the author, text, or reader)—what he sees as characteristic of traditional Western 
metaphysics.173 However, he uncritically makes ontological assumptions of his own along the 
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way. In doing so, he engages in a form of replacement metaphysics.174 Derrida admits that one 
cannot critique metaphysics without metaphysical categories.175 First, he rationalistically asserts 
his own form of irrationalism. This has been the unavoidable critique of Derrida and others who 
suggest that the ultimate meaning of texts is that they don’t have ultimate meaning. Second, 
though suggesting that language is absolute, he claims an autonomous omniscience for himself 
(as ‘absolute’?) in declaring this to be the case, making a universal negative truth claim. Third, 
he assumes an ‘otherness’ which cannot be known or reduced (e.g., through a ‘fusion’ of 
horizons). Again, this is an assumption about the nature of reality and communication. He seems 
to emphasize ‘otherness’ while also suggesting a common ground of sorts as the context for 
further deconstruction.176 Fourth, he assumes that there is no intelligible interpretation accessible 
for the ‘gap’ that he claims exists between the sign and the thing signified. If that is so, why 
believe such a gap even exists? Moreover, does a difference between the sign and the thing 
signified demand an unintelligible gap which has no real connection at all and if so, why? Fifth, 
he seems to include biblical metaphysics in the ‘metaphysics of presence’ as he calls it, not 
recognizing the significant differences that exist between the stream of Western philosophy in 
general and what is found in Scripture regarding metaphysics. Lastly, in assuming the ultimate 
context of reality as language, he precludes any consideration or possibility of a revelatory text 
which could inform the nature and function of language. The reader’s worldview is ultimate in 
interpretation, regardless of the worldview of its author or previous readers. Essentially, the 
motive here is primarily a pragmatic one.177 He takes Gadamer to task for his inconsistencies and 
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pushes his ideas to their logical end.178 However, Derrida does not escape inconsistencies of his 
own, especially in the area of metaphysics. He assumes something to be deconstructed, telling us 
what is ‘not’ rather than what ‘is.’ His emphasis on ambiguity and possibility under the guise of 
being open to the ‘other’ may be merely an unwillingness to listen to the ‘other.’ 
Summary 
It may be expedient to summarize some of the main points of continuity among the 
thinkers discussed. Three particular observations demand our attention. First, the ‘love-hate’ 
relationship with metaphysics is evidenced in ‘hating’ a particular form of traditional 
metaphysics (i.e. Greek-influenced Enlightenment rationalism), but ‘loving’ in the sense of 
making unavoidable metaphysical assumptions, regardless of the level of confidence in 
establishing a formal ontology. Second, a general finite ontology is assumed which is prior to 
any text under consideration. This is a significant when it comes to biblical interpretation. It 
precludes the very possibility of any biblical ontology. Third, a need for ‘transcendence’ is 
recognized (e.g., to get beyond the subject-object distinction), but undermined by merely 
locating it in the same stream of ontology-in-general—be it history, ‘being,’ language, or some 
other concept. A one-level reality does not provide meaningful understanding because there is no 
transcendent reference point from which to make sense of particulars. Frame sums up the 
dilemma concerning the subject-object distinction in terms of transcendence and immanence: 
Non-Christian philosophers have been utterly unsuccessful at maintaining a workable 
balance here. It seems either that the world is something utterly alien to the self, so alien 
that it can hardly be known or spoken of (‘transcendence’), or that it is identical to the 
self, so that there is no world to speak of, only self (‘immanence’). Some, in desperation, 
seek a special kind of knowledge that allegedly ‘transcends the subject-object 
distinction,’ but they are unable to state coherently what that knowledge is or how it is to 
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be obtained. Their claim is essentially a claim to know the unknowable, to achieve, by a 
mystical leap, access to the transcendence that is unknowable by ordinary means.179 
 
This highlights the unstable mix of rational and irrational elements present in the figures 
surveyed above. 
Metaphysics and Evangelical Hermeneutics 
Have evangelicals faired any better? How have they conceived of the relationship 
between metaphysics and hermeneutics? Sontag bluntly states that “biblical study needs…a 
metaphysical inquiry.”180 If evangelicals are to engage with the shifting definition of 
hermeneutics, this is certainly true. With regard to biblical exegesis, Bartholomew rightly asserts 
that “there is always a philosophical subtext…Notions of ontology, epistemology and 
anthropology inevitably shape biblical interpretation. The only question is how they shape 
interpretation.”181 How does the Bible speak to these philosophical categories? Notwithstanding 
the earlier comment from Noll regarding the predominant lack of self-conscious, ontological 
awareness, evangelical hermeneutics has largely operated with an assumed ontology. The 
following is a brief sample of how some have engaged with metaphysics, whether self-
consciously or not. 
Hirsch’s work still has widespread appeal among many evangelicals concerned with 
anchoring meaning in human authorial intent.182 However, there is little attention paid to certain 
ontological assumptions which are uncritically adopted in the process. By his own admission, 
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Hirsch not only treats the Bible like any other text (i.e. without consideration for the role of the 
divine author), but seeks definite, objective meaning in the human author, yet on the basis of 
ultimate uncertainty and probability.183 This notion is often seen in evangelical hermeneutics. 
For instance, after affirming Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and significance, Flatt 
discusses the role of presuppositions in biblical interpretation and offers a set of assumptions he 
finds to be fit for the task. Among these is “a sound attitude of objectivity”—i.e. good mental 
health and the equally ambiguous idea that one “should not make any exegetical conclusions 
with more certitude than are supported by his knowledge.”184 One should also assume the 
possibility of God’s existence.185 Inconsistently, in seeking objectivity, Flatt ends up proposing a 
hermeneutic of uncertainty which undermines clear biblical affirmations to the contrary. As 
Palmer has pointed out (in addition to the probability issue), Hirsch’s approach tends toward a 
“scientific reductionism,” including assumptions about the nature of things involved in his 
pursuit of ‘validity’ (e.g., nature of meaning, language, ‘validity,’ and understanding), not to 
mention his problematic notion of timeless objectivity in meaning as rooted in an historical 
author and understood by an historical reader.186 Insightfully and a bit ironically, Palmer points 
out that Hirsch treats hermeneutics as a general theory of interpretation based on Aristotelian 
presuppositions which end up being just as ‘dangerous’ to theology as those theories Hirsch 
opposes in his book.187 To be fair, Hirsch and his followers often do not discuss their 
metaphysical assumptions. However, questions should be raised concerning them in 
interpretation.    
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Thomas and others have emphasized a strict grammatical-historical method which 
downplays the consideration of philosophical categories. First, Thomas explicitly argues for 
withholding the ‘analogy of faith’ until the exegetical task is finished. This inevitably raises the 
question, if deeper assumptions are being made about reality, what is being presupposed, if not a 
doctrinally-informed ontology? What is being assumed in even making the interpretive move to 
suspend the analogy of faith in the first place? While not overtly arguing a particular ontology, 
Thomas betrays certain curious assumptions. For instance, he states that “neutral objectivity 
originates with the Creator of all things and is available through the illumination of the Holy 
Spirit.”188 Are we to understand that God himself is ‘neutral’ with respect to interpretative 
possibilities? In the same context, he suggests that a “Kantian dialecticism may be necessary in 
other realms,” but the interpretation of divine revelation demands a correspondence of reality 
between the objective and subjective realms.189 Is this consistent? In arguing for a stringent 
‘single sense’ meaning of a text, he says “meaning is static and locked up in the past.”190 He 
claims that all that is needed for biblical hermeneutics is grammar, history, and derived 
‘common-sense.’191 Each of these statements must be evaluated in terms of larger philosophical 
assumptions to avoid unbiblical notions. 
Some have focused, with varying degrees of strictness, on the historical-critical 
method.192 Sparks’ ‘practical realism’ epistemology seems to assume an unstable mixture of 
modernist and postmodernist elements—an epistemology which seeks a certainty based on 
human probability and pragmatic concerns. While God does not err, his relation to interpreters of 
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Scripture is one of adequacy, not inerrancy (either in revealing from his side or interpreting from 
ours).193 On the more conservative side of the spectrum, Blomberg argues for a combination of 
complementary approaches, but prefers the foundational priority of the historical method.194 
Moreover, he endorses a ‘critical realism’ which would seem to imply the priority of historical 
verification methods which are more functionally ultimate than the truths revealed in Scripture in 
terms of authority.195 What if history is rooted in God, who transcends and is distinct from it? 
For without divine ontological and epistemological grounding, the best historical methods prove 
only probabilities. Blomberg claims to have shorn his method of its anti-supernaturalism,196 but 
the question remains as to what exactly has he replaced it with? 
Others, from a more distinctly philosophical perspective, have acknowledged the need for 
ontological grounding. According to one writer, the function of the text is to link the real author 
and real reader in terms of the real world in which they find themselves.197 However, the 
question is how ‘real’ is defined and according to what authority? Some, like Corduan, suggest 
adding a generic theistic worldview as a deeper dimension in order to ground hermeneutics and 
transcend the historical—yet, one which does not necessarily take into account the “entire set of 
Christian beliefs” nor inspiration.198 This general approach, hesitant to affirm that there is a 
distinctly Christian ontology to be found in Scripture, is not uncommon. For example, Hasker 
cites Alfred Whitehead in favor of his point that Christianity is a religion of salvation, not a 
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metaphysical system. In his opinion, the search for a definitive Christian metaphysic has 
failed.199 Johnson seeks to provide ontological grounding via what he calls the “Transcendental 
Thomist” school of Wilhem Coreth. He argues that a comprehensive ‘horizon’ must ground all 
the particulars involved in the hermeneutical situation, which he concludes is the ‘world.’ 
“Hermeneutics transcends itself insofar as the openness to being is the transcendental ground of 
all understanding of the world, history, and language.”200 Being-in-general (or “totality of 
being”) is that which transcends the particulars, making understanding possible. Others see an 
approximation of this grounding in an eclectic blend of various ontological and epistemological 
perspectives. For example, Porter and Robinson conclude their work on hermeneutics by 
recommending that we not rely on opposing absolute categories (e.g., foundationalism or 
antifoundationalism), but rather we must combine aspects of different approaches into a sort of 
hybrid which will overcome false mutual exclusivism.201 However, one must ask whether there 
are deeper, more systemic flaws which pervade and transgress such ‘absolute’ categorical 
boundaries. If so, any combination, no matter how eclectic and multi-faceted, will only 
complicate matters. Yarbrough rightly observes that many of the major contemporary forms of 
hermeneutical approaches assume human autonomy, and a denial of the special relevance of 
inspired revelation. Any synthesis will presuppose a certain view of God.202 Westphal seems to 
suggest adding a consideration of special hermeneutics to Gadamer’s general (‘deregionalized’) 
hermeneutics, “without presupposing any particular theory of inspiration.”203 In other words, he 
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assumes compatibility between the two.204 He emphasizes the finitude of the reader to such a 
degree that error in interpretation is linked with it. His ultimate grounding which guards against 
sheer relativism is the community of readers, which inevitably leads to a probable and pragmatic 
interpretation.205 It appears that all we are left with is fallen interpretations of the voice of God. 
Those who generally see postmodern developments as helpful to the church often remain 
entangled in similar metaphysical issues that we identified in secular philosophy. David Tracy 
sees hermeneutics (including theology) taking place in a merely horizontal dialogue, with 
understanding rooted in human thought and existence according to secular standards of 
knowledge.206 Even if the conversation is extended across disciplines and societies, it is still 
finite and more consumed with demythologizing modernist assumptions than it is with providing 
its own solutions.207 Grenz, in his reaction to what he calls evangelical “propositionalism,” has 
endorsed a norm for theology which includes Scripture and tradition and culture, providing an 
indirect commentary on metaphysics in terms of authority.208 McKnight introduces a dichotomy 
between ‘absolute’ and ‘relational’ meaning, as well as an emphasis on the impossibility of 
objective and historical truth.209 Perhaps, more directly problematic is his insistence that God 
must be defined not in relation to himself, but rather “in terms of dynamic relationship—just as 
self and world.”210 Raschke, like Bultmann, pits knowing ‘about’ God against interacting with 
him personally, introducing a problematic dichotomy. “The Bible is the supreme text for the 
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‘overcoming’ of metaphysics and of ontotheology.”211 In other words, personal interaction 
trumps metaphysics, which he sees as inherently impersonal and propositional. Emphasizing the 
role of narrative, Roth argues for what he calls ‘story ontology’ (reality as story) in order to 
account for the plurality evident in history and to avoid the impersonal ontological abstractions 
of older points of view. However, this story ontology is more ultimate than even the Triune God 
and his relationship to the world.212 
Perhaps more directly than others who have been receptive to postmodern developments, 
Smith seeks to deal with the relationship between hermeneutics and metaphysics. He insightfully 
treats interpretation as a not a postlapsarian phenomenon, but as a good creational task prior to 
the fall.213 Though rightly seeking to avoid equating finitude with falleness, he ends up saying 
that it is never a sin to misinterpret because it is a finitude issue—each interpretive judgment is a 
kind of uncertain ‘leap of faith’ (similar to Derrida and Kierkegaard).214 God’s role in 
interpretation is apparently dismissed from Smith’s treatment as an example of seeking an 
improper ‘immediacy’ (i.e. God’s perfect interpretation). He takes issue with Lints, who argues 
that Scripture itself is God’s immediate pre-interpretation given to man in mediate form.215 
Smith claims that there is no available meta-narrative or ‘God’s eye view’ of things. Rather, 
invoking Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, he argues that every interpretation is of this world.216 
While he seeks to interpret according to the nature of what is being interpreted, with subjectivity 
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and plurality of finite interpretive possibilities, his object is no greater than this world. This poses 
a problem when dealing with a book which claims divine authorship.217  
Francke emphasizes aspects of postmodernity’s critique of modern foundationalism in 
terms of hermeneutics of suspicion and finitude in search of a ‘reforming’ approach to 
interpretation, yet still keeping with reformed tradition.218 However, in doing so, he ends up 
caught in a dialogue between the gospel and culture in which the dialogue informs both, and 
provides the normative witness for the hermeneutical trajectories of confessional doctrine.219 
One is left wondering what role the author (especially God) has in the process. Besides 
oversimplifying matters, Francke has surreptitiously introduced his own metanarrative—namely, 
the collapse of metanarratives, claiming an even more ultimate and transcendent point of 
view.220 His stance seems to deny the standard locus of authority in the reformed tradition, and 
also paint the conservative reformed epistemological tradition in rationalistic colors.221 He 
projects a sense of ontological agnosticism which demands elaboration especially in light of his 
strong assertions.    
Recent Developments in Evangelical Hermeneutics 
Two recent developments in evangelical hermeneutics have provided a helpful corrective 
to the current landscape, especially as it relates to metaphysics. By ‘recent developments,’ we 
certainly do not mean the genesis of such trends, but rather their increasing influence in recent 
decades. We will simply provide a brief overview of each and their relevance for the subject at 
hand. 
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Speech-Act Theory 
First, speech-act theory (SAT) has provided linguistic categories which bring the author 
back into focus in terms of meaning and what is being done through texts. Its initial proponents, 
Austin and Searle, identified three kinds of linguistic acts: locutions (saying words), illocutions 
(what we do with what we say—e.g., issue a command), and perlocutions (what we bring about 
by saying something—e.g., obedience to a command).222 These categories highlight the speaker 
or author as the one doing things with words. Austin and Searle see meaning as grounded in the 
speech-act, rather than merely in the word or sentence. It is this very aspect of doing which is 
often neglected and opposed by those who would ground meaning in something other than the 
author.223 Actually, each of the three main linguistic acts corresponds to the three main elements 
involved in hermeneutics: author, text, and reader.224 Hence, each is recognized without the 
process being reduced down to any one element. 
Many evangelical scholars have adopted versions of basic speech act theory,225 often to 
rescue the role of the author in the midst of postmodern influences.226 Out of an apologetic 
concern to affirm that God indeed ‘speaks,’ Wolterstorff endorses SAT as a way to do justice to 
both, the human and divine elements of Scripture.227 However, he succumbs to a two-level 
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hermeneutic, bordering on a division of the human and divine, in which methodological 
assumptions respective to each seem different and incompatible with one another.228 Though he 
believes certain safeguards exist, he admits ultimate uncertainty concerning what God actually 
said or did not say.229  
Thiselton, like Wolterstorff, prefers ‘authorial discourse’ over ‘authorial intention’ in 
order to avoid the intentional fallacy.230 However, he is more nuanced in his use of SAT for 
biblical interpretation, often articulating it alongside insights from Gadamer and Wittgenstein. In 
general, SAT highlights that it is not merely information that is communicated in Scripture, but 
also a performative force.231 While arguing for a spectrum of illocutionary acts (from weak to 
strong), he sees ‘promise’ as a key illocution.232 Ontologically, things are not quite as explicit. 
He at least endorses a hermeneutic which theologically steers clear of what he sees as the 
trappings of modernism and postmodernism (i.e. neither foundationalist nor anti-foundationalist), 
while also doing justice to the historical horizons involved. He also endorses a concept of ‘proper 
basicality’ in epistemology as expounded by Wolterstorff and Plantinga.233 However, his work 
tends toward a this-world emphasis, leaving many metaphysical questions unanswered. 
Timothy Ward provides a helpful corrective to this tendency in his attempt to describe the 
nature of the relationship between God and Scripture using SAT. He argues that God is present 
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personally and semantically in Scripture.234 In particular, it is the Triune God who uses the Bible 
to perform actions (cf. Heb 4:12).235 “In philosophical terms, there is an ontological relationship 
between God and his words. It seems that God’s actions, including his verbal actions, are a kind 
of extension of him.”236 In God’s verbal actions, we encounter God himself in action.237 He also 
highlights the fact that God’s speech-acts are covenantal in nature, having important 
interpersonal implications. For instance, to separate a person (e.g., God) from his words is an 
attack on that person. What one does with the words of the speaker, one does to the speaker.238 
Ward also suggests that the goal in preaching is to reenact the original speech-act that the Holy 
Spirit performed in the original authoring of the text.239  
Vanhoozer has probably done the most in recent years to incorporate SAT into a 
theological hermeneutic. First, he slightly modifies the standard speech-act categories by adding 
a fourth type of act—interlocutionary . The interlocutionary dimension recognizes that 
“language is the means of social interaction through messages.”240 Hence, human agents are not 
wholly determined by language, but rather use it to communicate, responsibly or not. This 
highlights the covenantal nature of communicative actions, involving both propositional and 
interpersonal elements. This speaks to the tendency of some to see the two in an either/or 
dichotomy. Second, Triune communication seen in Scripture reveals the ultimate paradigm for 
the nature of human communication,241 bringing the doctrine of the Trinity into the 
hermeneutical discussion. Third, he sees interpretation and understanding as involving the 
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recognition of authorial intentions and illocutionary acts. The Spirit is active in the process, not 
producing new illocutions, but illuminating ones already in text.242 This approach avoids pitting 
personal communication against the use of verbal propositions (i.e. people do things with 
propositions).243 Fourth, he stresses the canonical level of speech-acts. What God is doing in 
Scripture is seen most clearly in the canonical context. The Bible, as a whole, is also a 
communicative act of God. This multifaceted act is centered upon Christ, his primary 
‘illocutionary’ act, and the bringing about union with Christ by the Holy Spirit (‘perlocution’).244 
Vanhoozer does justice to the three main elements in communication through his brand of 
Trinitarian SAT: author, text, and reader—without reducing hermeneutical concerns to one.  
 Though many have acknowledged the positive influence of speech-act theory, some have 
pointed out weaknesses pertaining to its use in hermeneutics. I will briefly list three which 
pertain to the issue of metaphysics. First, in an interesting exchange with Searle, Derrida 
insightfully points out that there is no determinative foundation for establishing the intent and 
context of a speech-act of an author.245 Searle denies one must choose between certainty and 
Derrida’s relativism. Vanhoozer, citing Thiselton, concludes that “our knowledge of text acts 
may not be founded on metaphysical certainties, but that does not mean that it has no basis at 
all.”246 Again, we see a problematic defense of determinative meaning. Derrida rightly 
recognizes that there must be a certain ground of meaning somewhere if we are to assert meaning 
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(with any level of determination) anywhere. Otherwise, relativism inevitably creeps in and chips 
away at any certainty. Vanhoozer’s conclusion raises questions about the possibility of 
metaphysical grounding of our knowledge of the Bible. Is there such grounding to be found? If 
so, where?  
Second, Poythress points out certain limitations of SAT. One danger is ‘de-
contextualizing’ a text due to the selective attention to human acts and their complexity (let alone 
that of the divine author). The very move to start with atomistic propositions is a de-
contextualizing move. The context of a speech-act includes not only the complexity of the 
speaker but also of the environment in which they speak, involving history and ultimately God 
who rules it. Larger blocks of discourse only complicate matters further in terms of 
classification. Strictly applying SAT can prove to be reductionistic, and lead to allowing its 
categories to become the basis on which metaphysics is built.247 Perhaps more problematic is the 
ideal of complete knowledge lurking in Searle’s work. Often, the human speaker is invested with 
‘God-like’ transcendence and control over language use and meaning. The speech-act interpreter 
assumes such control and clarity on behalf of the author in seeking to understand a text.248 In 
sum, its reductionistic tendencies and failure to capture the complexities of human personhood, 
let alone God, fail to provide a transcendental ground for what it seeks to understand. We need 
something more for there to be “a transcendent adjudication of truth.”249 
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Third, many evangelical adherents of SAT also assume Hirsch’s distinction between 
meaning and significance,250 Plantinga’s epistemology,251 and a form of critical realism.252 
Space does not permit a discussion of these influences. However, the question should be raised 
as to how they inform the use of SAT in terms of metaphysical presuppositions. Can these 
assumptions be allowed to stand? For example, Vanhoozer defaults to Hirsch’s secular view of 
meaning, rooted in the human author and distinct from significance, leaving us with the feeling 
that stable and controlled meaning can be found in the human author apart from considering the 
divine author.253 It seems that important theological foundations are left in the background and 
their implications left unexplored. 
Theological Interpretation 
Second, theological interpretation of Scripture (TIS) has been receiving more attention in 
recent years. Due to emphasis on divine authorship, there is overlap among proponents of SAT 
and TIS. Daniel Treier argues that Christians have always been engaged in hermeneutics 
theologically—that is, the Bible was read as the authoritative Word of God. To interpret 
Scripture is to encounter God.254 Vanhoozer defines TIS as reading for the theological 
significance for the community of the faithful as opposed to merely imposing a theological 
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system or general hermeneutic on the text or any reductionistic preoccupation with the world 
‘behind,’ ‘of,’ or ‘in front of’ the text.255 While there is no one standard definition or method,256 
certain core values are evident.257 It has a governing interest in God—to hear his word and be 
changed by it. This, of course, assumes that God speaks in and through the biblical text. 
Vanhoozer explains: 
God must not be an afterthought in biblical interpretation. God is not simply a function of 
a certain community’s interpretive interest; instead, God is prior to both the community 
and the biblical texts themselves. A properly theological criticism will therefore seek to 
do justice to the priority of God. One way to do so is to guard against idols: images of 
God manufactured by interpretive communities.258 
 
The nature of God and his relation to the world lies behind what TIS seeks to recover—the 
Bible’s own governing purpose.259 Non-Trinitarian hermeneutical approaches tend to give 
priority to historical knowledge as an ‘omniscient’ determiner of theological truth.260 TIS seeks 
to interpret according to the intent and content of Scripture.261 The key is to avoid what Leithart 
describes as detaching the message from the medium, which in effect, muzzles the message 
itself.262 This tendency is often seen in seeking to understand the words of the text through a lens 
foreign to its message. Rather, the Bible should be read according to the ‘rule of faith’ (i.e. 
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doctrinal summary of the Bible’s story and God as Triune).263 This rule of faith dovetails with 
Scripture being analogous with itself, and “cannot be forced to correspond in analogy to some 
extra-biblical subject matter, norm, criterion, motif, or interpretation of reality.”264 TIS 
recognizes that we must utilize certain theological presuppositions from the message of Scripture 
in order to interpret it. Moreover, the interpreter is in dialogue with the text so that not only are 
presuppositions conformed to Scripture, but there is also a holistic and restorative transformation 
that progressively takes place in the interpreter by the Holy Spirit. Another core value is 
discerning the human and divine discourse in canonical context.265 In particular, attention is paid 
to the final form of the canonical text.266 In addition, with its attention on the divine author, TIS 
focuses on how Scripture is not like other human writings.267 Lastly, there is an emphasis on 
following the way of biblical wisdom (vs. human wisdom).268 This leads to a more holistic 
approach—one which takes into account ontology, epistemology, and ethics. 
 The main appeal of TIS is threefold. First, it seeks to provide a biblical corrective to 
hermeneutical methods foreign to the message of Scripture (e.g., a ‘general’, more ultimate 
theory of textual meaning)—modern and postmodern varieties. This avoids adding theological 
concerns to non-theological grounds.269 Indeed, this is contrary to viewing the facts of Scripture 
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as distinct from theology, as if they were theologically uninformed.270 Second, it highlights the 
nature of God and his relation to the world, including the rule of faith as guiding presuppositions 
for interpretation. Webster argues that this calls for a distinctly Christian, hermeneutical 
ontology, which answers many of the questions raised, and filling the gaps present in 
philosophical hermeneutics.271 Right interpretation involves looking through the right ‘lens’—
one provided by Scripture.272 The hermeneutical situation is not unformed or undefined, but 
rather contingent upon God’s assessment. Hence, man cannot transcend it in order to make sense 
of it. Rather, he must contingently participate in light of God’s transcendence and interpretation 
of it.273 Third, it appreciates the role of the reader in interpretation and how the Bible speaks 
today. Green says this involves asking whether the reader is ready to be the ‘model reader’ the 
biblical author implies in a given text.274 In other words, will the reader respond in his 
interpretation in a way consistent with the message and intent of the author in the text? In 
addition, communal aspects of the reader’s role are given more attention in terms of 
interpretation taking place in an historical believing community. Jensen captures this distinctive 
in stark fashion: “the question, after all, is not whether churchly reading of Scripture is justified; 
the question is, what could possibly justify any other?”275 
 Like SAT, TIS is not without its critics, both inside and outside the movement.276 Some, 
like Thiselton, perhaps do not disagree in principle, but dismiss some expressions of the 
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approach as too simplistic, generalized, and dogmatic.277 Others have objected to what is implied 
by the movement and its problematic label—namely, that other hermeneutical approaches cannot 
be equally ‘theological’ in nature.278 Ironically, critics fault TIS for its built-in assumptions while 
uncritically making their own in their very critiques. For example, Poirier assumes Scripture is 
merely a religious testimony about God’s activity (not divine revelation), and that this has no real 
bearing on what should be considered ‘theological’ interpretation. Later, he assumes a dichotomy 
between theological truth being text-mediated and event-mediated.279 He argues that all 
interpretation in the interest of theology should be labeled as ‘theological.’280 This assumes that 
there is nothing more ultimate or authoritative than man’s own theological interpretation of the 
Bible. 
 Those more receptive to the overall program of TIS see the need for further refinement. 
For some, this refinement comes in the form of seeing a methodological spectrum of TIS, and 
exercising caution with the use of the ‘rule of faith,’ especially as a guide or heuristic to better 
understand a text.281 Poythress, while commending Watson for his canonical awareness and his 
emphasis on God as the Creator, faults him for arguing his position according to the rules of the 
academy rather than Scripture. Consequently, he fails to do justice to the Bible’s own authority 
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to interpret all of life. As such, Watson is left without an ultimate standard for his claims.282 
According to Bowald, further refinement involves the doctrine of God and the role of divine 
agency in hermeneutics, as opposed to merely giving attention to the human level. In part, this is 
due to that fact that we interpret from a worldview, involving ontological presuppositions.283 Too 
often, Bowald argues, biblical hermeneutics displays deistic tendencies in construing the 
meaning of Scripture primarily as “a by-product of human agency, as an expression of its created 
capacities and conditions.”284 Rather, we should read the Bible “against a thicker theological 
horizon of divine agency or we do not read it at all.”285 He insists that we must frame the 
problem of hermeneutics not in terms of the tension between the reader and text or reader and 
human author, but rather ontologically, focused on divine agency.286 Bowald and Webster both 
point out the absence of an ontology of Scripture in the contemporary literature. The biblical text 
and the reader are both shaped by divine acts, and human interpretive acts should be ordered by 
these acts and correspond to them.287 
Conclusion 
Vanhoozer observes that “the great lesson of twentieth-century hermeneutics is that 
understanding is a matter not strictly of epistemology but, more fundamentally, of ontology: 
human being.”288 The earlier part of our survey evoked an uneasy sense of entrapment. First, 
there seems to be a general confusion regarding the nature of metaphysics and its role in 
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hermeneutics. As scholars have grappled with these issues through the various shifts in the 
contemporary landscape, we see a back and forth monotony—from rationalistic attempts to pin 
down meaning to an almost irrational mysticism in hopes of transcending the essential historical 
elements involved. In the latter, attempts are made to avoid the Enlightenment ideal of 
knowledge, while at the same time, projecting that same ideal albeit under the guise of degrees 
of objectivity289 and subjectivity in limited perspectives where supposedly one will find solid 
ground on which to stand.290 In the words of Walhout, “much contemporary thinking about 
philosophical hermeneutics can be characterized as a debate over the issue of relativism.”291 Yet, 
even among postmodern thinkers on the farthest end of the spectrum, there is an assumed 
objectivity from which conclusions are drawn, which undermines their own subjective tenets.292 
The same could be said for those on the modernist end of the spectrum. In seeking the 
Enlightenment ideal, essential aspects of that ideal have been abandoned, such as certainty in 
favor of probable consensus. We have also seen that prominent evangelical scholars are not 
immune to this tension. How are we to escape such a vicious cycle in hermeneutics which both, 
modern and postmodern scholars have succumbed to? How can we evaluate what constitutes a 
good or bad interpretation amidst such instability? From a Christian perspective, one could see 
each attempt which emphasizes one aspect of interpretation to the exclusion of another as a 
counterfeit of the biblical worldview, including ontology. To round out Vanhoozer’s observation 
above, it is necessary to add that human ‘being’ must be defined in relation to God, the Creator. 
Ward sums it up well:  
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If God is not taken into account as the ultimate solid ground on which all meaning rests, 
and as the basis on which our language can be said reliably to bear meaning, then we do 
indeed end up staring into the abyss in which meaning is forever undecidable.293     
 
Disregard for the divine author eschews proper metaphysical consideration in hermeneutics. 
Recent developments, like SAT and TIS, have been helpful correctives, highlighting the 
need to attend to the divine author’s role in interpretation. In doing so, certain aspects of the 
nature of God have been brought into the discussion. However, each approach is not without 
need for further development and refinement in terms of biblically-informed ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions.   
Throughout our survey, it has become evident that certain questions demand attention in 
light of recent shifts and focus. How does ontology shape biblical interpretation? How does one 
avoid the pitfalls of both modernism and postmodernism? How do we best re-examine 
ontological foundations on a distinctly Christian basis?294 What is the “relationship between a 
strictly theological hermeneutic for biblical interpretation, and issues of general hermeneutics 
and philosophy”?295 Getting at this need for a Christian framework, Erickson calls for the 
development of a “metahermeneutics” to provide a proper theoretical basis for discussion.296 We 
need a Christian hermeneutic which can not only help diagnose counterfeit methods, but also 
comes from the Bible itself—God’s interpretation on his terms.297   
Van Til has addressed many of these questions in a stimulating and fruitful way. In his 
search to establish a strictly Christian apologetic, he addressed many of the same philosophical 
                                                          
293 Ward, Words of Life, 64-65. 
294 Bartholomew, “Uncharted Waters,” 2, 24; “Post / Late Modernity,” 33. 
295 Bartholomew, “Introduction,” in Renewing Biblical Interpretation, xxx. 
296 Erickson, Evangelical Interpretation, 124. 
297 Poythress, “Philosophical Roots,” 170. 
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questions receiving significant attention in hermeneutics. How did he address them? In the next 
chapter, we will begin examining the root of his thinking on these matters. 
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Part Two: Van Til’s Doctrine of God 
Chapter Four: Creator – Creature Distinction 
Introduction 
 As we have seen in the previous two chapters, contemporary hermeneutics has exhibited 
two main trends: defining ‘hermeneutics’ more holistically, with an explicit awareness of the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions involved, and searching for a general theory of 
understanding to ground interpretation. However, there has been significant confusion and 
disagreement over the nature of such assumptions and how they actually relate to interpretation. 
 We have looked at two recent developments in evangelical hermeneutics which have 
provided some helpful contributions to the discussion—namely, SAT and TIS. Most importantly, 
each in its own way has directed attention to God’s role as the ultimate author of Scripture and 
the need for an explicitly theological account of understanding.1 
 One key aspect of Van Til’s thought was his unwavering insistence upon bringing all 
aspects of human thought under the authority of the self-interpreting God of the Bible. This 
includes providing biblical definitions to philosophical categories and critiquing unbiblical 
notions. Methodologically, he argued by presupposition—to identify what ontological and 
epistemological principles control one’s method.2 He opposed any generalized philosophical 
system which claimed to be more ultimate than the one found in the Bible. One’s system and 
method must match its content.3 A Christian system and method should match the content and 
intent of Scripture. At the core of his program and critique was the nature of God and His 
                                                          
1 Mark D. Thompson, A Clear and Present Word: The Clarity of Scripture (ed. D. A. Carson; Downers 
Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2006), 132-133. 
2 Van Til, Apologetics, 128. 
3 Van Til, “My Credo,” 15. 
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relation to creation as revealed in the Bible.4 He states that “our concept of God has specific 
implications for every branch of human knowledge.”5  Furthermore, “unless God is back of 
everything, you cannot find meaning in anything.”6 Perhaps, one could locate his emphases in 
the current stream of concerns found in both SAT and TIS. However, neither provides exactly 
the same type of articulation found in Van Til’s works. The type of creative expression found in 
Van Til is different, largely due to the context in which he engaged, requiring unique summaries 
of the biblical message in order to meet the challenges of his day. In that sense, Van Til’s 
thought could be considered complementary and a contribution to the evangelical cause in both 
movements.   
The Creator–Creature Distinction 
 As hinted at in our brief survey of Van Til’s macro-hermeneutical statements in chapter 
one, his doctrine of God is the primary principle of explanation for everything else.7 One of the 
main ways in which he asserts this principle is in terms of the Creator–creature distinction.8 It is 
“the most fundamental distinction of orthodox theology…a distinction that is presupposed in all 
its other differentiations. Upon it rests the whole construction of the direct revelation of God in 
history.”9 Elsewhere, he states that “the Christian doctrine of god implies a definite conception 
of the relation of God to the created universe.”10 This is opposed to unbiblical notions, such as a 
distinction made between a self-existent temporal world and a self-existent, timeless world of 
                                                          
4 Roberts, “Van Til,” 75; cf. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 30. 
5 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, xiv. 
6 Cornelius Van Til, Why I Believe in God (Philadelphia, Pa.: Committee on Christian Education of the 
OPC, n.d.), 3. 
7 Roberts, “Van Til,” 80; cf. Van Til, Apologetics, 97. 
8 Cf. Jim S. Halsey, For Such a Time as This: An Introduction to the Reformed Apologetic of Cornelius Van 
Til (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1976), 20, 24. 
9 Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner 
(Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1947), 7. 
10 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 32.  
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ideas or any other proposed distinction merely within creation.11 To the contrary, the Creator-
creature distinction revealed in Scripture necessarily provides a two-level metaphysic which 
should inform all our thinking and interpretive efforts from start to finish.12 Indeed, it is this 
distinction which sets the Christian worldview apart.13 Responding to Pinnock, Van Til says, “I 
agree with you that Scripture should speak for itself. In fact, I want it to tell us what God is, what 
the world is, and what we as men are, not after but before we start speaking of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics.”14 “The Christian concept of hermeneutics is based first of all upon the 
creation idea, that is, upon the conviction that there are not merely one but two levels of 
existence, and that man must be interpreted in terms of God.”15 The Bible nowhere speaks of a 
general concept of ‘being’ to which this distinction can be subsequently added.16 Rather, it is the 
given context for all creaturely thinking.17 According to Van Til, all non-Christian thought can 
be summed up as monistic at some level, seeing all reality as equal in nature, even if not in 
degree (e.g., scale of ‘being’).18 We saw this monistic trend among many key figures surveyed in 
the last chapter—a tendency to conceive of a one-level metaphysic-in-general, while also 
seeking to achieve a kind of ‘transcendent’ or ‘god-like’ vantage point from which to establish 
interpretation. In this pursuit, 
The distinction between the approach of the “ancient” mind and the “modern” mind is not 
fundamental. The “objectivism” of the ancient mind is only gradationally distinct from 
the “subjectivism” of the modern mind. There is no true transcendence in Platonism, 
                                                          
11 Van Til, New Modernism, 7. 
12 Van Til, Apologetics, 30; Scripture, 16; Defense of the Faith, 229; Systematic Theology, 265. 
13 Cf. Herman Bavinck, God and Creation (vol. 2 in Reformed Dogmatics; ed. John Bolt; trans. John 
Vriend; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2003), 407. 
14 Van Til, “Response by C. Van Til,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 426. 
15 Van Til, Psychology, 53; cf. “Introduction,” 9. 
16 Cornelius Van Til, The Intellectual Challenge of the Gospel (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Tyndale Press, 1953), 
10; Reformed Pastor, 91, 141, 144.  
17 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 1. 
18 Cf. Van Til, Apologetics, 30-31, 37-38; Systematic Theology, 56, 118, 291, 353; cf. Frame, Van Til, 74.  
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Aristotelianism, or Stoicism, any more than there is in modern existentialism and 
dialecticism.19 
 
The main distinction which sets off the Christian metaphysic from the non-Christian variety is 
the Creator-creature distinction. Van Til’s emphasis on this distinction is pervasive and discussed 
in a number of contexts. In the following discussion, we will look at seven such contexts and 
consider some implications for hermeneutics. 
Facts, Possibility, and Interpretation 
First, this distinction informs his discussions of ‘fact,’ ‘possibility,’ and ‘interpretation.’ 
Van Til argues that all too often in apologetic dialogues, these concepts are treated uncritically in 
terms of the Creator-creature distinction.20 Van Til maintained that the meaning of any ‘fact’ 
(and its relation to all other ‘facts’) was determined by God as their Creator and pre-interpreter, 
according to his own self-knowledge and its place in his all-encompassing plan.21 Hence, they 
are not only dependent upon God for their existence and meaning,22 they are also inherently 
contextual in nature (known in-relation). In other words, states of affairs include not merely 
‘things,’ but also their properties and relation to other ‘things.’23 Created facts are governed by 
created laws and, as objects of knowledge, are so fashioned by God as to come into fruitful 
contact with the mind of man as a knowing subject.24 In sum, all facts are ‘Theistic-facts.’25 
However, creation is in no way necessary to the being of God, who freely relates to it in terms of 
                                                          
19 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 202; cf. New Hermeneutic, 23. 
20 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 25. 
21 Van Til, Apologetics, 128, 194; Christian Epistemology, 1-2; Theory of Knowledge, 35-36; Theistic-
Evidences, 51, 54; cf. Rousas John Rushdoony, The Biblical Philosophy of History (Vallecito, Calif.: Ross House, 
1969; repr., 2000), 40. 
22 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 5-6; Theistic-Evidences, 52, 64-65. 
23 Frame, Knowledge of God, 99-100. 
24 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 122-123. 
25 Cornelius Van Til, “Antitheses in Education,” in Foundations of Christian Education (ed. Dennis E. 
Johnson; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1990), 16. 
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his plan, creation, and providence.26 God himself is the most basic ‘Fact’ from which all created 
facts are determined and defined—with the Fact-facts distinction paralleling the Creator-creature 
distinction. Moreover, all created facts are revelational of God.27 Even man, as a created ‘fact,’ 
can have no pre-understanding of himself apart from or prior to the revelation of God.28 Man 
cannot reason apart from an atmosphere of revelation—his created mind and capacity to reason 
(as with the rest of his being) is itself as aspect of general revelation.29  
Unbelieving thought and methodology tend to assume the uncreated nature of facts in the 
universe (i.e. ‘brute’ or uninterpreted facts),30 treating them as essentially indeterminate.31 
According to Van Til, without the counsel of God as the ultimate principle of individuation,32 
man is left to appeal to an individuation of chance.33 In terms of metaphysics, “unless we begin 
with the Creator-creature distinction, participation in non-being is the only principle of 
individuation there is.”34 To the contrary, one must speak not merely of ‘facts’ in-general (akin 
to a ‘being-in-general’), but rather of one’s philosophy of ‘fact’ in light of the above truths. This 
is what Van Til sought to expose in apologetics.35 
 Following close upon his view of ‘facts,’ is his understanding of ‘possibility’ and 
‘interpretation.’ Any assertion about reality involves assumptions about the nature of that reality 
                                                          
26 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 393; Defense of the Faith, 32, 46, 50, 53, 228, 233-234; cf. Cornelius Van 
Til, “Bavinck the Theologian,” WTJ 24 (1961): 60. 
27 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 40; Apologetics, 79, 150; “Nature and Scripture,” 274-275, 280. 
28 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 25; “Nature and Scripture,” 273; Theory of Knowledge, 348. 
29 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 119, 122, 129; Theory of Knowledge, 15; Christian Epistemology, 123-
124. 
30 Cf. Nathan D. Shannon, “Christianity and Evidentialism: Van Til and Locke on Facts and Evidence,” 
WTJ 74 (2012): 323-353.  
31 Van Til, Common Grace, 2; cf. Christian Epistemology, 117-125. 
32 I.e. facts intelligible according to a pattern or by way of contrast. 
33 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 295. 
34 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 221. 
35 It may be noted that recent work in the area of historiography has also recognized the importance of these 
concerns (e.g., Iain Provan et al., A Biblical History of Israel [Louisville, Ky.: WJK, 2003], 56-102). 
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and possibility.36 God alone, as Creator, determines what is possible and impossible in relation to 
facts. He is the source of possibility, not man’s reason.37 “The very words possibility and 
probability have no meaning unless the God of Christianity actually exists”38—for Scripture tells 
us there is no other God, but the one who determines meaning. Antithetical to this are notions of 
an ultimate abstract and absolute possibility. Such a concept is ultimately rooted in indeterminate 
chance, for it does not take God’s revelation as ultimate, but rather posits an ‘unknown mystery’ 
encompassing both man and God—both subject to ‘possibility’ rather than ‘possibility’ being 
subject to God.39 Van Til concludes that: 
…a “possibility” that is above God is the same thing as chance. A God surrounded by 
chance cannot speak with authority. He would be speaking into a vacuum. His voice 
could not be heard. And if God were surrounded by chance, then human beings would be 
too. They would live in a vacuum, unable to hear either their own voices or those of 
others. Thus the whole of history, including all of its facts, would be without meaning.40 
 
Treating God as merely one fact among many surrounded by bare possibility is a negation of the 
self-attesting God of Scripture—the Fact who determines all things. To assume ‘neutrality’ 
toward facts as created and determined by God is to assume the universe is ultimately ‘open’ to 
both God and man. Such neutrality assumes God’s pre-interpreted system of facts is non-
existent.41 For example, to ask whether such a God exists and whether what He says about reality 
through Scripture is true, presupposes such a concept of possibility.42 In expounding Paul’s 
argument in Romans 1, Van Til highlights that God does not probably exist, nor is there any 
fault in objective revelation in the created order in expressing this—no one can escape 
                                                          
36 Van Til, New Modernism, 66. 
37 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 293; Systematic Theology, 396; Scripture, 131; Theistic-Ethics, 35. 
38 Van Til, Apologetics, 39 (emphasis his). 
39 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 197-198, 201; cf. Is God Dead?, 35-37; Christianity and Idealism, 8. 
40 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 327. 
41 Van Til, Christianity and Idealism, 9. 
42 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 263. 
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confronting it at every point.43 The non-Christian view of ‘possibility’ involves a suppression of 
the Creator-creature distinction (Rom. 1:18ff.). This distinction is so real and clear that there is 
no excuse for denying it and condemnation is just (1:20). So, to ask whether this God exists, 
denies the God of Scripture. Van Til also connects ‘possibility’ with special revelation in a 
similar fashion: 
True Protestantism starts from the fact or actuality of the book [Bible]. The meaning of 
the word possibility is first determined by God who has spoken to sinners through the 
book. That, and only that, is possible which the God of the Bible determines. The 
‘possibility of the book’ is no better than the idea of the ‘possibility of a book.’44 
 
Hence, an unbiblical notion of ‘possibility’ with regard to the Bible is a negation of it and the 
very possibility of an authoritative, self-attesting, divine revelation.45 In essence, the non-
Christian sees man “as the ultimate judge of what can and cannot be.”46 However, determination 
and certainty is only found in the Creator revealed in Scripture.47  
 One may object to such circular reasoning. However, when considering the issue of 
ultimate authority, it is unavoidable.48 Has the absolute Creator revealed truth or is it up to man 
to decide such truth?  This gets at the very heart of Van Til’s transcendental approach. “The only 
argument for an absolute God that holds water is a transcendental argument…a truly 
transcendental God and a transcendental method go hand in hand.”49 An argument which does 
not presuppose what God has said in his word to be true, reasons as if it were untrue and 
                                                          
43 Van Til, Intellectual Challenge, 5. 
44 Van Til, Intellectual Challenge, 20 (emphasis his). 
45 Cf. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 31. 
46 Van Til, Scripture, 13. 
47 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 103. 
48 Cf. Rousas John Rushdoony, By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy of Cornelius Van Til 
(Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1958), 139-140; Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 284-285, 523-525; Frame, Van 
Til, 299-309; Knowledge of God, 130-133. For helpful study of Van Til’s view on the place of evidence in relation 
to ultimate commitments, see Thom Notaro, Van Til and the Use of Evidence (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 
1985). 
49 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 11. 
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uncertain. Reasoning in a circular or spiral fashion50 is the only biblical option open to the finite 
creature. “Unless we are larger than God we cannot reason about him any other way, than by a 
transcendental or circular argument.”51 This kind of circularity is not fallacious because it is 
cogent in terms of the Christian worldview. God’s absolute coherence in his comprehensive 
knowledge of facts is the basis for man’s reasoning about them. Van Til explicitly connects this 
issue with metaphysics: 
…our reasoning cannot fairly be called circular reasoning,52 because we are not reasoning 
about and seeking to explain facts by assuming the existence and meaning of certain 
other facts on the same level of being with the facts we are investigating, and then 
explaining these facts in turn by the facts with which we began. We are presupposing 
God, not merely another fact of the universe.53 
  
When it comes to special revelation, “the kind of God that speaks in Scripture can only speak on 
his own authority.”54 If God’s word must be verified by some other criteria in order to be his 
word, then that criterion is more ultimate than God and hence, inconsistent with his nature 
revealed in Scripture.55 In short, we must reason as such if we are to interpret reality and the 
Bible consistent with the content of revelation, involving the Creator-creature distinction.56 This 
issue is important not only for Van Til, but also for philosophical hermeneutics.57 
                                                          
50 Van Til prefers ‘spiral’ in emphasizing that we grow in our understanding of the facts (of creation and 
Scripture) in this process, analogously approximating God’s understanding of them with his help (Frame, Van Til, 
306-307). 
51 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 12. 
52 That is, in a fallacious sense. 
53 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 201-202 (emphasis mine).  
54 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 265. 
55 This would include the inner-circularity of God’s triune nature (Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 202). 
In discussing the issue of Canon and authority, Ridderbos argues similar fashion (Herman N. Ridderbos, Redemptive 
History and the New Testament Scriptures [2d ed.; trans. H. De Jongste; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1988], 
33-38). 
56 Elsewhere, Van Til boldly asserts that “Christianity does not need to take shelter under the roof of a 
scientific method independent of itself. It rather offers itself as a roof to methods that would be scientific” (Theistic-
Evidences, 52). 
57 Poythress, “Kinds of Biblical Theology,” 134. 
136 
 
In addition to what has already been said about the ‘interpretation’ of facts, a few 
pertinent points can be made related to contemporary hermeneutical concerns. First, it is 
impossible for man to make a statement about any fact “without doing so in terms of an all-
inclusive view of reality.”58 We have seen that ontological assumptions are inevitable in 
hermeneutics, even when seeking to avoid them. This is especially made clear in light of Van 
Til’s treatment of the Creator-creature distinction. In order for man to engage in hermeneutics in 
terms of its holistic nature, he must not decontextualize himself nor treat his own reason as 
uncreated. Moreover, he must not re-contextualize himself in a different metaphysical context 
considered more ultimate. Rather, “the great presupposition of all his efforts at interpreting 
himself and the world about him is the fact that he and the world are first interpreted by God in 
Christ as revealed in Scripture.”59 Man cannot interpret himself rightly, as if in a vacuum, based 
on his own autonomy—as if able to determine the nature of things.60 
Second, any theory of interpretation that does not assume facts to be created and pre-
interpreted by their Creator assumes the existence of ‘brute’ facts and treats ‘God’ on the same 
ontological level as man, reducing him to “at most a co-interpreter, with man, of brute fact.” 
Without God creating the universe, facts would be ultimately unrelated.61 At least, subjectively, 
we would never know for sure if or how they were related. Not only are brute facts mute facts, 
but as uninterpreted, they are uninterpretable.62 Facts and their interpretation cannot be 
separated. “It is impossible to discuss any particular fact except in relation to some principle of 
interpretation.” Put another way, we cannot distinguish between facts as something we 
                                                          
58 Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 115.  
59 Cornelius Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1962), 432. 
60 Cornelius Van Til, The Great Debate Today (Nutley, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1971), 221. 
61 Van Til, Theistic-Evidences, 80-81. 
62 Van Til, God of Hope, 308. 
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experience and arguments about the source of those facts.63 Only the God of Christianity can 
provide: source, interpretation, and determinate meaning.64  
On this basis, Van Til was opposed to what he called the ‘block-house method’ in 
apologetics. 65 In short, this method seeks to prove Christianity in a piecemeal fashion, building 
‘story by story.’ Often, one seeks first to prove a generic ‘theism’ and then secondly, to establish 
that this ‘theism’ is of the Christian sort.66 Van Til argues that this type of method undermines 
the Creator-creature distinction in that it assumes the existence of a being-in-general to which 
one may subsequently add certain ontological characteristics of the Christian God, such as 
Creator and Triunity. What has actually been proven with a generic ‘theism’ which bears no 
particular resemblance to the God of Scripture? By not making the Creator-creature distinction 
basic at the outset of all prediction, ‘foreign material’ is introduced which distorts other doctrines 
of the Christian system of truth.  It treats the facts of creation and redemption as ‘brute’ facts, 
encouraging a philosophy of fact which already denies the Creator-creature distinction before it 
is even introduced.67 That God exists is involved in what God exists—from the start.68  
One could argue that there are forms of contemporary biblical hermeneutics which could 
be labeled as ‘hermeneutical block-house methods’—not self-consciously beginning with the 
presuppositions of the Creator-creature distinction and special revelation, but seeking to add 
them later in the process. For example, Dempster argues that Brevard Childs’ canonical 
approach, though not without significant merit, inconsistently utilizes the historical-critical 
method uncritically, then seeks to add to this historical ‘depth dimension’ a canonical role which 
                                                          
63 Van Til, Psychology, 155. 
64 Van Til, Theistic-Evidences, i. 
65 E.g., Van Til on Warfield (Theory of Knowledge, 229-254). 
66 Van Til, Apologetics, 148-149. 
67 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 136, 310-312. 
68 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 128. 
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cannot be explained by such a dimension.69 In short, Childs seeks to cross ‘Lessing’s ditch’ with 
a canonical hermeneutic constructed upon unstable assumptions exhibiting a reason-faith 
dichotomy.70 The issue is not that Childs’ method is ahistorical, but rather that he deals with 
history uncritically and inconsistently in light of his canonical concerns.71 What is needed is an 
approach which does not drive a wedge between the historical and the canonical or between 
general and special revelation.72 The issue of hermeneutical authority again surfaces in Childs’ 
work—whose intent has ultimate authority, the Author (or authors) or the canonical shapers (i.e. 
‘canonical intention’)?73  
Third, Van Til discusses the relationship between history, revelation, and interpretation in 
ways which seek to maintain the Creator-creature distinction. Due to this distinction, man must 
be interpreted in terms of his Creator, and then interpret history in light of God’s pre-
interpretation of it found in Scripture.74 In any philosophy of history, men seek to bring ‘facts’ 
into a pattern or framework.75 However, even historical description of the ‘facts’ involves 
explanation and patternization (i.e. the what and the that involved in one another). Hence, the 
difference between Christian and non-Christian philosophies of history involves more than 
merely an explanation of the ‘facts.’ It also involves their very idea of what counts as ‘facts’ to 
begin with. Van Til cites Eddington’s “ichthyologist” analogy in support of this point. The 
“ichthyologist” surveys his catch of fish and concludes that ‘fish’ are what his net can catch (i.e. 
                                                          
69 Stephen G. Dempster, “The Prophets, the Canon and a Canonical Approach,” in Canon and Biblical 
Interpretation (eds. Craig G. Bartholomew et al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2006), 322-323; cf. James Barr, 
Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 133; P.R. Davies, Whose 
Bible Is it Anyway? (JSOTsup 204; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 31.  
70 Dempster, “Canon and a Canonical Approach,” 321, 324. 
71 E.g., his inconsistent conclusions regarding the historical audience of Isaiah 40-66 (Brevard S. Childs, 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979], 323-327). 
72 Dempster, “Canon and a Canonical Approach,” 324-325. 
73 Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 217-218. 
74 Van Til, Psychology, 53; Apologetics, 21, 53-54. 
75 Cf. Cornelius Van Til, Paul at Athens (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, n.d.), 11-13. 
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of a certain size, shape, and so on), and conversely, what his net cannot catch are not ‘fish.’ The 
only ‘fish’ are those that can be caught by the net. The description fits the pattern. In other 
words, a non-Christian philosophy of history includes not only the view that ‘facts’ must be 
utterly pliable in order to fit a pattern of their own making (‘catchable fish’), but also the 
impossibility of falsification due to their patternization, which determined the nature of what 
those ‘facts’ can be to begin with.76 Van Til reminds us that “the facts of history cannot be 
disentangled from the principles of interpretation by which alone they can be presented to us as 
history, that is, as a coherent and connected series or order of events.”77  
Hermeneutically, this exhibits itself in how the role of the interpreter is conceived of in 
terms of ‘shaping’ meaning. A Christian hermeneutic, while recognizing the role of the 
interpreter in the process, opposes any concept of ‘shaping’ which assumes the completely open, 
pliable, or uncreated nature of the facts being interpreted.78 “According to any consistently 
Christian position, God, and God only, has ultimate definitory power.”79 Consequently, to follow 
the facts where they lead is to follow them in relation to God. However, there has been a general 
tendency in Western thought to resist using theological categories to understand history.80 This 
anti-metaphysical tendency, in order to make room for man-made objectivity and subjectivity in 
those who do not recognize or seek to be consistent with a two-level metaphysic based on the 
Creator-creature distinction, contradicts the Christian worldview and its corresponding 
philosophy of history.  
Inerrant Autographa 
                                                          
76 Van Til, Common Grace, 3-4; cf. Theistic-Evidences, 140. 
77 Van Til, “Introduction,” 5-6 (emphasis his). 
78 Cf. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 342-343. 
79 Van Til, Common Grace, 5.  
80 Murray A. Rae, “Creation and Promise: Towards a Theology of History,” in “Behind” the Text: History 
and Biblical Interpretation (ed. Craig Bartholomew et al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2003), 268. 
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 In terms of revelation and interpretation, Van Til also discusses the importance of the 
inerrant autographa in the context of the Creator-creature distinction. Arguing against the 
misguided notion that one can have a general trust in Scripture without infallible inspiration,81 he 
says: 
But we have seen that man needs absolutely authoritative interpretation. Hence, if the 
autographa were not infallibly inspired, it would mean that at some point human 
interpretation would stand above divine interpretation. It would mean that man were, 
after all, not certain that the facts and the interpretations given to the facts in Scripture are 
true.82 
 
This statement shows that Van Til saw Scripture not merely as a collection of ‘brute’ facts, but 
God’s interpretation of them according to his counsel and plan of redemption, centered on Christ. 
Furthermore, he ties together the issues of infallibility and authority in terms of the autographa. 
Restating things from a different angle, the Creator-creature distinction demands an infallible 
autographa in order to maintain the absolute authority of the Creator over the creature and a 
certain interpretation of the facts. Assuming man’s metaphysical freedom undermines the 
possibility for God’s absolute, authoritative revelation to man. Such a denial of the Creator-
creature distinction leads to claiming revelation to be unclear, with no finished facts in history, 
hence, no finished revelation,83 and, in light of Van Til’s view of special revelation as God’s 
interpretation of reality, no finished interpretation.84 Consequently, one’s ‘rule of faith’ becomes 
indistinguishable from ‘canon.’ Unbelieving thought seeks to bury the idea of divinely 
authoritative revelation by means of ‘being-in-general’ based on a monistic assumption not 
                                                          
81 In context, his concept of infallibility includes inerrancy. 
82 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 251. 
83 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 91-92. Incidentally, Childs roots his ‘canonical’ concept in the community 
and with regard to the OT, ultimately in the 4th C. church, which subjects his approach to a similar critique (cf. 
Michael J. Kruger, Canon Revisited: Establishing the Origins and Authority of the New Testament Books [Wheaton, 
Ill.: Crossway, 2012], 52-59). 
84 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 189-190; New Modernism, 287. 
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found in Scripture.85 Often, this ‘being-in-general’ is conceived of as history itself. However, 
according to Scripture, history is not the master category for interpretation, but rather, due to the 
Creator-creature distinction, God is—through his word revealed in history. This is the proper 
lens through which we are to make sense of the world.86 It is “folly for a creature of time to try 
out the interpretation of God in the test tube of time.”87 
Analogy 
The Creator-creature distinction is the root from which Van Til formulates his concept of 
analogy. Man is a created analogue of God. By this, he means that there are two levels of 
existence and two levels of knowledge, with man being dependent on and derivative of God.88 
By ‘analogy,’ Van Til seeks to understand how two levels of being and knowledge are related.89 
In terms of knowledge, God is the original and “has an absolute, self-contained system within 
himself…what comes to pass in history happens in accordance with that system.” Man cannot 
have a replica or exact reproduction of that system.90 Rather, man’s system should be “self-
consciously analogical.”91 Elsewhere, he describes this as “thinking God’s thoughts after 
himself.”92 Man must form his finite ‘system’ by seeking to think God’s thoughts after himself in 
submission to God’s authority, according to what He has revealed. “For this reason all of man’s 
interpretations in any field are subject to the Scriptures given him.”93 However, this does not 
mean that our knowledge is doomed to uncertainty or that knowledge does not require absolutely 
                                                          
85 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 152.  
86 Cf. Stephen I. Wright, “Inhabiting the Story: the Use of the Bible in the Interpretation of History,” in 
‘Behind’ the Text, 497. 
87 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 22. 
88 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 33; Defense of the Faith, 62-63. 
89 Gilbert B. Weaver, “Man: Analogue of God,” 324. 
90 This is opposed to univocal thinking, where there is an epistemological identity at any given point of 
correspondence (Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 71). 
91 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16.  
92 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 278; Theory of Knowledge, 16. 
93 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16; cf. Apologetics, 77. 
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certain foundations.94 “Man does not need to know exhaustively in order to know truly and 
certainly.”95 At a fundamental level, man’s interpretation of nature and Scripture must “be a re-
interpretation of what is already fully interpreted by God.”96 God’s certainty is the very essence 
of true knowledge.97 Van Til, speaking of the ethics of knowledge according to the Christian 
worldview, describes this type of dependent re-interpretation as “receptively reconstructive” as 
opposed to non-Christian ethical knowledge, which is “creaturely constructive.” The main 
difference is that the former is in creaturely submission to the Creator, while the latter seeks 
epistemological and ethical independence, without reference to God.98  
What are some hermeneutical implications of this? First, metaphysically speaking, there 
are two levels of interpreters—Creator and creature. If man does not think God’s thoughts after 
himself, God merely becomes a collaborator with whom we think thoughts that have never been 
thought by God or man.99 Second, if man refuses to interpret as an analogue of God, there is a 
tendency to set up a contrast between reason and faith in terms of revelation. Hence, man’s 
attitude toward one type of revelation (general) is set in opposition to another type (special).100 
This is a false antithesis according to Scripture. Third, man must interpret the Bible actively and 
creatively, but only re-constructively according to the pre-interpretation already there in the text, 
in its context (including canonical context). As a creature, man cannot engage in the creation of 
meaning. An example of such an attempt is Peter Enns, who denies an objective message in the 
                                                          
94 E.g., C. Stephen Evans, “Tradition, Biblical Interpretation, and Historical Truth,” in ‘Behind’ the Text, 
331. 
95 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 277-278. 
96 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 278, Scripture, 8; Sovereignty of Grace, 61-62. 
97 Van Til, Psychology, 142-143. 
98 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 72-73, 76; Systematic Theology, 213. 
99 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 70-71. 
100 Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 73. 
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Bible, and concludes that “we are all free to put the pieces together as we think best.”101 To the 
contrary, creaturely hermeneutics can only seek a re-creative summary of what is already there. 
The key issue is not whether interpretive creativity or subjective elements are involved, but 
whether they are of the rebellious sort or not. To put it in contemporary hermeneutical terms, 
man must re-interpret Scripture in dialogue with God as the ultimate authority.  
Van Til was careful to distinguish his doctrine of analogy from that of Rome and what he 
saw as its Greek philosophical influences.102 He seeks to avoid any trace of an Aristotelian 
‘analogy of being’ which “envelops God and man in a common reality.”103 This notion, found in 
Aristotle and Neoplatonism, having influence on Aquinas (though inconsistently so), saw ‘being’ 
on a scale or continuum, with God’s being at the top and non-being at the bottom. The higher on 
the scale, the more unity there is between essence and existence (i.e. nature governing actions 
and experience).104 Weaver has succinctly highlighted three main differences between Aquinas 
and Van Til on ‘analogy.’ First, whereas Aquinas presupposed partial autonomy of human 
reason, Van Til argued that all human knowledge was dependent upon divine revelation. Second, 
Aquinas believed all knowledge begins in sense experience apart from revelation, while Van Til 
said that sense experience functioned only in the context of revelation. Third, whereas Aquinas’ 
concept was rooted in a common scale of being with ‘analogy’ being a middle ground between 
univocal and equivocal predication, Van Til’s was based on two distinct levels of being. Rather 
                                                          
101 Peter Enns, The Bible Tells Me So: Why Defending Scripture Has Made Us Unable to Read It (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2014), 86. 
102 E.g., Van Til, Systematic Theology, 34, 38-39, 47, 52-53, 326, 333; Defense of the Faith, 177, 187. This 
is contrary to claims of critics (Gordon Clark, “The Bible as Truth,” BSac 94 [1957], 166; Robert Reymond, The 
Justification of Knowledge: An Introductory Study in Christian Apologetic Method [Nutley, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 
1976], 104). 
103 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 343; cf. Case for Calvinism, 58, 100. 
104 Frame, Van Til, 90-91. 
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than seeing ‘analogy’ dealing primarily with names or words applied to subjects, Van Til saw 
‘analogy’ as applying to the overall process of human thought—in both being and knowledge.105     
Frame points out a further nuance in Van Til’s concept of analogy.  Our thinking is 
reflective of God’s thought in two senses: all human thought reflects God, but in another sense, 
only obedient thought does. This is indicative of how theologians have spoken of man in the 
image of God in broad (structural) and narrow (functional) senses.106 In the former, man remains 
in the image of God after the fall, but in the latter, man ceases to function properly in the image 
of God. This nuance highlights the ethical component of epistemology related to analogy. 
 Another way in which Van Til speaks of ‘analogy’ is in terms of the archetypal-ectypal 
distinction found in the reformed tradition.107 Although he references this distinction (though not 
always in those exact terms) in the context of epistemology and the incomprehensibility of God, 
it is closely related to his doctrine of analogy.108 Discussing the attributes of God, Van Til uses it 
to emphasize God as the original and man as derivative, both metaphysically and 
epistemologically. Only on this foundation can we safely apply the way of eminence and 
negation. An abstract notion of either way, without this distinction in place, ends in conceiving 
of a finite ‘God’—either as an expanded creature (eminence) or as an abstract ‘blank,’ without 
positive or knowable qualities (negation). In the former, one ends in subjectivity, while in the 
latter, one ends in an empty, bare concept. Van Til argues that sinful man conveniently employs 
both ways in order to avoid thinking of himself as a creature, but rather as the ‘original.’ 
                                                          
105 Weaver, “Man: Analogue of God,” 326-327. 
106 Frame, Knowledge of God, 36. 
107 Cf. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 62n25; Willem J. van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning of 
Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology,” WTJ 64.2 (2002): 319-336; Richard A. Muller, Prolegomena to 
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108 R. Scott Clark, “Janus, the Well-Meant Offer of the Gospel, and Westminster Theology,” in The Pattern 
of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries (ed. David VanDrunen; Phillipsburg, N.J.: 
P&R Publishing, 2004), 157-160. 
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However, “our attempts to say something about God then have back of them the original fact that 
God has said something about himself.”109 Hermeneutically, our interpretations of reality in 
general and Scripture in particular have God’s revealed interpretation in back of both.  
At this point, a word may be said about accommodation and anthropomorphism. Both are 
closely related, with the latter being a more narrow subset of the former. Due to the Creator-
creature distinction, “any knowledge that we have of God is the result of divine 
accommodation.”110 Poythress points out that accommodation is really an expression of the 
Creator-creature distinction for understanding the nature of revelation. If we make a distinction 
between what God knows and what man knows, we infer that God’s communication to man will 
take into account that we are creatures. This steers us away from making creaturely knowledge 
the standard into which God must fit.111 Van Til observes that “every non-Christian philosophy 
and science seeks therefore to envelop God in his creation.”112 An important implication follows. 
If general and special revelation are both divine accommodations to the creature, there is for man 
no ‘unaccommodated’ viewpoint (e.g., human reason) from which to judge Scripture or sift 
through its anthropomorphisms in order to decide whether it is revelation from God or not.113 
Rather, God, as the archetype of communication in himself among the persons of the Trinity, is 
the unaccommodated ‘vantage point.’ In light of these truths and in close relation to reasoning 
‘analogically,’ Van Til argues that “we must speak of God anthropomorphically.”114 There is no 
other way to speak of God as Creator. In affirming accommodation, he is not promoting an 
                                                          
109 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 324. 
110 Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 137; cf. Michael Tinker, “John Calvin’s Concept of Divine 
Accommodation: A Hermeneutical Corrective,” Chm 118.4 (2004): 325-358. 
111 Vern S. Poythress, “Rethinking Accommodation in Revelation,” WTJ 76 (2014): 145.  
112 Van Til, Scripture, 126. 
113 Poythress, “Rethinking Accommodation,” 153-154. 
114 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 326; Common Grace, 73; Theory of Knowledge, 37. 
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agnostic attitude toward the knowledge of God, but rather a greater confidence.115 This is 
because God is in control as Creator and has so fashioned his creatures that he is able to 
communicate exactly what he intends without hindrance, and they are able to apprehend it 
without inherent metaphysical deficiencies.  
Antecedent Being 
Van Til also emphasizes the Creator-creature distinction in terms of God’s antecedent 
being and the corresponding relation to man. This is especially evident in his writings on the 
theology of Karl Barth. It must be said from the outset that much has been written about Van 
Til’s critique of Barth’s theology, both positively116 and negatively.117 In fact, in his earlier work 
on Barth, Van Til admits that “he is deeply aware of the fact that to discuss a system of theology 
in relation to its deepest philosophical bases is a hazardous undertaking.”118 It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to discuss the nuances of this debate. However, whether one agrees with 
Van Til’s assessment of Barth, it nonetheless exhibits his own concerns regarding the doctrine of 
God. We will merely highlight a few important emphases in Van Til’s work on Barth which 
flesh out his own concerns regarding the Creator-creature distinction. 
Van Til’s general critique is that Barth’s ‘wholly other –wholly revealed’ scheme 
suggests unbiblical notions of transcendence and immanence. He claims that in such a scheme, 
God ironically ceases to be considered as an antecedent being when the two are brought together 
                                                          
115 Frame, Van Til, 93-94. 
116 E.g., Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 135-148;  Frame, Van Til, 353-369.  
117 E.g., T. F. Torrance, Review of Cornelius Van Til, The New Modernism, EQ 19.2 (1947):144-149; G. C. 
Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1956), 387-390; 
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Book?” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology, 26-59). 
118 Van Til, New Modernism, viii. 
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(e.g., ‘Christ event’).119 This leads Van Til to emphasize certain truths related to the Creator-
creature distinction which he believes are compromised. God has comprehensive self-knowledge 
and is self-contained (i.e. sufficient unto himself),120 with his activities ad intra and his activities 
ad extra remaining distinct. Van Til was careful to preserve God as a se—as self-existent, self-
sufficient, and self-contained, and who does not limit himself in order to relate to man.121 
Moreover, God “is self-contained rationality.” This means that his infinite rationality is 
coterminous with his infinite being122—not dependent on anything outside himself, nor subject 
to any ‘mystery’ within himself or subordinate to a more ultimate ‘mystery’ from without.123 
Implied in this is the idea that ‘fact’ and ‘interpretation’ are coterminous in God, apart from the 
world.124 God has absolute self-consciousness and is the only self-explanatory being.125  
Van Til argued that Barth’s scheme undermined these truths by creating an unstable 
dualism between God and creation which needs to be overcome,126 as opposed to a created 
relation to be embraced. Horton concludes that for Barth, “grace does not so much restore nature 
as replace it.”127 The only way to ‘overcome’ such a dualism is through participation, wherein 
God wholly reveals himself to man and man participates in God through identification in Christ. 
                                                          
119 For a similar critique, see: Michael J. Ovey, “A Private Love? Karl Barth and the Triune God,” in 
Engaging with Barth (eds. David Gibson and Daniel Strange; Nottingham: Apollos, 2008), 220. 
120 Van Til, New Modernism, 364, 370, 373-374, 387. Sometimes Van Til refers to God as ‘self-contained 
fullness,’ by which he means to guard against univocal thinking in terms of the way of negation (no positive 
qualities) or the way of eminence (merely extrapolating a larger universe) (Frame, Van Til, 54-56; cf. Van Til, 
Systematic Theology, 332-333). 
121 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 27, 58, 117, 197, 267, 324, 327, 369, 373, 376, 385, 393, 397; Defense of 
the Faith, 33, 75, 83, 228, 277, 296, 327, 335, 401; Theory of Knowledge, 12, 16, 44, 202; Christian Epistemology, 
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123 Van Til, Apologetics, 25, 28; Barthianism, 490. 
124 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 30; Defense of the Faith, 31-32; “Introduction,” 5-6, 19. 
125 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 341; Theory of Knowledge, 15, 19, 56. 
126 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/3, 351-352, 366-368; cf. Berkouwer, Triumph of Grace, 69-88. 
127 Michael S. Horton, “A Stoney Jar: The Legacy of Karl Barth for Evangelical Theology,” in Engaging 
with Barth, 354. 
148 
 
Hence, this notion of transcendence carries with it a corresponding immanence (‘wholly 
revealed’).128 Yet, there remains an inconsistency between such conceptions of transcendence 
and immanence. It would seem that a wholly other and wholly revealed scheme would contain 
irrationalistic and rationalistic elements, respectively.129 For example, “If God is ‘wholly other,’ 
then how can we know or say that he is ‘wholly other’?”130 Barth, without direct special 
revelation given by God through an infallible and inerrant word in history,131 is left with an 
ambiguous revelation in Christ (which is from time to time and ‘strictly future’ for us)132 and an 
equally ambiguous participation in him. How would we know if and when this revelation occurs 
without revealed parameters? As one of Van Til’s mentors put it, “without God’s acts the words 
would be empty, without his words the acts would be blind.”133 Van Til argued that Barth’s 
concept of participation and identification is inconsistent with God as an antecedent being. The 
‘wholly other’ cannot speak to man until wholly identical or wholly revealed to man.134 God and 
man end up in a correlated relationship with each other for either to be themselves. 
While some have faulted Van Til for overlooking Barth’s own emphasis on the 
antecedence of God,135 few have sufficiently answered his critique of Barth’s twofold view of 
history (Geschichte and Historie).136 At best, these concepts are confusing, especially in how 
                                                          
128 Van Til, New Modernism, 367-368; Barthianism, 307. 
129 E.g., Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, 201; cf. Frame, Van Til, 364. 
130 Cf. Frame, Knowledge of God, 13-15. 
131 Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, 126; I/2, 507-533; II/1, 88 cf. Gabriel Fackre, “Revelation,” in Karl Barth 
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132 Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, 16, 111, 124, 258. 
133 Geerhardus Vos, “Idea of Biblical Theology,” in The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos: Redemptive 
History and Biblical Interpretation (ed. Richard B. Gaffin, Jr.; Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1980), 10. 
134 Van Til, Barthianism, 428.  
135 E.g., Ortlund, “Wholly Other or Wholly Given Over,” 39-43; cf. Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and 
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Frame, Van Til, 362n33). 
136 This is curiously absent from Ortlund’s assessment of Van Til, considering its prominence in both of his 
major works on Barth. Van Til faulted Berkouwer’s assessment of Barth for neglecting his view of history 
(Sovereignty of Grace, 89). Cassidy’s recent work identifies three ‘times’ in Barth: God’s time, our time, and God’s 
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they relate to one another.137 At worst, unorthodox implications follow. In short, Geschichte 
involves: God, divine revelation, redemptive acts, and reality in Christ. These are significant 
events for faith which illumine ordinary history, yet are distinct from it. Historie, on the other 
hand, refers to ordinary calendar, time-space history. The latter is subject to historical 
investigation and critique, while the former is not.138 This inaccessibility is primarily due to 
God’s sovereign freedom being at stake.139 Divine revelation takes place in Historie, but does 
not leave lasting or reliable information concerning what actually took place, nor does it make 
historical claims. Though there is debate as to whether the ‘events’ of Geschichte actually take 
place in Historie and on what level, to Van Til, the most problematic implication is that there is 
no ultimate transition from wrath to grace in our ordinary, time-space history.140    
Much could be said of Barth’s ‘histories,’ but one particular point which Van Til makes 
is especially pertinent to the Creator-creature distinction. It would seem that for Barth, the 
fundamental relation between God and man is ultimately in terms of Geschichte, not the Creator-
creature distinction, traditionally understood.141 This is problematic in that it seems to give 
priority to Christ’s initial creative and universal work, to the neglect of his re-creative, particular 
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137 E.g., Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/2, 58; cf. Craig G. Bartholomew, Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics: 
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work in redemption.142 Grace becomes the ground and essence of the original ontological 
relation between God and man, and reconciliation does not follow creation in our time-space 
history.143 
James J. Cassidy’s recent study of Barth’s view of eternity and time provides a balanced 
alternative to Van Til’s work on Barth, which is much more polemic and antagonistic. While 
more appreciative of Barth’s contributions as a whole, Cassidy raises some of the same concerns 
seen in Van Til’s work. Namely, he questions the ontological dualism between God and creation 
expressed in Barth’s depiction of ‘God’s time’ and ‘our time,’ and how he proposes to overcome 
this dualism theologically. Moreover, can Barth’s Christology avoid charges of Eutychianism, 
merging created time and eternity in an unbiblical form of participation?144    
There are many hermeneutical implications from the above discussion. First, Barth’s 
scheme seemingly creates a dualism between God and creation which provides a more ultimate 
interpretive grid than what is revealed in Scripture.145 Moreover, Van Til argues that Barth ends 
up with a monistic ontology using one scale of being, with indeterminism (wholly other) at one 
end of the scale and determinism (wholly revealed) at the other end.146  Second, his stress on 
God’s revelation as a continued, future act (‘from time to time’) implies that there is no finished 
revelation (not unlike issues related to inerrancy cited above).147 This is opposed to Van Til’s 
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assertion that the Bible is the finished interpretation of Christ’s work of redemption in history.148 
Third, in light of his twofold concept of history, Barth does not identify the Bible with 
revelation. Certainly, the Word of God (Christ) is distinct from the written word, but the latter is 
God’s directly inspired, corresponding witness to the Word. Hence, they are distinct, but not 
separate, nor in opposition to one another.149 After all, Jesus explicitly appeals to and assumes 
the written word as no less from God in his own teaching.150 Van Til argues that we must begin 
from the Bible as identical with revelation when interpreting any fact of the world.151 A Christian 
philosophy only works on the foundation of the redemptive history revealed in Scripture. Though 
distinct, there is no biblical justification for a disjunction between Christ and the written word in 
terms of revelation, authority, and interpretation.152 The revelation of the Word (Christ) is 
divinely interpreted by the revealed written word. In the words of Warfield, “at the basis of 
Christianity [lies] not only a series of great redemptive facts, but also an authoritative 
interpretation of those facts.”153 Fourth, while rightly intending to interpret the Bible according 
to its message, Barth ends up distorting that message by conceiving of a revelation history 
incongruent with it.154 This is one reason why Barth’s theological interpretation differs from that 
of Van Til. Other differences could be added, such as not recognizing the Bible’s own inner-
hermeneutic as direct revelation.155 It would seem that Barth was right to emphasize subject 
matter in hermeneutics over against attempts to get ‘behind’ the text, but wrongly saw the 
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Bible’s subject matter as Jesus Christ experienced in an ‘event,’ divorced from a divinely 
inspired text. This leaves his subject matter without clear content and his theological hermeneutic 
without bearings. Lastly, Barth seems to remove the distinction between God’s revelation and 
man’s acceptance of it.156 The recipient becomes part of special revelation itself, confusing the 
traditional categories of inspiration and illumination.157 Revelation is redefined as experience, 
not finished instruction, leading to issues involving authority—not unlike more reader-response 
approaches in hermeneutics.158 God with man in Geschichte is the ultimate shared reference 
point of interpretation rather than the antecedent God.159 Whether or not one agrees with his 
assessment of Barth, Van Til affirms significant truths regarding the Creator-creature distinction 
with implications for hermeneutics. 
Recently, Oliphint has highlighted another implication of the Creator-creature distinction 
for hermeneutics related to the above discussion. Citing Muller in support,160 he argues for an 
ontological priority in interpretation based on the fundamental aseity of God. This ontological 
priority means that rather than interpreting texts in isolation (with the danger of imposing an 
extra-biblical conception of God on a given text), the unity of Scripture must be taken into 
account because God is immutable and independent of his creation. Hence, the unity of Scripture 
must be given priority in interpretation. By being created in the image of God, man has an 
inherent understanding that God exists as independent from his creation (Rom. 1:18ff.). An 
understanding of God as God, apart from and prior to creation, informs our ‘ontological 
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158 Cf. Van Til, Barthianism, 249-250; Geoffrey W. Bromiley, “The Authority of Scripture in Karl Barth,” 
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conception’ which functions as our guide in handling other texts which speak of God (or 
anything else for that matter). This is merely another way of affirming the reformed principle of 
Scripture interpreting Scripture, letting clearer passages interpret the less clear (e.g., WCF 
1.9).161 We could say that as a creature, man cannot interpret Scripture as if uncreated and God 
as not independent without undermining the ontological priority of the text.   
The Person of Christ 
 The Creator-creature distinction is prominent in his discussion of the person of Christ. 
Taking his cue from Chalcedon, Van Til affirms that the eternal Son, the second person of the 
ontological Trinity assumed a fully human nature in the incarnation, yet did not lose his full deity 
in any way.162 Only non-Christian notions of the divine-human relationship involve God having 
to limit himself.163 The eternal Son took on full humanity, without being absorbed by it.164 He 
did not become a human person, nor did he mingle the two natures and become a third entity. 
Rather, “in Christ, the divine and the human natures are so related as to be ‘two natures, without 
confusion, without change, without division, without separation.’”165 One implication is that 
“even in the incarnation Christ could not commingle the eternal and the temporal. The eternal 
must always remain independent of and prior to the temporal.”166 All heresies related to the 
doctrine of the Trinity “may be reduced to the one great heresy of mixing the eternal with the 
temporal.”167 Van Til’s main concern was to keep God and man in a proper relation to one 
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another, without confusion. In creation and no less, re-creation, the Creator remains distinct from 
the creature, expressed uniquely in the incarnation.168 
Van Til repeatedly measures his critique of others according to the Chalcedonian 
formulation to evaluate whether justice is done to the Creator-creature distinction. For example, 
as opposed to one level of being with two aspects, eternal and temporal, in which the temporal is 
merely a particular expression of the eternal (e.g., Platonism), Van Til points to Chalcedon as 
showing the close union between the two in Christ, yet without intermixture. Against Bowne, he 
argues that the divine does not merge into the human person of Christ, which would involve the 
eternal merging in the temporal.169 It is important to note that exactly how the eternal and 
temporal are combined without intermixture is only exhaustively known by God.170 In 
combating forms of dialecticism that would correlate notions of being and non-being, Van Til 
again points to Chalcedon to affirm the distinction between deity and humanity.171 In his critique 
of Barth, he opposes any notion that God, in Christ, is free to submit himself to the limitations of 
the creature in Geschichte, with man participating in it.172 Furthermore, he argues that Barth’s 
stress on the identity between Christ and the revelation event in Geschichte and man’s 
participation removes the restrictions of Chalcedon. This is what Van Til calls ‘actualizing’ the 
incarnation. This involves interpreting the two natures of Christ “in terms of the one act that 
takes place within both” wherein the immutability of the divine nature and the ‘immutability’ of 
the human nature are compromised in the Christ-event.173 Van Til also stresses that man was and 
always will be a creature, even in redemption. We must not confuse ethical rebellion with 
                                                          
168 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 359-360. 
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155 
 
ontology.174 Hence, in the incarnation and work of redemption, the distinction between the 
Creator and creature remains unchanged.175 Re-creation follows and restores creation, it does not 
establish it. 
Some may fault Van Til for over-emphasizing the distinction between the two natures of 
Christ, seemingly at the expense of their union, which was also affirmed at Chalcedon and 
reinforced at Constantinople II (‘hypostatic union’). Van Til does argue against Barth using the 
term, ‘separation,’ to describe the relation between the two natures,176 but elsewhere he uses the 
more traditional language of ‘distinct.’177 Granted, his argument suffers from inconsistency in 
terminology. He often emphasized the distinction for his apologetic purposes. However, upon 
closer examination, his discussion of Chalcedon not only clearly denounces the error of 
Nestorianism, which he sees as both, an assault on the Trinity (wherein there is interpenetration 
without losing personhood) and as confusing the eternal with the temporal (resembling a form of 
deism in which the divine is separated from the human).178 However, he also affirms the union of 
the two natures in the one person of the Son.179 Indeed, he even stresses the indivisible and 
inseparable relation between the two natures to avoid any notion that it is not a real union.180 
 One key hermeneutical implication is that we cannot allow temporality to limit our 
consideration of the divine author in all of his self-contained fullness. Historical and temporal 
concerns are prominent in contemporary hermeneutics. Rather than taking away from human 
authorial intentions, consideration of the divine establishes them in their Spirit-inspired intent.181 
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The only way consideration of either the human or divine author becomes problematic is if both 
are seen on the same level of being or participation, in which justice done to one necessarily 
takes away from the other and one attempts to merge the two in a way that neither remain 
themselves.  
Sovereignty & Election 
Another context where Van Til emphasizes the Creator-creature distinction is in terms of 
sovereignty and election. In discussing the issue of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, 
he points out that both hyper-Calvinists and Arminians fall into similar errors. The former 
compromises responsibility to maintain sovereignty, while the latter do the reverse. Van Til sees 
the two extremes as stemming from one common denominator. Frame summarizes as follows: 
Unwittingly, both hyper-Calvinists and Arminians at this point see God and man on a 
common scale of being, so that anything ascribed to God must be taken from man, and 
vice versa…There are two distinct levels of reality: that of the Creator and that of the 
creature. There are also two distinct levels of causality: divine causality and causation 
from within the world…thus, it is Van Til’s “two-circle metaphysics,” his distinction 
between Creator and creature, that enables him to have a strong doctrine of divine 
sovereignty together with a strong doctrine of human freedom.182 
 
 Rather than divine sovereignty and human freedom on one ‘balanced’ scale, wherein 
affirming one side necessarily takes away from the other side, Van Til asserts two levels of being 
in which exercising the nature of one does not limit the other. He argues that the absolute will of 
God is very presupposition of the will of man: 
Looked at in this way, that which to many seems at first glance to be the greatest 
hindrance to moral responsibility, namely the conception of an absolutely sovereign God, 
becomes the very foundation of its possibility.183 
 
This insistence on consciously presupposing two levels of being with the issue of 
sovereignty and responsibility could also be applied to interpretation. For example, consider the 
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role of creativity in interpretation. In terms of one level of being, one may conclude that any 
human creativity used in interpretation would necessarily detract from or at least modify the 
objective creativity of God’s revelation. This may lead to avoiding all creativity by seeking to 
isolate the meaning of a text in a way that ignores complexity, reducing the fullness of meaning 
down to what is deemed as ‘scientific’ or ‘controlled.’ However, if a two level ontology is 
assumed, human creativity, though never absolute, would reflect the absolute creativity of God. 
It is necessary for finite creatures to summarize the complex truth revealed in Scripture 
creatively in order to grow in understanding it. The Bible would still function as the ultimate 
authority, but this would not inhibit creativity, but enhance it. The only creativity prohibited 
would be of the rebellious sort. Complexity is only a problem for hermeneutics if a one-level 
ontology is assumed, resulting in a search for ultimate certainty and objectivity in the human 
mind. However, with a two-level ontology, we can embrace complexity without reductionism. 
This brings us to the issue of election. Van Til again stresses the importance of the 
Creator-creature distinction in seeking to avoid mixing the eternal with the temporal in 
soteriology: 
Even if we say that in the case of any one individual sinner the question of salvation is in 
the last analysis dependent upon man rather than God, that is if we say that man can of 
himself accept or reject the gospel as he pleases, we have made the eternal God 
dependent upon man. We have then, in effect, denied the incommunicable attributes of 
God. If we refuse to mix the eternal and the temporal at the point of creation and at the 
point of the incarnation, we must also refuse to mix them at the point of salvation.184 
 
In conceiving of election and reprobation in these terms, he guards against thinking of man as 
exercising his created will as if in a void, without relation to or dependence upon the all-
embracing will and counsel of God.185 God is the source of ultimate causation for both election 
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and reprobation, notwithstanding the presence of secondary causes. However, while God’s 
decree is behind both election and reprobation (with “equal ultimacy”), it is not behind them in 
the same manner.186 Van Til seeks to articulate the doctrine of election in such a way as to affirm 
God’s pre-interpretation of all things, including reprobation, before the foundation of the 
world.187 While he acknowledges great mystery here for man, it is no mystery to God.  
Rebellion against the Creator-Creature Distinction: the Fall 
Perhaps one of Van Til’s most innovative contributions is his diagnosis of unbelieving 
thought patterns in terms of the biblical account of the fall. He often uses the fall narrative as the 
case study and origin of rebellious epistemology. Prior to the fall, man was to know and interpret 
reality with God as the final reference point in all predication. God gave a sure command with a 
determined outcome. However, Satan suggested to Adam and Eve that what God said was not 
determinative of reality and that they could make that determination themselves, apart from God. 
Through mere observation and future prediction, based on the powers of their own logic, they 
could legislate what was possible or impossible, moral or immoral.188 Presented with God’s 
word and Satan’s antithetical word, they were tempted to decide which was true as ultimate 
judge. This assumes that God (and his word) is merely one ‘fact’ among many to be evaluated, 
rather than the Fact which determines all others. However, in assuming the role of ‘neutral’ 
judge and the fallibility of God, they already decided against God.189 “This…was a denial of 
God’s absoluteness epistemologically. Thus neutrality was based upon negation. Neutrality is 
negation.”190 In short, Satan tempted them to think and act autonomously.  
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When man sinned, he sought to interpret reality without reference to God. The revelatory 
character of every fact, even his own consciousness, was denied. Man assumed an ‘uncreated’ 
stance from which interpretation would be original, not derivative.191 Rather than thinking 
according to God’s sure revelation, man searches for ideals ‘in-general,’ in terms of knowledge 
and morality. “Man made for himself a false ideal of knowledge, the ideal of absolute 
inderivative comprehension. This he could never have done if he had continued to recognize that 
he was a creature.”192 When man saw that he could not obtain comprehensive, knowledge of all 
things, he blamed his own finitude. Hence, he confused the ontological and ethical aspects of 
reality—a common trait among non-Christian philosophies.193 
Van Til helpfully summarizes the epistemological effects of the fall in terms of a 
rationalistic-irrationalistic dialectic:  
The root of both irrationalism and rationalism is the idea of the ultimacy of man. If this 
root is not taken out, it will do little good to trim off some of the wildest offshoots of 
irrationalism with the help of rationalism, or to trim off some of the wildest offshoots of 
rationalism with the help of irrationalism.194 
 
The issue is not seeking a balance between the two. Rather, the unstable combination of both 
stems from a faulty starting point. There is no essential difference between what the rationalist 
and irrationalist are defending. They only differ in how they defend it. Both are interested in 
suppressing the fact of their own creaturehood and have become friends against their common 
foe—Christianity.195 In rejecting God’s revelation, man irrationalistically assumes that no 
rational scheme could explain or control reality.196 This included the idea of uncreated, 
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uninterpreted, brute facts, and an uncontrolled environment of chance (i.e. pure contingency).197 
Hence, God is reduced by man to the same level as man, with both seeking the truth in an 
ultimate environment of unknown mystery and chance.198 In essence, the Creator-creature 
distinction is discarded in favor of God and man as both of one being surrounded by a factual 
space over which no one has control.199 Unbelieving thought exhibits epistemological 
irrationalism correlated with a metaphysic of chance.200 On the other hand, man also 
rationalistically assumes no need to obtain information from any outside source other than his 
own mind in order to know and judge reality. In effect, man made a universal negative 
judgment—assuming to know all things, knowing for certain that no absolute truth can be found 
anywhere, and what God said could not be true.201 
Ironically, man “has to be both in order to be either,”202 and seeks to combine elements of 
both, in order to preserve his own autonomy—unifying experience through a principle of 
coherence rooted in his own mind.203 For example, he irrationally claims that all things are 
possible, but rationalistically, that no one knows. He rationalistically claims, through universal 
negative propositions, that some things are not possible, but irrationalistically, that no one knows 
all things. Van Til explains: 
About chance no manner of assertion can be made. In its very idea it is the irrational. And 
how are rational assertions to be made about the irrational? If they are to be made, then it 
must be because the irrational is itself wholly reduced to the rational…he must assert on 
the one hand that all reality is nonstructurable in nature, and on the other hand that he 
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himself has virtually structured all of it. Thus all predication is, in the nature of the case, 
self-contradictory.204 
 
The bottom line is that once man assumes ultimacy, he must either know everything or he cannot 
know anything.205 This creates insurmountable tension and an unstable mix of both notions, 
ending in self-contradiction. For example, seeking to know all things, man is frustrated by the 
limits of human language and driven to conclude that the reality is a mirage.206 Moreover, 
through a denial of the Creator-creature distinction, man ceases to know the limits of his own 
reason, ending in futility.207 “The proper limits of human thought cannot be ascertained unless 
one first takes one’s stand upon the position of revelation.”208 The history of philosophy could be 
seen as a grappling with the limits of human reason, and even the escape from creaturely reason 
since the fall. This is not a ‘neutral’ pursuit, but one in which the idea of pure factuality and 
chance are employed to “guarantee that no true authority, such as that of God as the Creator and 
Judge of men, will ever confront man.”209 To the contrary: 
…the biblical position is not like that of rationalism or like that of irrationalism. Nor is it 
like any combination of these two. It is based on the presupposition that man knows truly 
though not comprehensively because God does know all things in terms of his self-
contained being and has revealed himself to man.210 
 
 Though there are wide-ranging hermeneutical implications concerning this dialectic as a 
diagnostic tool, we will consider a few of the more salient ones. First, in evaluating 
hermeneutical philosophy from a Christian perspective, one must ask, what ultimate reference 
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point is being presupposed? Is it the creature or Creator?211 If the former, without succumbing to 
a superficial simplicity or over-generalization,212 it would be expedient to ask where 
inconsistencies exist in such methods, in terms of an unstable mixture of both rationalism 
irrationalism. Rather than seeing the different approaches in philosophical hermeneutics as 
merely a battle between modern and postmodern schools, it would be more consistent and 
helpful to address the deeper issues of autonomy and monistic metaphysics in both.  
Second, in discussing the fall and its effects on the history of philosophy, Van Til argues 
that certain gaps are introduced through this dialectic not present prior to the fall. One is the gap 
between ‘truth’ and reality (e.g., ‘facts’ but no fully known system of reality to make sense of 
those facts). Another is the gap between fact and the mind (e.g., between what is outside and 
inside the mind). Irrationally, man assumed that truth was found apart from a rationally 
controlled scheme of reality given by God. Rationalistically, man sought to provide ‘unity’ 
rooted in his own mind—a system based on comprehensive knowledge. However, this only 
functions as a limiting notion due to it being an ultimate context of irrational mystery. Both gaps 
are symptomatic of an essentially atomistic approach. All non-Christian philosophies virtually 
deny the unity of truth. This introduced a certain dualism which cannot adequately be resolved 
while still holding onto the ultimacy of the human mind.213 Regarding biblical interpretation, 
unbelieving thought tends toward decontextualizing the Bible from its revealed, contextual 
system of truth concerning God and his relation to man as a creature, and then seeks to re-
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contextualize its parts back together again from the ultimacy of the human mind. Inevitably, this 
re-contextualizing distorts the message of Scripture.214 
Conclusion 
 The Creator-creature distinction is paramount in Van Til’s theology proper, expressed in 
a number of different contexts, and connected to other important emphases. In addition, it is the 
basis for evaluating various forms of non-Christian philosophy, which deny this distinction. 
Since the fall, man has conceived of his own mind as autonomous and ultimate, resulting in an 
unstable and inconsistent mixture of rationalistic and irrationalistic elements and insurmountable 
gaps in epistemology. Such things as comprehensive knowledge, history, and language only 
become problematic if man seeks to understand them in himself, going beyond his creaturely 
limits. Finitude is only problematic if one is seeking to think other than as a creature. 
This is a helpful approach for evaluating contemporary biblical hermeneutics from a 
Christian worldview, and to avoid methodology which undermines its message. “If God is not 
made first in human interpretation, then he is not God at all.”215 Doing justice to the Creator-
creature distinction is the first step in making God first in interpretation. In the next chapter, we 
will address another important emphasis in Van Til’s doctrine of God with implications for 
contemporary hermeneutics.      
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Part Two: Van Til’s Doctrine of God 
Chapter Five: Incomprehensibility 
Introduction 
 While the Creator-creature distinction is most prominently expressed in Van Til’s 
doctrine of God, it is incomprehensibility for which he is notoriously known in reformed circles. 
If the Creator-creature distinction is seen as his most pervasive category for theology proper, 
incomprehensibility can be seen as an important subset of that distinction. In what follows, we 
will consider first, his debate with Gordon Clark over God’s incomprehensibility and his further 
elaborations. Next, we will look at how Van Til discusses incomprehensibility in relation to the 
concepts of ‘paradox’ and ‘mystery.’ Lastly, we will consider hermeneutical implications related 
to the divine and human authors of Scripture in terms of incomprehensibility and meaning. 
The Clark Debate 
 Incomprehensibility was at the center of Van Til’s feud with Gordon Clark. Clark was a 
Christian philosopher who sought ordination in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC). 
During the examination process, Clark’s views regarding epistemology were questioned by some 
as to their consistency with reformed theology. The debate revolved around the relationship 
between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. Our concern here is not with the politics and 
procedure of their dispute in the OPC (c.1944-1948), but rather with the theological and 
philosophical elements expressed therein. After addressing the substance of the debate, we will 
suggest two potential remedies overlooked within its very documents1 and one remedy not 
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mentioned, but found in the writings of both Clark and Van Til. In these remedies, we will get a 
clearer picture of Van Til’s view of incomprehensibility. 
 Van Til’s doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God was represented in the ‘complaint’ 
against Clark,2 yet more nuanced his own writings on the subject. Because God is on another 
level of being as Creator, man cannot have the same identical knowledge, but only derivative 
knowledge.3 Therefore, there must not merely be a quantitative, but also a qualitative difference 
between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. A mere quantitative difference implies a 
difference in degree rather than in kind—which would transgress the Creator-creature distinction 
and the majesty of God.4 The ‘complaint’ objected to Clark’s view that: 
any knowledge that man possesses of any item must coincide with God’s knowledge of 
the same item in order to be true knowledge, thus failing to distinguish with respect to 
content between the Creator’s knowledge of any thing and creaturely knowledge of the 
same thing.5 
 
In short, Clark was charged with not rising above a mere quantitative distinction in terms of 
content. The emphasis on the Van Til side was clearly on avoiding unbiblical rationalism. 
While the dialogue suffered from terminological confusion, Clark “argued that Van Til’s 
notion of ‘qualitative difference’…with no coincidence ‘at any single point,’ leads to 
irrationalism and to only an analogy of the truth,” but something other than the truth.6 Clark was 
adamant that there cannot be two levels of truth (one for God and one for man), with neither 
being the same truth for the other. While he believed that God knows an infinite number of 
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propositions, including all proper relations between them, this was not qualitatively different in 
terms of the meaning regarding any one proposition known by God and man.7 For Clark, the 
emphasis was clearly on avoiding any form of unbiblical irrationalism. 
 Those who followed Clark continued to press the point that Van Til’s notion of 
incomprehensibility led to skepticism and put a true knowledge of God in jeopardy. Hoeksema 
argued that “if what God has revealed to us has a different meaning for him than for us, God is 
not only incomprehensible, but also unknowable.” He suggested that the real crux of the debate 
was not incomprehensibility, but whether revelation is intelligible to man.8 Nash, though not 
uncritical of Clark’s later ideas, concludes that there must be points of identical coincidence for 
there to be true knowledge.9 Moreover, he claims that Van Til rejects that anyone can know 
something about the mind of God without it being the product of special revelation.10 Reymond 
explicitly endorses what he calls Clark’s “Christian rationalism”—seeing this as a “wholesome 
corrective” to Van Til.11 However, his critique is somewhat perplexing, considering that 
elsewhere, he explicitly endorses Van Til’s two-level ontology and epistemology based on the 
Creator-creature distinction.12 Yet, he contends that God is able to impart knowledge to man 
univocally, and that man must think God’s thoughts univocally after him (i.e. true knowledge is 
univocal knowledge).13 He sees Van Til’s doctrine of ‘analogy’ as problematic—as an unstable 
blend of univocity and equivocity. To him, Van Til had not sufficiently stated the clear nature of 
                                                          
7 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 22; cf. Gordon H. Clark, Logic (Jefferson, Md.: Trinity Foundation, 1985), 129. 
8 Herman Hoeksema, The Clark-Van Til Controversy (Hobbs, N.Mex.: Trinity Foundation, 1995), 12.  
9 Ronald H. Nash, “Gordon Clark’s Theory of Knowledge,” in The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark: A 
Festschrift (ed. Ronald H. Nash; Philadelphia, Pa.: P&R Publishing, 1968), 173-174; The Word of God and the 
Mind of Man (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1982), 90, 101. 
10 Nash, Mind of Man, 100. 
11 Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, 109; A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (2d ed.; 
Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 109. 
12 Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, 42-43; Systematic Theology, 97-98. 
13 Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, 44-45, 101-104. 
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the ‘qualitative’ difference between divine and human knowledge.14 He suggests that, according 
to Van Til, God is still as incomprehensible after his revelation as he was prior to it, leading to an 
unbiblical skepticism.15 
Latent Remedies and Further Nuances  
 The impasse created by the use of poorly defined terminology unfortunately obscured 
two latent remedies embedded in the OPC documents themselves which could have not only 
provided clarity, but also could have highlighted helpful nuances in Van Til’s writings on 
incomprehensibility.16 Indeed, one pitfall was that Clark emphasized the identity of the object 
known by God and man, whereas the Van Til side emphasized difference in the subjective 
knowing between God and man. Hence, neither side adequately distinguished between ‘knowing’ 
and the ‘thing known.’17 
God’s Simplicity 
 The first latent remedy is God’s simplicity, which was affirmed by both sides. Van Til 
often stressed that God’s being is coterminous with his knowledge (as well as his attributes).18 
Consequently, God’s knowledge has divine attributes. Indicative of divine simplicity with 
respect to God’s knowledge is his statement that “God’s thought with respect to anything is as a 
unit…in God’s mind, any bit of information that he gives to man is set in the fullness of his one 
supreme act of self-affirmation.”19 Clark also clearly affirmed divine simplicity20—even with 
respect to knowledge. For example, the committee appointed to examine the debate 
acknowledged his belief that “God’s knowledge of any truth is not divorced from his knowledge 
                                                          
14 Reymond, Systematic Theology, 102-103n19; Justification of Knowledge, 100, 104. 
15 Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, 100-101. 
16 Cf. Hunt, “Introduction,” 82-89. 
17 Minutes of the Twelfth, 9-15, 29-30; Minutes of the Fifteenth, 22. 
18 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 201, 364, 371-372. 
19 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 270. 
20 Clark, Logic, 120-123; Trinity, 76-79. 
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of all truth” (as opposed to imperfect man), seeing in his position an acknowledgment of an 
essential distinction between God and man.21 The committee goes on to conclude that Clark, 
considering the evidence he provided, would not deny a qualitative difference, in spite of both 
parties failing to make important distinctions in their argumentation.22 In fact, the ‘complaint’ 
even acknowledged that Clark recognized a difference in ‘mode’—God’s knowledge is intuitive, 
whereas man’s is discursive and dependent. However, it goes on to dismiss this point as not the 
issue of the debate, which in their mind concerned ‘contents’ of knowledge related to 
incomprehensibility.23 This was clearly a confusing and short-sighted conclusion. Elsewhere, 
Clark explicitly recognized a ‘qualitative’ difference in this distinction as a necessary implication 
of divine simplicity.24  
 The committee also indicated that it was unfortunate that the complaint against Clark 
merely focused on an epistemological comparison between God and man, rather than 
emphasizing a ‘qualitative’ difference against the backdrop of God’s being and attributes.25 
Going one step further, the committee concluded that any definition of incomprehensibility 
should be deemed inadequate if it is not considered in relation to God’s being and perfections—
they call this a “fundamental datum of theological thinking.”26 A later committee appointed by 
the 1947 General Assembly found that the “content of divine psychology is 
indivisible…knowledge in this sense is an attribute of God in which man cannot participate.”27 
                                                          
21 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 50. 
22 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 73. 
23 Minutes of the Twelfth, 15. Perhaps Clark’s emphasis on ‘object’ and ‘mode’ as opposed to subjective 
experience kept the views he did have implicit, about how God and man experienced knowledge differently (Frame, 
Van Til, 105). 
24 Clark, “Bible as Truth,” 163. 
25 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 50. 
26 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 76. 
27 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 92. 
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Clearly both sides mistakenly left this out of their consideration in terms of emphasis. Yet, if 
explored, both parties may have found common ground rather than talking past each other. 
 How might the consideration of divine simplicity have helped in the debate? Confusing 
terminology, such as ‘content,’ ‘mode,’ and ‘subjective knowledge’ could have been more 
clearly understood in terms of divine attributes.28 This would have done justice to Van Til’s 
concerns regarding the Creator-creature distinction, as well as Clark’s concept of ‘mode’ without 
battle over the ambiguous, ‘no point of coincidence.’29 Moreover, attention to divine simplicity 
could have highlighted the important relationship between epistemology and ontology for 
incomprehensibility.30 While it is not clear to what extent Clark presupposed this relationship 
during the debate, his later writings indicate that he saw epistemology as prior to metaphysics, 
and did not speak of them in terms of a mutually dependent relationship.31 To the contrary, Van 
Til often emphasized the relation between the two as involved in one another.32 
God’s Self-Knowledge  
The second latent remedy affirmed by both sides is God’s exhaustive self-knowledge. 
The Van Til side clearly saw a relationship between God’s self-knowledge and 
incomprehensibility.33 In stating its case, the ‘complaint’ emphasized that God knows himself 
and all things and that this knowledge remains a mystery to the finite mind.34 Any true 
knowledge for man must be ‘analogical’ to God’s knowledge of himself and all things.35 The 
                                                          
28 Cf. Frame, Van Til, 106-107. 
29 Hunt, “Introduction,” 84. 
30 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 11, 14, 89-90. 
31 Cf. Clark, Trinity, 80; Bahnsen, Van Til, 668-670. 
32 E.g., Van Til, Theistic-Ethics, 34; Defense of the Faith, 55, 70-71; Apologetics, 31-32. 
33 E.g., Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 150-151. 
34 Minutes of the Twelfth, 9. 
35 Minutes of the Twelfth, 13-14. 
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committee recognized that the complainants defined incomprehensibility in terms of God’s self-
knowledge, and that he can only be known “to the extent that he voluntarily reveals himself.”36 
 Clark did not explicitly affirm God’s self-knowledge in articulating incomprehensibility. 
However, he did affirm that God has infinite knowledge of his own being and that he cannot 
exhaustively reveal this knowledge to man. It is in this sense that man can never comprehend 
God. Though he describes this self-knowledge in terms of knowing an infinite number of 
propositions, finite man cannot know “a single attribute of him who knows himself and all things 
exhaustively ‘at a glance’.”37 Elsewhere, Clark states that “God is eternally omniscient” and that 
he is the “source of his own knowledge.”38 Even when arguing against Van Til for the identity of 
content between the knowledge of God and man, he recognizes that God knows all truth and 
“unless we know something that God knows, our ideas are untrue.”39 This implies that man must 
know truth with reference to God’s knowledge, even if man cannot actually obtain this 
knowledge in full. However, Clark distanced himself from Van Til’s emphasis on defining 
incomprehensibility in terms of God’s self-knowledge, claiming such reason is ‘circular’ (i.e. 
seeking to define God’s incomprehensibility by his own comprehension of himself) and 
something to be avoided in matters of logic.40 
 The committee saw essential agreement between both sides regarding God’s self-
knowledge. Moreover, it specifically mentioned that God’s self-knowledge could have provided 
a solution to the terminological difficulty which hampered the proceedings.41 Because the object 
and content of God’s knowledge are identical, man’s knowledge is necessarily indirect and an 
                                                          
36 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 43. 
37 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 43-45. 
38 Clark, Logic, 118. 
39 Clark, Logic, 129. 
40 Cf. Clark, Trinity, 89. 
41 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 76. 
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“analogue of the truth rather than the object, the truth itself.”42 Hence, there is a ‘qualitative’ 
difference present, not in any way destructive of true knowledge, but established by God, making 
knowledge possible.43 The committee concluded that the key difference between God’s 
knowledge and man’s knowledge is not the ‘object’ of that knowledge, but in the apprehension 
of it.44 This difference in apprehension is ontological in nature, rooted in the Creator-creature 
distinction, not merely a difference in quantitative degree.45 This is contrary to Clark’s assertion 
that what is not revealed is incomprehensible, implying that what God does reveal is 
comprehensible.46 The committee summed up its report, following Berkhof: “our knowledge of 
God is on the one hand ectypal and analogical, but on the other hand also true and accurate, since 
it is a copy of the archetypal knowledge which God has of himself.”47 
Reference Point for Knowledge  
 This second remedy also highlights other important themes in Van Til regarding 
incomprehensibility in terms of God’s knowledge. First, he often speaks of God’s knowledge of 
himself as the ultimate reference point for man’s knowledge. As we saw in chapter four, the non-
Christian dilemma is that man must know everything or he knows nothing. However, this 
‘dilemma’ is removed by the Christian doctrine of incomprehensibility. Van Til explains: 
It is true that there must be comprehensive knowledge somewhere if there is to be any 
true knowledge anywhere, but this comprehensive knowledge need not and cannot be in 
us; it must be in God.48 
                                                          
42 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 49. 
43 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 49-50. 
44 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 13. Clark failed to make the important distinction between ‘comprehension’ and 
‘apprehension’ in the debate (e.g., Minutes of the Fifteenth, 19-20, 93). 
45 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 13-14. 
46 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 19, 31. 
47 Minutes of the Fifteenth, 36; cf. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Carlisle, Pa.: Banner of Truth, 
1958), 35. 
48 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 65. 
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This is another way of affirming that God is the principium essendi of knowledge. Citing 
Bavinck, Van Til argues that without God’s self-conscious, self-existence, man could not know 
anything.49 Our knowledge, must be dependent on God’s self-contained knowledge, which is not 
correlated (i.e. co-dependent) with anything in creation. God has comprehensive knowledge of 
all things, not only because he created and controls all things, but also because he knows them in 
reference to his comprehensive self-knowledge. “God knows his own being to its very depths in 
one eternal act of knowledge.”50 God’s incomprehensibility to man is rooted in the fact that God 
is exhaustively comprehensible to himself.51 As the final reference point for all knowledge and 
interpretation, God must know all things in relation to himself, which he must know 
exhaustively, to know truly and certainly.52 By implication, “true human knowledge corresponds 
to the knowledge which God has of himself and the world.”53 However, as Van Til explains: 
It is impossible for man to know himself or any of the objects of the universe about him 
exhaustively as it is impossible for man to know God exhaustively. For man must know 
himself or anything else in the created universe in relation to the self-contained God. 
Unless he can know God exhaustively, he cannot know anything else exhaustively.54 
 
This does not mean that any created thing is infinite (as God is), making comprehension 
impossible, but an object of knowledge can only be interpreted rightly if it is brought into 
relation with both the human mind and God’s mind.55  
Alluding to the ‘point of coincidence’ language in the Clark debate, Van Til expresses 
another important nuance to his doctrine of incomprehensibility. However, before we proceed, 
we must reiterate its foundation. Without God’s revelation, God is inapprehensible and 
                                                          
49 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 29, 268. 
50 Van Til, Apologetics, 25. 
51 Van Til, Apologetics, 76. 
52 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 36, 56-57; Apologetics, 27-28; Psychology, 142. 
53 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 1. 
54 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 269; cf. Defense of the Faith, 67. 
55 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 67.  
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unknowable to man. However, God has revealed himself in creation and through man’s very 
constitution and capacities, and there is not one aspect of creation which does not display 
something of God’s nature.56 This is the very basis and presupposition upon which man is able to 
apprehend God or make any predication concerning Him. By being in the image of God and by 
virtue of living in God’s world, man knows something about everything, but does not know 
anything exhaustively—whether it be God or his creation.57 This fact will help to avoid two 
particular errors. First, it keeps one “from making the false distinction between content of God’s 
knowledge as being incomprehensible bit by bit, and the mode of God’s knowledge as always 
incomprehensible.”58 In other words, the difference in mode is not dependent on component 
parts of knowledge, but rather on the nature of God as self-contained. Second, it keeps one from 
seeking the false ideal of exhaustive knowledge in the human mind, and reducing facts to a 
system of timeless logic. Such a pursuit is self-defeating, for there is no a priori resting place, for 
the human mind is part of moving history and time-bound. 
This is where we come to Van Til’s further commentary on the ‘point of coincidence’ 
issue raised in the debate with Clark. In principle, God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge 
“coincide at every point in the sense that always and everywhere man confronts that which is 
already known or interpreted by God. The point of reference cannot but be the same for man as 
for God.”59 However, on the other hand, divine and human knowledge do not coincide at any 
point in that human knowledge is always dependent upon prior divine knowledge (including 
God’s self-knowledge). It is important to note that they coincide in such a way as to preclude any 
antirealism or ultimate skepticism, because anything the human mind could know is already 
                                                          
56 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 1.1-5. 
57 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 268-270. 
58 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 272. 
59 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 270 (emphasis his). 
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known by God.60 Moreover, “If there could be an identity of content, there would be and always 
has been an identity of content.”61 In other words, identity of content would necessitate an 
ontological identity of mind, transgressing the Creator-creature distinction. Identity is only 
properly understood in terms of the object of knowledge and analogy, not in terms of mode. In 
short, if the Creator-creature distinction is assumed, there is no point of coincidence in one sense, 
and coincidence at every point in another sense. This nuance avoids the ‘either-or’ dilemma 
posed in the debate. 
We may now briefly summarize Van Til’s emphasis on God as the reference point for 
knowledge in light of the Clark debate. God reveals himself by eternally knowing himself. “Man 
has no approach to the knowledge of the nature of God—on which truth is admittedly 
dependent—except on the self-conscious activity of God as expressed in revelation.”62 Hence, 
there is identity of reference point—God’s self-contained, self-referential knowledge. Van Til 
claims that the Clark controversy has shown that “any attempt that aims at identity of content 
between the mind of man and the mind of God overreaches itself and ends in skepticism.”63 
Rather than Van Til’s position ending in skepticism, it is Clark’s insistence on identity of 
content, with its tendency to obscure the Creator-creature distinction that ends in skepticism.  
In light of the above discussion, a word may be said in response to the objections of Clark 
and his followers mentioned earlier.64 First, Hoeksema charges Van Til with bringing the very 
intelligibility of God’s revelation into question, if it is not comprehensible in a univocal way to 
man. However, God’s revelation is ultimately intelligible to Himself in relation to his eternal, 
                                                          
60 James N. Anderson, “Van Til Frequently Encountered Misconceptions,” n.p. [cited Jan 21 2015]. Online: 
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61 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 271 (emphasis his). 
62 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 281. 
63 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 281. 
64 Cf. Hunt, “Van Til’s Doctrine of God,” 89. 
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exhaustive self-knowledge. Therefore, it is never unintelligible, but rather both incomprehensible 
and apprehensible to man. Second, Nash argues that without identical coincidence in terms of 
object and nature, there is no true knowledge for man. However, in light of Van Til’s 
refinements, the foundational ‘point of coincidence’ is properly found in God’s knowledge as a 
reference point for both God and man, not in the nature or mode of knowing which is rooted in 
the ontology of the human knower. We can say that both God and man can know the same object 
(e.g., a rose), but this object is what it is based on God’s pre-interpretation of it (related to his 
divine self-knowledge) prior to it being an object of man’s knowledge. Third, both Clark and 
Reymond take Van Til to task over not precisely defining ‘incomprehensibility’ in terms of 
‘qualitative difference.’65 Yet, to what degree are we to define ‘incomprehensibility’ without 
undermining it? What standard of precision is sufficient? Perhaps more importantly, what 
ontological assumptions underlie such questions? 
Coherence and Correspondence 
Another important nuance in Van Til’s doctrine of incomprehensibility is in terms of 
epistemological coherence and correspondence. In setting out his terminology, he calls his 
position a “correspondence theory of truth”—which is actually opposed to what is often 
understood by the label.66 Simply put, something is true if it corresponds to a ‘fact’ in reality as 
opposed to something being true if it merely coheres with other propositions. The main 
difference concerns the primary relation as to the conditions of a truth. Van Til distinguishes his 
position from an ‘either-or’ approach concerning correspondence and coherence theories of truth 
in the tradition of Kant and Hegel, seeking to understand matters from a consistently Christian 
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worldview. The struggle between ‘realists’ and ‘subjective idealists’ often ignores God as a 
foundational reference point. To the contrary, 
If all our thoughts about the facts of the universe are in correspondence with God’s ideas 
of these facts, there will naturally be coherence in our thinking because there is complete 
coherence in God’s thinking.67 
 
A Christian epistemology will take into account true elements of both in relation to God, without 
reducing things down to either one, with man’s reason as the ultimate reference point. First, there 
is perfect coherence in the mind of God and in his plan prior to anything outside of himself to 
which his knowledge might correspond.68 Second, man’s thinking must begin with 
correspondence to God’s thoughts if there is to be any creaturely coherence, for it is rooted in the 
coherence of God.69 In this sense, correspondence between God and man is necessarily more 
fundamental than correspondence between man and any other created thing. Though our 
coherence will never be as comprehensive or inclusive as God’s, because it is based upon God’s 
coherence and analogous to it, it will still be true knowledge.70 However, if coherence is sought 
ultimately in the mind of man, with ‘God’ merely treated as a ‘fact’ to cohere with other ‘facts’ 
in our experience, then God becomes a subset of man’s coherence and no longer distinct from 
creation. If there is to be any true correspondence and coherence for human thought, it must be in 
relation to God’s mind.  
How does this intersect with incomprehensibility? How one conceives of it depends on 
whether one sees correspondence or coherence as rooted in God or man. If they are seen in 
relation to God, creaturely correspondence and coherence depends on God’s comprehensive 
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68 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 64. 
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coherence. While God is incomprehensible to man, God is not incomprehensible to himself.71 
Hence, he can reveal truth in part with certainty. However, if correspondence and coherence are 
seen as rooted in the mind of man, then what is incomprehensible to man is also 
incomprehensible to ‘God.’ In terms of Van Til’s argument, either coherence is most complete in 
God or in man from which the correspondence of the other follows suit. If in the former, then 
man begins with correspondence in order to achieve analogous coherence. If in the latter, God 
must correspond with man’s coherence in order to achieve his own coherence. This second 
notion wrongly correlates the Creator with his creation. 
The Incarnation   
 A third remedy not included in the debate documents is the doctrine of the Incarnation.72 
Neither Clark nor Van Til made the explicit connection between incomprehensibility and the 
Incarnation during the debate. However, both would have endorsed the Chalcedonian statement 
regarding the natures of Christ. As we have seen, Van Til particularly emphasized this doctrine 
as a model for the Creator-creature distinction. Perhaps the problematic phrase, ‘no point of 
coincidence,’ could have been placed in the context of the Incarnation, rightly nuancing the 
emphasis on discontinuity in knowledge between God and man without ‘separation,’ producing a 
more balanced account. For example, thinking in Chalcedonian categories may have helped to 
steer clear of accusations of nominalism (e.g., of Van Til), since both would have been opposed 
to a corresponding Nestorian Christology. On the other hand, it may have helped to avoid 
accusations of univocity (e.g., of Clark), since both would have been opposed to a corresponding 
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Eutychianism. This would have also helped the ‘complaint’ to present the idea of ‘analogous’ 
knowledge in more explicitly theological, rather than philosophical terms.73  
Mystery & Paradox 
 Another area in which Van Til articulates his doctrine of incomprehensibility is in 
distinguishing between Christian and non-Christian views of ‘mystery’ and issues of ‘paradox’74 
in theology. We have already spoken of the concept of ‘mystery’ in relation to other matters in 
chapter four. First, Van Til stressed that God is not subject to ‘possibility.’ Rather, ‘possibility’ is 
subject to God. Second, God’s rationality and being are coterminous. Hence, he is not 
ontologically or epistemologically dependent on anything, including any ultimate ‘mystery’ or 
chance, within himself or from without. In short, while all things end in mystery for man in terms 
of incomprehensibility,75 there is no mystery for God, who comprehends all things. 
Intelligibility 
All things are ultimately intelligible to God, and this intelligibility is not dependent upon 
man or anything else outside of God. In contrasting the apologetic approach of Romanism and 
Protestantism regarding the reference point for knowledge, Van Til states that “man’s 
consciousness of self and of objects presupposes for their intelligibility the consciousness of 
God.”76 Van Til further observes that “it is not because God is irrational that we cannot 
comprehend him; it is because God is rational, and in the nature of the case, ultimately rational, 
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179 
 
that we cannot comprehend him.”77 In other words, God is incomprehensible to man because he 
rationally comprehends all things in relation to himself, not because he is in part or wholly an 
irrational mystery to himself. Our rationality as creatures depends on his ultimate rationality. 
There is no ultimate mystery or chance which is unknown to God. One could say that in light of 
God’s comprehensive knowledge, Christian epistemology holds to an ultimate rationalism in 
God, while non-Christian epistemology holds to an ultimate irrationalism.78 
One may detect an antithesis here between how Van Til understands intelligibility and 
how Kant and those influenced by him have understood it. For Kant, intelligibility depends on 
the shaping of raw reality by the human mind and its categories.79 For Van Til, intelligibility 
depends on the mind of God and his exhaustive self-knowledge. We see how diametrically 
opposed they are in terms of the source of intelligibility. On Kant’s view, a God beyond human 
experience is unknowable, and functions only as a limiting, but not actual concept.80 The only 
knowable God is shaped by the human mind.81 Ultimately, this means that man only knows 
according to his self-knowledge, not in relation to God’s. From a Christian worldview, God is 
distinct from human experience, but is knowable because God knows himself and has revealed 
himself in creation and Scripture. As a result, God and creation are ultimately intelligible and 
man is able to know him. 
Christian vs. Non-Christian ‘Mystery’    
 Let us now unpack Van Til’s idea of ‘mystery’ a bit further as it relates to the topic at 
hand. One contrast between the Christian and non-Christian concept of mystery is that the latter 
                                                          
77 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 33. 
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“holds that there is either no mystery for God or man [i.e. rationalism] or there is mystery for 
both God and man [i.e. irrationalism].”82 Both ideas are involved in one another. In discussing 
Paul’s preaching in Athens (Acts 17), Van Til points out that though Paul singles out the altar to 
an ‘unknown’ god, he does not endorse either—the ‘known’ or ‘unknown’ gods as posited by the 
Greeks. This is perhaps due to the underlying principle “that their doctrine of the unknown god 
was involved in their doctrines of known gods.”83 Essentially, this principle is grounded in a 
monistic assumption—that all reality is of one kind of being. Known gods were of the same level 
of being, even if they were higher on the scale of that being. On the other hand, unknown gods 
were utterly unknowable and indeterminate, for man is finite. This raises important questions. 
How would one know if there is an unknown god? What is the relationship between the gods one 
claims to know and the god one does not know? If there is an unknowable god, can one really 
know with certainty of such a claim? Again, this pursuit is problematic in that it is impossible to 
know anything unless one knows everything, which is a problem for finite man but not for the 
infinite God.84 The ‘unknown’ god concept functions as a sort of ultimate irrational mystery, 
occupying a place in reality and inevitably influencing that reality epistemologically. This 
renders even the ‘known’ parts suspect. If there is ultimate irrationalism somewhere in the 
universe, it will never be overcome.85 Consequently, “Christians and non-Christians cannot pool 
or trade their mysteries as long as they are true to their positions.”86  
 Another contrast between views of mystery is in terms of truth. Van Til explains: 
In effect, non-Christian thought argues that, because man cannot comprehend something 
in its knowledge, to that extent his knowledge is not true. Christians say that we as 
creatures do not need to and should not expect to comprehend anything fully. God 
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85 Van Til, Psychology, 75. 
86 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 366. 
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comprehends fully, and that is enough for us. God’s full comprehension gives validity to 
our partial comprehension.87 
 
Partial knowledge is not a problem in the Christian system, because God has full comprehension. 
As such, true partial knowledge is not only possible, but a reality due to God’s revelation. In 
understanding anything, we either see it surrounded by God’s rational comprehension or 
unintelligible mystery—we either bow to God or the void.88 Notice the difference here with 
Hirsch’s view of validity. For Hirsch, validity is the probable (not certain) consensus regarding 
the intent of the human author.89 For Van Til, validity of knowledge, and by implication, 
interpretation, is dependent upon God’s certain comprehension.90   
Van Til speaks of issues of ‘paradox’91 as being involved in the very fact that man can 
never have comprehensive knowledge, and since man cannot have a fully comprehensible 
knowledge of God, “we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our 
knowledge.”92 In other words, our analogical knowledge must be related to God’s absolute 
system of knowledge, yet we cannot fully comprehend that system.93 It is important to note that 
Van Til is not saying that every Christian doctrine can be both affirmed and denied at the same 
time and in the same way. Rather, he is speaking of ‘paradox’ in a broad sense, emphasizing the 
Creator-creature distinction and the element of mystery inherent in finite man trying to 
understand an infinite and immutable God who works in and through temporal creation.94 He is 
                                                          
87 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 61 (emphasis his). 
88 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 61. He uses the example of an atom. 
89 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, ix-xi, 4. 
90 Cf. Van Til, Psychology, 142-143. 
91 It is important to note that Van Til uses ‘paradox,’ ‘apparent contradiction,’ and ‘antimony’ 
interchangeably in his works (e.g., Defense of the Faith, 67-69; Common Grace, 9-10). Along with the concept 
represented by these designations, he also speaks of being ‘fearlessly anthropomorphic’ (i.e. affirming biblical 
evidence without denial of any one aspect as a result of abstract deduction) (e.g., Common Grace, 73, 187). 
92 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 67, cf. 384-385. 
93 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 68. 
94 See Oliphint’s comments (Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 384n6). 
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saying that there are apparent contradictions or antimonies in theological affirmation. While man 
cannot resolve them, God does—in his own perfect coherence of knowledge. There is no real 
contradiction in such cases. To conclude that real contradictions exist would be to acknowledge 
not only incomplete coherence in our thinking, but also to conclude that God lacks coherence 
and is not consistent with himself.95 Furthermore, justifying a real contradiction involving God 
would assume an exhaustive knowledge of the necessary and sufficient conditions for what 
constitutes the divine being and abilities.96 Some examples of antimonies Van Til highlights 
include the following: time and eternity, the one and the many,97 the decrees of God and 
prayer,98 divine sovereignty and human responsibility,99 and glorifying God, who is not 
dependent on creation for glory.100 There are two possible responses to these antimonies. Either 
the human mind ‘solves’ them and concludes that unless it succeeds, there is no valid knowledge 
of such things available to man, or they must ultimately be solved in God or man’s thinking 
would be meaningless altogether (not just regarding an issue which seems to be a mystery).101 
Van Til suggests that antitheistic thought, in one sense, has actually created these 
antimonies. By seeking the false ideal of human knowledge (full comprehension) as an 
alternative to equivocity, man concludes that he must solve such antimonies in order to have true 
and adequate knowledge. He uses the Greek philosophers and Kant as examples of those who 
have endorsed such a false antithesis, introducing a natural epistemological separation between 
                                                          
95 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 68-69.  
96 Oliver D. Crisp, Revisioning Christology: Theology in the Reformed Tradition (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 
7. 
97 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 60. The Trinity as three-in-one provides the ultimate ground for the 
inevitability of paradox for finite human reasoning (cf. Eric J. Johnson, “Can God Be Grasped By Reason?” in God 
Under Fire [ed. Douglas F. Huffman and Eric L. Johnson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002], 87). 
98 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 68. 
99 Van Til, “Response by C. Van Til,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 399. 
100 Van Til, Common Grace, 9.  
101 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 60. 
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God and man, resulting in an all or nothing approach to truth. Van Til argues that the remedy to 
this type of thinking is found in a clear understanding of God as an exhaustively self-conscious 
being on whom man is dependent, not only for what seems to be paradoxical, but for any true 
knowledge.102 Only then can man know truly without bearing the impossible burden of an 
exhaustive knowledge of all things. 
Limiting Concepts 
Related to the issues of mystery and paradox is Van Til’s idea of a limiting concept.103 
Drawing upon Kant’s terminology concerning the functional import of his noumenal realm, Van 
Til self-consciously redefines its meaning according to biblical presuppositions. There are two 
antithetical notions of this concept related to mystery. The non-Christian notion is purely 
negative, constructed on the basis of a non-Christian concept of mystery—the irrational, 
unknown aspect of reality yet to be rationalized. It has no positive content, but rather functions to 
limit thought, whether it actually exists or not (e.g., ‘God’). Yet, on a deeper level, such a ‘god’ 
concept is seen as limited by creation and vice versa.104 The Christian notion of a limiting 
concept is based on the Christian notion of mystery. The creature seeks to receptively-reconstruct 
the revelation of the Creator in a systematic form, resting upon the presupposition of the self-
contained being of God revealed in Scripture (i.e. not correlated or dependent upon what man 
knows or does not know).105 Theologically, the Christian seeks to formulate doctrine in a way 
that allows various aspects of biblical teaching to balance and inform each other,106 rather than 
                                                          
102 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 60-64, 102, 108-109; Great Debate, 20. 
103 He also uses “supplemental concepts” interchangeably with “limiting concepts” (Frame, Van Til, 167). 
104 E.g., the idea of pure rationality or pure fact (Van Til, Apologetics, 186). 
105 Van Til, Common Grace, 11. 
106 In his recent work on paradox, Bosserman argues that Van Til and his followers have not sufficiently 
attended to how apparently contradictory doctrines do not merely ‘limit,’ but actually require one another in the 
Christian system (B.A. Bosserman, The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian Paradox: An Interpretation and 
Refinement of the Theological Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til [Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick, 2014], 164-165). 
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allowing one doctrine to override an apparently contradictory doctrine.107 Van Til is emphasizing 
that man is finite. Therefore, his theological concepts are ‘limiting’ in the sense that his concepts 
never exhaust the essence of the thing as known by God.108 For example, consider Christ’s full 
humanity and full deity. Christians affirm both truths together as taught in Scripture, while 
recognizing the mystery being professed in such a formulation.109 Van Til employs limiting 
concepts to emphasize the actual reality of the self-contained God and what he has revealed in a 
way which does not allow man to solve or override that which is only comprehended by God, 
through a process of ‘logical’ deduction based on human autonomy.110 
Clark Revisited 
Van Til’s concept of mystery and paradox runs contrary to Clark, at least in how Clark 
expressed himself. He was skeptical of ‘paradox’ and preferred to label such matters as merely 
something one does not understand and has yet to resolve through careful reasoning and logic.111 
Appeals are made to a priori principles of reason in general, apart from revelation in seeking 
solutions.112 For example, in the divine sovereignty and human responsibility issue, Clark claims 
to have provided a logical solution.113 However, as the minority report pointed out in the debate, 
his solution is unsatisfactory in that it eliminates a key element of the issue (i.e. free agency) in 
                                                          
107 E.g., General revelation and special revelation ‘limit’ each other in that the former provides the context 
for the latter. However, both are ways in which God freely relates to creation (Apologetics, 75; cf. “Introduction,” 
30-31). So, while general and special revelation ‘limit’ each other, they do not limit God.   
108 John M. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” in Foundations of Christian Scholarship (ed. 
Gary North; Vallecito, Calif.: Ross House, 1976), 326, 329. 
109 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 68; Christian Epistemology, 20; Tipton, “Triune Personal God,” 136-137; 
cf. Frame, Van Til, 165-175.  
110 Cf. James Loder and W. Jim Neidhardt, The Knight’s Move: The Relational Logic of the Spirit in 
Theology and Science (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Helmer & Howard, 1982). 
111 Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 143; cf. Gordon H. Clark, “Apologetics,” in Contemporary 
Evangelical Thought (ed. Carl F. H. Henry; Great Neck, NY: Channel, 1957), 161. Clark does mention the 
importance of God as the source of all truth in the midst of his logical pursuits. The question is whether his view and 
use of logic is consistent with this fact. 
112 Gordon H. Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1946), 49. 
113 Gordon H. Clark, “Determinism and Responsibility,” EvQ 4.1 (1932): 13-23. 
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order to solve it.114 In addition, Van Til claims that Clark’s method actually denies sovereignty 
from the start in that it seeks to use logic outside the context of revelation. Clark seeks a 
methodological “consistency” that is recognized by all, Christian and non-Christian alike, but not 
predicated upon revelation from the start.115 A Christian form of logical deduction would be used 
in submission to the teachings of Scripture from the start.116 
Corroboration  
 Others have corroborated Van Til’s general approach to the issue of paradox. Frame 
suggests that how one conceives of paradox reveals one’s methodological commitments. All 
doctrines, even those with a seeming paradoxical relationship, must be understood as a system of 
truth grounded in God’s ‘systematic’ and exhaustive knowledge of himself and the world. 
Hence, even prolegomena must be subject to Scripture as any other theological doctrine rather 
than done apart from or prior to it.117 Each major doctrine provides a perspective on the whole 
system. “All doctrines are ‘apparently contradictory’ in that none exhausts the fullness of truth, 
and their non-exhaustive character limits our ability to demonstrate formal logical 
consistency.”118 However, they are not actually contradictory, but true and intelligible as they are 
rooted in God’s comprehension. Anderson asserts that if human knowledge is analogous to 
God’s knowledge, it must be ‘paradoxical.’ This is due to paradox being an implication of the 
Creator-creature distinction and incomprehensibility.119 
Some Objections 
                                                          
114 Minutes of the Thirteenth, 80. 
115 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 278-279. 
116 Frame, “Theological Paradox,” 322-325. 
117 Frame, “Theological Paradox,” 299-300. 
118 Frame, “Theological Paradox,” 329. 
119 James N. Anderson, Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, and 
Epistemic Status (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 5-6, 311-312. 
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Some have objected to the notion that all Christian truth is ultimately paradoxical. One 
such objection is that Van Til is paradoxical in handling paradox—denying paradox in the very 
assertion of it. The basic claim is that Van Til is opposed to rational explanation because it is 
rational.120 For example, Sproul et al. argue that Van Til affirms paradox in the doctrines of 
election and reprobation (i.e. Scripture teaches both), yet rationally explains that in order to be 
disobedient and punished for sin, man must be confronted with God in all he does.121 Much 
could be said in response, but I will mention two key flaws. First, Van Til is not against rational 
analysis as such, but rather rational analysis in-general, without conscious regard for the Creator-
creature distinction. This involves recognizing creaturely limits of reason which cannot be 
imposed on the divine mind as revealed in Scripture. Second, their discussion of reprobation 
leads to a straw man of Van Til’s argument which stems from ignoring an important distinction 
found in the context of quotes drawn from his work, Common Grace and the Gospel.122 In 
context, it is clear that Van Til is making a distinction between the decretive will of the Creator 
and the responsibility of the creature. On the one hand, he states that Adam ultimately could not 
have chosen not to sin in light of the divine decree. On the other hand, he could choose not to sin 
in a proximate, creaturely sense. Ignoring this distinction results in pitting the two against each 
other on the same level of being. Overlooking this distinction, accounts for their conclusion that 
Van Til makes God out to be arbitrary and irrational. Curiously, his objectors conclude the 
following: “Divine ‘control’ and significant human choices hardly constitute a rational difficulty 
                                                          
120 R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the 
Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1984), 287-288. 
121 Sproul et al., Classical Apologetics, 290. 
122 Cf. Van Til, Common Grace, 138, 140; Sproul et al., Classical Apologetics, 289-290. 
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or apparent contradiction, not to mention paradox.”123 However, they give no explanation 
concerning how this is not a ‘rational difficulty.’ 
 A second and related objection stems from a false assumption. Reymond recognizes that 
‘paradox’ is a hermeneutical category in terms of the need to harmonize Scripture with 
Scripture.124 However, he opposes the notion that all Christian truth is ultimately paradoxical to 
man. After acknowledging that Van Til holds to apparent contradictions, he proceeds to argue as 
if Van Til held to irreconcilable, actual contradictions set forth in Scripture.125 This undercuts 
any sense of success in his argument. His reasons for denying Van Til’s idea of ‘paradox’ exhibit 
a fundamental and problematic assumption: argumentation according to one level of being.126 
For example, he states that Van Til’s definition of paradox is problematic in that it rules out the 
possibility of being “reconciled before the bar of human reason” at some point in the future.127 
However, Van Til’s whole point is that paradox cannot be exhaustively reconciled in the human 
mind, but only in God’s mind. Reymond claims the coup de grace to ‘apparent contradictions’ is 
that if truth may appear in the form of irreconcilable contradiction, we give up the possibility of 
ever detecting falsehood. Why not accept truth claims contrary to Scripture as merely an 
‘apparent contradiction’?128 While all truth is ultimately paradoxical, not all truths are equally 
apparent in terms of this ultimate paradox. We are enabled to grow in understanding and to 
detect falsehood according to Scripture by the aid of the Holy Spirit. The problem is that 
Reymond does not consistently recognize that Van Til’s concept of paradox is in terms of the 
                                                          
123 Sproul et al., Classical Apologetics, 291. 
124 Reymond, Systematic Theology, 103. 
125 Reymond, Systematic Theology, 104-107. Basinger makes the same mistake (David Basinger, “Biblical 
Paradox: Does Revelation Challenge Logic?” JETS 30.2 [1987], 207-209, 211). 
126 Granted, this an inconsistency in Reymond, not a view he explicitly endorses (cf. Systematic Theology, 
115-116). 
127 Reymond, Systematic Theology, 105. 
128 Reymond, Systematic Theology, 106-107. 
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Creator-creature distinction, not growth in creaturely knowledge (though he certainly does not 
rule this out). If growth in creaturely knowledge diminished paradox, it would imply a one-level 
ontology on which man could move up the scale toward God-like knowledge. To the contrary, 
man may grow in knowledge and harmonization of biblical truth in developing a creaturely 
replica of God’s ultimate system, but never in a way which diminishes the Creator-creature 
distinction regarding paradox. Any progress is dependent on divine knowledge and God freely 
revealing truth to creatures, not on man’s logical abilities to reduce paradox. Much like Clark, 
Reymond ends up confusing the truth known with the mode of knowing when evaluating 
paradox.129 
Hermeneutical Implications 
 We conclude our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of incomprehensibility by sketching 
out some important hermeneutical implications. Each will pick up on a particular emphasis in his 
formulation. 
 First, his emphasis on the Creator-creature distinction highlights the need to address the 
mode of thought as it pertains to subjective knowing. Attention is often given to either the human 
author or reader of the Bible to the exclusion of the divine author in this regard, especially in 
terms of the limits of comprehension. In light of the current emphasis on the limits of human 
comprehension, a Christian hermeneutic would avoid choosing between alternatives which are 
inconsistent with a biblical incomprehensibility (e.g., must know everything to know anything 
truly or one knows nothing truly) in order to establish a foundation for truth and meaning. This 
                                                          
129 It may be added that often the law of non-contradiction is invoked against paradox (e.g., Basinger, 
“Biblical Paradox,” 213). However, even this law is rooted in God, and is to be imaged in the logic of man. It is not 
a tool to judge the veracity of God’s revelation or to rule out certain truths seemingly incompatible with human 
reason. It is to be understood according to a two-level ontology, not adhered to by God and man in the same way, 
but rather as Creator and creature.  
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problematic pursuit either seeks a presumptuous form of comprehension and certainty in terms of 
historical-grammatical concerns or a subjective pragmatism often based on ‘common sense’ 
dictated by the interpreter.130 Neither escapes the pitfalls of seeking to transcend the limits of 
human knowledge. For example, man does not have to comprehend authorial intent or historical 
context in order to interpret truly, for God comprehends it all. God’s intent revealed in Scripture 
will not contradict creation or history as such, but it cannot be reduced to them. God’s 
knowledge and control of all things go hand in hand. He cannot fully know that which he does 
not exercise full control over. Based on revelation, God indeed knows all that is involved in 
interpretation: knowing subjects (God and man) and all objects of knowledge. In fact, if God 
does not know all things involved in interpretation, he can give no authoritative interpretation of 
anything at all, including his own Scripture.131 However, as true interpretation is rooted in God 
and not dependent upon creation to supply such meaning (for itself or God), not only is God self-
interpreting, but his word (as canon) is also self-interpreting.   
 Second, the doctrines of God’s simplicity and exhaustive self-knowledge provide the 
basis and ground for true knowledge in interpretation. The fact that God is the ultimate reference 
point for our interpretation of the Bible should direct how meaning is conceived and sought. 
Generally speaking, God is the ultimate context or category of creaturely interpretation.132 Even 
God’s revelation in Scripture, which is in part (for God has not revealed all things in the Bible), 
still expresses his intent through the human authors. Hence, his intended meaning is infinite in 
nature.133 This is due to his mode of knowing and its close relationship to simplicity and self-
                                                          
130 Apologetic arguments for the existence of God based on the phenomenon of consciousness (e.g., J.P. 
Moreland) reveal similar flaws related to seeing man’s consciousness rather than God’s as the reference point for 
knowledge (Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, “Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism: Recalibrating the 
Argument,” JETS 57.4 [2014]: 777-791).  
131 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 221. 
132 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 67. 
133 Cf. Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 77-79. 
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knowledge. The goal is creaturely understanding, with the divine, self-exhaustive help of the 
Triune God (1 Cor. 2:10-14; Col. 2:3), his intent expressed through the human authors’ intent. 
God’s intent necessarily transcends that of the human authors.  
However, far from introducing a problematic separation between divine and human 
meaning, we have a relationship resembling that of the two natures of Christ, in which the 
‘meaning’ of Christ follows along the parameters charted by Chalcedon.134 It is interesting to 
note that the intent of the human authors, as inspired by God (2 Pet. 1:20-21; 2 Tim. 3:16), 
actually directs the reader to consider divine intent (cf. 1 Pet. 1:10-12) which necessarily 
transcends them. For example, in John 17, we cannot limit ourselves to John’s human intent, 
because in the text, he directs the reader to consider the intent of the Son. So, to do justice to 
John’s intent, we must go beyond his own comprehension.135 If this transcendence of 
comprehension is not dealt with in biblical interpretation, meaning will inevitably be distorted 
and reduced to mere human categories, undermining not only the divine intent, but also the 
human intent as carried along by the Spirit. 
In short, divine intent may be considered, not merely in a vague or ambiguous way, but 
more specifically. Who God is in terms of incomprehensibility-type categories which Van Til 
articulated could be used to provide further insights into the nature of meaning found in biblical 
texts. Moreover, in order to appreciate divine intent in the Bible, one must go beyond the 
limitation of humanity without negating it. The only way in which to do this, in a ‘controlled’ 
manner, is to attend to all that God has revealed when interpreting a text. Canonical context is 
necessary to do justice to the comprehensive knowledge of God which is incomprehensible to 
                                                          
134 Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 78-80. 
135 Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 79. 
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man. It is a revealed window into the comprehension of God, transcending the comprehension of 
the human authors and readers as time-bound participants in history.  
 Third, Van Til’s observations concerning intelligibility also have hermeneutical 
significance. Interpreting the Bible according to its content involves the recognition that the 
apprehension and knowability of God’s revelation are to be presupposed by creatures. This is 
involved in God’s self-knowledge. Intelligibility of God’s revelation in the Bible would be 
impossible if God did not fully know himself.136 Here we have an example of how our doctrine 
of God and interpretation inform one another. Scripture comes to us as already intelligible 
because it comes from the mind of God. It is not dependent upon the mind of man to make it 
intelligible according to a standard of reason or hermeneutic without reference to God and not 
subject to his revelation. 
Frame has also pointed out that intelligibility is closely related to application. 
Formulating the message of the Bible along theological lines is to ask how it applies (cf. 2 Tim. 
3:16-17)—theologians summarize the teachings of Scripture for a particular purpose (e.g., to 
answer questions). Consequently, Frame defines ‘theology’ as “the application of Scripture, by 
persons, to every area of life.”137 When we look for the meaning of a passage, we are looking 
according to a purpose or application to our lives on some level. We do not understand the 
meaning of a text until we know what to do with it.138 What does this have to do with 
intelligibility? Frame argues that if interpretation and application are so closely related, “then the 
question of intelligibility becomes the question of whether a consistent pattern of application is 
                                                          
136 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 268-269. 
137 John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Christian Belief (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R 
Publishing, 2013), 6-8. 
138 Frame, Systematic Theology, 660; Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 73, 76-77. 
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possible.”139 God has eternally known what to do with everything he knows. He understands the 
full import and meaning of everything he has revealed. What he has revealed is a system of truth 
inherently involved in its application in order to be understood. Intelligibility in interpretation 
involves application at some level or texts are not understood according to their divine and 
human intent. In other words, it is rightly known in a particular way, in relation to how God 
knows it.140 
 Fourth, Van Til’s doctrine of incomprehensibility helps to understand our level of 
comprehension in interpretation. This is where his observations concerning correspondence and 
coherence factor into the discussion. God’s comprehensive coherence provides the basis for our 
correspondence and coherence, not the other way around. Clearly man does not possess this level 
of comprehension in either respect, and cannot achieve a comprehensive interpretation of any 
text of Scripture because it is connected to God.141 Man cannot know himself or anything 
exhaustively unless he knows God exhaustively. “All our ingenuity cannot exhaust the humanly 
inexhaustible rationality of God.”142 Our interpretations are not only finite, they are also fallible. 
Only God, in the self-authenticating Christ, whose person and work is explained in the divinely 
inspired Bible, has infallible interpretation of his revelation. Sinful and finite men cannot 
produce an infallible interpretation and are in need of Christ for their interpretive activity.143 Our 
finite interpretation is always growing and approximating the infallible interpretation revealed in 
Scripture.144 At no point is there an exact replica, but it is at every point analogical of God’s 
system.145 This only becomes problematic for man when he seeks an autonomous interpretation 
                                                          
139 Frame, “Theological Paradox,” 328. 
140 As SAT and TIS have rightly emphasized, this necessarily involves personal and ethical aspects. 
141 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 36; Defense of the Faith, 67; Systematic Theology, 60-61. 
142 Van Til, Common Grace, 10; Systematic Theology, 269.. 
143 Van Til, Calvinism, 145; cf. Poythress, “Savior of Interpretation,” 321. 
144 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 162. 
145 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 292. 
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without reference to God’s self-authenticating, comprehensive pre-interpretation.146 Man’s 
apprehension through interpretation, while adequate, inevitably varies in terms of precision and 
clarity.147 We may be uncertain of our interpretive reconstruction at particular points, but 
absolutely certain that God’s pre-interpretation is certain and precise. This implies avoiding what 
Anderson calls “inflexible univocality” in our approach to interpretation, and instead, embracing 
an analogical perspective.148 In light of God as incomprehensible, we must avoid reductionistic 
tendencies regarding meaning in terms of precision. 
 Fifth, Van Til’s notions of mystery and paradox have implications for biblical 
interpretation. First, there is no ultimate mystery to be found in the Bible which God does not 
comprehend. This gives us confidence that what he has revealed and interpreted for us in 
Scripture is true, even if not comprehensively revealed. Moreover, the Spirit helps us in our 
interpretation by renewing our knowledge (Col 3:10) according to his divine comprehension of 
the godhead and all things (1 Cor 2:6-16). Second, Van Til’s notion of paradox provides a 
fruitful ground for comparing Scripture with Scripture—doctrine with doctrine and text with 
text, implying an acute canonical awareness. When dealing with particular texts, Van Til’s 
categories related to incomprehensibility drive the interpreter to consider larger contextual 
factors, both textual and metaphysical. Hermeneutics, like prolegomena and other doctrines, 
must be subject to Scripture rather than done from the ‘outside.’ The that of hermeneutics must 
be involved in the what (i.e. content) of Scripture.  
Conclusion 
                                                          
146 Rushdoony argues that when this autonomous enterprise is pursued, any ‘system’ is conceived of as an 
ideal, not as reality (i.e. non-Christian ‘limiting concept’) (By What Standard?, 105).  
147 Van Til argues that the perspicuity of general and special revelation is in no way opposed to mystery. 
Rather, perspicuity and mystery are involved in one another only as they are understood in light of God as self-
contained and exhaustively comprehensible to himself with absolute clarity (Scripture, 7-9). 
148 Anderson, Paradox, 240-241. 
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 Our discussion of Van Til’s doctrine of incomprehensibility raises important 
considerations for understanding the divine author in relation to hermeneutics. In conjunction 
with insights from SAT and TIS, Van Til’s summary of the Christian system or worldview 
provides more categories to pursue. In light of contemporary hermeneutical concerns, a distinctly 
Christian hermeneutic necessarily moves away from a mere human focus and its reductionist 
tendencies. Rather, a Van Tillian hermeneutic reflects the ultimate realities revealed in Scripture 
which, while expressed through human authors, actually point beyond them. In the next chapter, 
we will discuss another important contour of Van Til’s doctrine of God which will help to 
provide and refine further relevant hermeneutical categories regarding the divine author and 
meaning.  
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Part Two: Van Til’s Doctrine of God 
Chapter Six: Ontological Trinity 
Introduction 
 A third main contour in Van Til’s doctrine of God is the ontological Trinity. As we have 
already seen, each doctrine is inseparable from the others, and when one is spoken of, the others 
are always in the background. His articulation of the ontological Trinity touches upon many 
issues which resonate even more directly with certain contemporary hermeneutical categories 
and concerns. By stressing the ontological Trinity, he sought to avoid correlating the Trinity in 
any way with creation. This, as Van Til sees it, contrasts with all non-Christian thought, which 
thinks of God as ultimately one aspect of the universe.1 This is an all-important point, even with 
respect to interpretation.2 Van Til often makes reference to the ontological Trinity as the most 
basic principle of interpretation for all reality,3 and especially for Scripture in terms of the self-
interpreting nature of its divine author.4 This is due to the fact that God is ultimately independent 
and active within himself as Trinity, apart from creation.5 As such, he is absolutely self-
explanatory. “It is this notion of the ontological Trinity that ultimately controls a truly Christian 
methodology.”6 
 Before proceeding, a word may be said about Van Til’s emphasis on God as absolute 
personality. For the most part, he uses this designation synonymously with the ontological 
                                                          
1 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 353. Here, Van Til cites Bavinck regarding the importance of the 
ontological Trinity (cf. Reformed Dogmatics, 2:296). 
2 Cf. Frame, Van Til, 64-65. While recognizing essential continuity between the two, Van Til highlights the 
importance of thinking of the ontological Trinity before the economic Trinity in order to avoid blurring the Creator-
creature distinction (Defense of the Faith, 37; “Introduction,” 23). 
3 Van Til, Apologetics, 30; Common Grace, 64; Christian Epistemology, 62. 
4 E.g., Van Til, “Introduction,” 22-23; Theory of Knowledge, 19; Defense of the Faith, 396; Reformed 
Pastor, 76. 
5 Van Til, Apologetics, 29 
6 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 122. 
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Trinity.7 However, he does seem to use ‘absolute personality’ to preserve certain truths. He 
sought to guard against setting notions of an ‘absolute’ and ‘personality’ in opposition to one 
another. Rather, with God, “there is no distinction between absoluteness and personality.”8 He 
does not limit himself (ceasing to be absolute) in order to relate to another. His essence and being 
are coterminous, as is his essence and personality.9 Van Til emphasizes that men are like God in 
terms of being persons, but unlike Him in that we are not absolute, but finite persons.10  
In this chapter, we will look at four main ways in which Van Til nuances this doctrine 
with an eye toward hermeneutical significance: the philosophical issue of the one and the many, 
personalism, the ontological Trinity as the archetype for human communication, and 
perspectivalism.  
The One and the Many 
 Perhaps the most fundamental and enduring issue in the history of philosophy is the ‘one 
and the many problem.’ Is reality ultimately one or many? What is prior, unity or diversity? How 
does the one relate to the many and the many to the one? Where do the one and many come from 
to begin with? In light of Van Til’s emphasis on the Creator-creature distinction, ultimacy 
belongs to the Creator. This distinction precludes the possibility that the space-time universe can 
be a source of independent or absolute particularity or unity. As a creation of God, the space-
time universe’s particularities and universals are rooted in the nature and plan of God.11 The 
ontological Trinity has direct bearing on the answer to this problem of the one and the many. In 
                                                          
7 E.g., Van Til, Apologetics, 128; Defense of the Faith, 75, 236; Systematic Theology, 348.  
8 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 346. 
9 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 346, 364. 
10 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 33. 
11 Van Til, Psychology, 58. 
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God, unity and plurality, the one and the many, are equally ultimate, independent from 
creation.12 Van Til explains:  
Unity in God is no more fundamental than diversity, and diversity is no more 
fundamental than unity…In God’s being there are no particulars not related to the 
universal, and there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars.13 
   
The ontological Trinity does not depend upon creation for unity, particularity, or for their 
relationship to one another at any point. Rather, the persons of the Trinity are “mutually 
exhaustive of one another and therefore of the essence of the Godhead.”14 The one and the many 
in God are exhaustively related to one another.15  
Failure to see the equal ultimacy of the one and the many in the ontological Trinity leads 
to unstable forms of philosophical tension. Van Til suggests that “all heresies in the history of 
the church have in some form or other taught subordinationism,” and that “all ‘heresies’ in 
apologetic methodology spring from some sort of subordinationism.”16 However, there is no 
ontological subordination among the persons of the Trinity, or between the unity and plurality of 
God.17 The unity of God does not surrender to or subordinate the diversity of the three persons.18 
Apologetic methodology which fails to maintain this point undermines what it seeks to defend—
                                                          
12 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 59, 348; Defense of the Faith, 31, 34; cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 
2:300, 332; Colin Gunton, The One, the Three, and the Many (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
13 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 48-49.  
14 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 348. 
15 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 372-373. 
16 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 48. 
17 Frame helpfully nuances this point by recognizing that while there is no subordination in the divine 
nature shared by the persons of the Trinity, there is a subordination of roles involved in the distinctiveness of each 
person. This provides essential continuity between the ontological and economic Trinity, while maintaining God’s 
independence from creation (John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2002], 720). 
18 Rushdoony, “The One and Many Problem,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 345. Giles wrongly cites Van Til 
in support of his argument that no subordination in the Trinity means there are no distinctive roles (Kevin Giles, 
“Evangelicals and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” EvQ 80.4 [2008]: 323-338). This overlooks Van Til’s emphasis on 
ontological subordination as the issue to avoid, not with regard to roles. For Giles, it seems that role differentiation 
necessitates ontological subordination. Hermeneutically, he neglects the distinction between canon and history, 
leaving the meaning of Scripture ultimately dependent upon man and historical context (cf. Trinity and 
Subordinationism [Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2002]). 
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the Triune God.19 Christian hermeneutical methodology avoids contradiction insofar as it does 
justice to this point. For example, if there is any level of ontological subordinationism in the 
persons of the Trinity, there is no complete self-consciousness as the foundation of 
epistemology. To whatever extent there is subordinationism, God is “to that extent no longer the 
sole interpretive category of all reality.”20 Non-Christian philosophies and non-Trinitarian 
religious thought exhibit a tension between the one and the many. Either they are conceived of as 
two ultimate principles in a dialectical relationship21 or one is more ultimate than the other, 
making the subordinate principle illusionary and incapable of differentiation from the other. If 
the Triune God is not the ultimate interpretive category, then eternal and temporal categories are 
not distinct, but rather parts of the same reality.  
There is an interesting connection between concepts of subordinationism and ‘being in 
general’ which appears in some forms of Trinitarian theology. For example, some have argued 
that Karl Rahner’s identification of the economic and ontological Trinity22 tends toward making 
God a part of creation. His Christology exhibits a blending of deity, humanity, and humanity in-
general, with the result of correlating God and man’s experience in order for God to reveal 
himself. The ontological Trinity becomes illusory and reduced to human experience, leaving a 
kind general ontology in its wake, in which both God and man participate.23 LaCugna, 
influenced by Rahner, argues that “economy and theology are two aspects of one reality: the 
                                                          
19 For an example of a theistic argument which presupposes the Trinitarian foundation for the one and the 
many, see: James Anderson, “If Knowledge Then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Alvin Plantinga 
and Cornelius Van Til,” CTJ 40 (2005): 61-64.  
20 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 102. 
21 Rousas John Rushdoony, “Van Til and the One and the Many Problem,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 342; 
The One and the Many: Studies in the Philosophy of Order and Ultimacy (Fairfax, Va.: Thoburn Press, 1978), 3-8, 
356. 
22 Karl Rahner, The Trinity (trans. Joseph Donceel; New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1970). 
23 Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1983), 11-15; Molnar, Divine Freedom, 85-92. 
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mystery of divine-human communion.”24 To the contrary, Molnar rightly warns against allowing 
any principle of relationality to be defined according to a general ontology founded upon some 
form of correlation with creation prior to considering how the economic Trinity can enrich that 
ontology.25 This disregards God’s independence, freedom, and authority. In terms of 
hermeneutical methodology, this cautions against assuming a principle of relationality (e.g., 
between the reader and the author[s] or between a text and a reader) prior to consideration of the 
ontological Trinity.  
We have seen in philosophical hermeneutics, there has been a tendency to assume a 
‘being in general,’ whether it is conceived of as ‘being,’ experience, language, or history, which 
is more ultimate and somehow provides a unity to the plurality of things. However, certain 
problems arise. For instance, if all reduces down to one type of being (personal or not), how can 
an interpreter of reality (or of a text) distinguish particulars in relation to universals? How can an 
interpreter even know that all is essentially ‘being’ if he or she is merely reducible to that same 
‘being’? Does not all interpretation end up saying ‘being is being’? The same could be said of 
opting for ultimate plurality. Interpretation would merely end in saying that ‘all is all.’26 
Explanation becomes a mirage, with no progress in understanding. Van Til’s assertion that 
“every type of heresy is, in last analysis, an attack upon the Trinity”27 is applicable to 
hermeneutics in terms of metaphysical assumptions. This becomes especially evident in the one 
and many problem.  
                                                          
24 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), 
222, cf. 228. 
25 Molnar, Divine Freedom, 312. In Rahner’s case, there is a tendency to subordinate the many to the one in 
a kind of modalism, which depends upon God in relation to creation for ‘personality’ (Trinity, 109-110). 
26 Cf. Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy, 40-41. 
27 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 352-353. 
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Generally, human beings seek to organize information in terms of generality and 
particularity.28 Non-Christian thought tends toward either pole as if on what Frame calls a 
‘ladder of abstraction.’ Either one moves ‘up’ the ladder (from particular to general) in order to 
seek the essence of things through more abstraction, or one moves down the ladder (from general 
to particular) in order to reduce things down to their most detailed components. As one moves 
‘up,’ there is a loss of actual content in that it is stripped of all particulars, so that there is nothing 
left but an empty concept or essence. As one moves ‘down,’ the small components become much 
like the essences of things (like moving ‘up’). For example, the smallest components of a ‘text’ 
may be ‘marks on a page’ and ‘whiteness and blackness.’ Yet, these visual experiences of a 
‘text’ do not tell us anything meaningful about it. Some unifying principle must tie these various 
experiences together in order to understand its meaning. So, whether going up or down the scale, 
there is a loss of actual content and meaning.29 Frame summarizes: 
In the end, there is no difference between “being in general” [abstract unity] and 
“ultimate matter” [abstract particularity].30 Both concepts are empty, uninformative, and 
unintelligible. If abstract being is the ultimate reality, then there is no particularity. If 
abstract particularity is the ultimate truth, then there is no unity in the world. If both are 
somehow true, then all is chaos, and nothing is true.31 
  
There is a need for both for intelligibility and meaning. Van Til has pointed out that the kind of 
thinking presented above comes out of man’s desire to achieve exhaustive knowledge of reality, 
which ultimately ends in futility. Abstract concepts of unity and particularity are idolatrous in 
that they are sought within creation, rather than in the Triune God. These abstract concepts are 
                                                          
28 For the following discussion, see: Frame, Van Til, 72-76. 
29 E.g., ‘Scientific metaphysics,’ as a means of getting to the bottom of what is real and what is not, is 
ultimately reductionistic (Vern S. Poythress, “Three Modern Myths In Interpreting Genesis 1,” WTJ 76 [2014]: 328).  
30 Generally speaking, the former is characteristic of modernism (i.e. the one over the many), while the 
latter is characteristic of postmodernism (i.e. the many over the one). Van Til also speaks of abstract particulars as 
‘brute facts’ and abstract universals as ‘abstract laws’ (cf. Common Grace, 75). 
31 Frame, Van Til, 74. 
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not only empty in terms of content, but they also cannot be meaningfully related to one 
another.32 This leads us to our next consideration.  
The one and many of creation is dependently derivative of the equally ultimate one and 
many found in the Trinity. In his discussion of temporal unity and plurality as created by God, 
Van Til argues the following, based on the fact that the created one and many are both equally 
dependent on God for their being and sustainment: 
The particulars or facts of the universe do and must act in accord with universals or 
laws…the laws may not and can never reduce the particulars to abstract particulars or 
reduce their individuality in any manner. The laws are but generalizations of God’s 
method of working with the particulars…thus there is a basic equality between the 
created one and the created many, or between the various aspects of created reality [in 
relation to God].33 
 
This means that not only is there an ultimate correspondence of the created one and many with 
that of Triune God’s inner coherence, but there is also a consequent irreducibility of the one and 
many in creation. In addition, this irreducibility also corresponds to the particulars exhaustively 
related to the universal in God. Hence, created particulars are not unrelated and unknowable in 
that they are inherently correlative to universals. We do not have to ‘abstract’ the one from the 
many or the many from the one because they are not inherently opposed to one another. Bahnsen 
summarizes: 
The Christian worldview, therefore, does not face the problem of irrational particulars 
(which cannot be interpreted according to unifying categories, generalizations, or laws) 
standing over against abstract universals (blank formalities, empty of any detailed content 
regarding the concrete particulars).34 
 
These realities have implications for all levels of knowledge. Consider history, a 
significant concept for contemporary hermeneutics. For there to be a ‘history’ or an 
                                                          
32 Frame, Van Til, 74. Moreover, abstract concepts within creation are impersonal principles which cannot 
account for personal aspects of reality.  
33 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 50; Systematic Theology, 364-365; cf. Common Grace, 64. 
34 Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 241.  
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interpretation of a ‘fact’ of history, there must be recognition of both, particulars and universals, 
in order for a pattern to be articulated (i.e. a philosophy of history and of reality).35 However, 
these must not be abstract and impersonal or else history loses purpose and direction. Non-
Christian concepts of history are often impersonal, making purposeful and directional claims 
suspect in terms of their foundation.36 One must get behind the ‘facts’ of history to find their 
meaning.37 For example, if one takes historical relativism as a starting point, no mere series of 
historical ‘facts’ can itself raise problems or questions in that there is no intelligible relation 
between the elements of the series. Even if the series had meaning in and of itself, all the 
elements of the series would lack a larger intelligible context, fully comprehended, from which 
to discern the relative value of each element, not to mention any larger contour of history from 
which to discern a climax of the whole.38 Non-Christian philosophy, including hermeneutical 
philosophy, often seeks the meaning of history within history.39 Such a pursuit, due to its 
assumption of brute, unrelated facts and abstract, impersonal universals leads to a denial of 
history, offering no final interpretation.40 On non-Christian presuppositions: 
No philosophy…can offer any true interpretation of history, for history cannot supply the 
key to its own meaning, and the human mind cannot impose its subjective interpretation 
upon objective factual data. History is neither self-originating nor self-sustaining and 
time cannot exist in and of itself.41 
 
                                                          
35 Van Til, Apologetics, 19; Common Grace, 2-9. 
36 Cf. Van Til, Theistic-Evidences, 94-110; C.T. McIntire, “The Ongoing Task of Christian 
Historiography,” in A Christian View of History? (eds. George Marsden and Frank Roberts; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1975), 54-59. 
37 Van Til, Psychology, 87. 
38 Van Til, Psychology, 42. An ironic result of historical subjectivism is that ‘history’ is not the past at all, 
but rather the present inward teleology of the mind (C. Gregg Singer, “The Problem of Historical Interpretation,” in 
Foundations of Christian Scholarship, 66-67). 
39 E.g., R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
40 Rushdoony, “One and the Many,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 346-347; Singer, “Historical Interpretation,” 
in Foundations of Christian Scholarship, 58. 
41 C. Gregg Singer, “A Philosophy of History,” in Jerusalem and Athens, 330. 
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Neither is history nor any historian intelligibly self-interpreting. Rather, the meaning of history, 
if we remain consistent with special revelation, is found in the eternal one and the many. Only a 
theology of history is fit for the task, not only for historiography, but also for any hermeneutical 
method that would seek to do justice to history—as revelation of God. Forms of both, historical 
relativism and positivism run contrary to the Christian worldview in that they assume man is an 
autonomous and a self-interpreting interpreter. 
  Consider the broader implication of the one and the many as it pertains to the general 
and particulars of the hermeneutical enterprise. If one cannot emphasize unity to the expense of 
diversity and vice versa, then the particular is always related to the whole and the whole to the 
particular. Knowledge of one truth is always in relation to other truths.42 Of course this is only 
perfectly and comprehensively known by God, in relation to himself and his plan. Modernist 
tendencies to exalt unity over diversity and postmodern tendencies to exalt diversity over unity 
(in Scriptural exegesis or in terms of hermeneutical possibilities) ultimately run contrary to the 
ontological Trinity. As mentioned in chapter one, Poythress detects the errors of Unitarianism 
and polytheism present in hermeneutical approaches which either collapse elements of 
communication (author-text-reader) into one or multiply and set meanings in opposition to one 
another through a denial of unity in favor of diversity. 
 Another implication of the one and the many being equally ultimate in the ontological 
Trinity is the hermeneutical ‘spiral.’ In God’s knowledge, there is no process or ‘spiral’ between 
knowing the particular in relation to the whole and the whole in relation to the particular. This is 
another way of saying that God has pre-interpreted all things in terms of the one and many in 
                                                          
42 Cf. Poythress, Symphonic Theology, 46; “Truth and Fullness,” 212. 
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relation to his own being. Finite man does grow through the ‘spiral’ with the help of the Spirit as 
he learns to think God’s thoughts after himself with regard to the one and many.  
Personalism  
 We now turn to perhaps Van Til’s most controversial theological formulation. The 
ontological Trinity is the very foundation of his concept of personalism. We have already seen 
that being and personality are coterminous in God, as are the three persons exhaustive of one 
another, without correlation with anything outside of himself. Van Til boldly asserts: 
We speak of God as a person; yet we speak also of three persons in the Godhead…each 
of the persons of the Trinity is exhaustive of divinity itself, while yet there is a genuine 
distinction between the persons…God is a one-conscious being, and yet he is also a tri-
conscious being.43 
 
Later he states plainly, “we do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person.”44  
Not surprisingly, he received sharp criticism for his deviation from traditional 
formulations.45 We will briefly mention three prominent ones. First, some have objected to the 
uniqueness of the formulation. Clark labeled it as a ‘novelty,’ out of step with the theological 
heritage of the church.46 Robbins branded it as a new Unitarian heresy, opposed to the 
Westminster standards.47 In addition, Clark argued that Van Til imported his irrational view of 
incomprehensibility into his doctrine of Trinity, involving a clear violation of the law of non-
contradiction.48 Second, some have objected to supposed roots in British Absolute Idealism for 
such language as “one-conscious,” “tri-conscious,” and speaking of equal ultimacy of unity and 
                                                          
43 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 348. 
44 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 363 (emphasis mine). 
45 For the following discussion, see: Hunt, “Van Til’s Doctrine of God,” 71-73, 89-92. 
46 Clark, Trinity, 88. 
47 Robbins, Man and the Myth, 20-21. 
48 Clark, Trinity, 84-88; cf. Reymond, Systematic Theology, 108-109; Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., “The 
Three/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” CTJ 23.1 (1998): 50-53. 
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diversity.49 Lee Irons also sees the influence of Idealism, concluding that Van Til falls prey to 
modalism.50 Third, some have complained that, while orthodox in his intention, his formulation 
suffers from the limitations of human language. Letham warns that the ‘one person-three person’ 
rendering could be taken in one of three problematic directions: the being of God as a fourth 
person related to the other three, the being of God related to another being, or the three persons 
“reduced to the attributes of the one absolute person.”51 The key issue is whether Van Til intends 
that God is ‘one’ and ‘three’ in the same sense. Even if not, why abandon the difference stressed 
in church history expressed through the use of different terms (e.g., one substance, three 
persons)? Has he not confused the matter?52 
Responding to the above criticisms in turn will give us at least a greater sense of Van 
Til’s rationale and purpose for his innovation. First, the charges of novelty or heresy can be 
dismissed upon closer inspection of the context of Van Til’s statements. His rationale is self-
consciously orthodox. Out of an appreciation for even the earliest historical developments of the 
doctrine, he especially draws upon Calvin’s emphasis on autotheos with regard to the Son and 
Hodge’s emphasis on perichoresis.53 The concept of autotheos (deity of himself) stresses that 
each person is equally underived and consubstantial, yet at the same time, not denying actual 
personal distinctions in the Godhead. This opposes any hint of subordination or mixing the 
                                                          
49 John Vander Stelt, Philosophy and Scripture: A Study in Old Princeton and Westminster Theology 
(Mariton, N.J.: Mack, 1978), 231-133. 
50 Ralph A. Smith, Paradox and Truth: Rethinking Van Til on the Trinity (Moscow, Idaho: Canon Press, 
2002), 119-123. 
51 Letham, Holy Trinity, 181, 462. 
52 Others have expressed reservations about referring to God as ‘one person’ (e.g., Thomas F. Torrance, 
The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons [New York: T&T Clark, 1996], 102-103, 155-161; Carl 
F. Henry, God Who Stands and Stays [vol. 5 of God, Revelation, and Authority; Waco, Tex.: Word, 1982], 209-
212).  
53 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 356-360. The concept of perichoresis goes back much earlier than Hodge, 
being present in the early church, at least by the time of Athanasius. This term was used later by St. Hilary and John 
of Damascus (cf. Douglas F. Kelly, Systematic Theology: Volume One [Scotland, UK: Mentor, 2008], 489; Charles 
C. Twombly. Perichoresis and Personhood [Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2015]).  
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eternal with the temporal.54 This influence explains Van Til’s emphasis on each person as 
exhaustive of the essence of the Godhead. The concept of perichoresis emphasizes the unity of 
the three persons as they mutually indwell one another. On the basis of perichoresis, Charles 
Hodge pointed out that the three persons are one God, with one will and one mind as opposed to 
three intelligences, wills, and efficiencies. In light of this, he and others have spoken of God in 
unipersonal terms, though not inconsistent with tri-personality, thus steering clear of modalism.55 
It may be that Reymond’s criticism is indicative of his own hesitation to affirm the doctrine of 
perichoresis.56 Rather than being doctrinally innovative, Van Til merely made explicit what was 
already implicit through the use of autotheos and perichoresis.57 He re-summarizes the doctrine 
in a way which highlights that God is personal, both in his unity and diversity. God is not an 
essence that has a personality attached to it. Rather, he is exhaustively personal.58  
Second, Vander Stelt’s claim that Van Til was influenced by British Idealism is 
unfounded. The substance of Van Til’s treatment displays the marks of Calvin and Old 
Princeton, not philosophical idealism. In fact, there is no positive reference to British Idealists in 
his most concentrated treatment of the subject.59 Rather, Van Til’s emphasis on God as an 
absolute personality runs contrary to British Idealism’s concept of the ‘absolute’ which 
                                                          
54 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 101. 
55 Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:461-462; cf. A. A. Hodge, Evangelical Theology: Lectures on Doctrine  
(Carlisle, Pa.: Banner of Truth, 1990), 102-103; Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:300, 302-303; T. F. Torrance, 
Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh, Scotland: T&T Clark, 1988), 33; Doctrine of 
God, 161, 173, 175. 
56 Reymond, Systematic Theology, 321-322; cf. Robert Letham, review of Robert L. Reymond, A New 
Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, WTJ 62.2 (2000): 316-319.  
57 Tipton, “Triune Personal God,” 53, 87. 
58 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 364. This would oppose Clark, who saw God as tri-conscious in his 
diversity, but not ‘one-conscious’ in his unity (Trinity, 106-107). Tipton has argued that on Clark’s notion, any self-
consciousness in terms of God’s unity would imply a fourth person (“Triune Personal God,” 36, 74). 
59 E.g., Van Til, Systematic Theology, 351-361; Lane G. Tipton, “Function of Perichoresis and the Divine 
Incomprehensibility,” WTJ 64 (2002), 304.  
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transcends personal and impersonal categories.60 Elsewhere, he clearly opposes Idealism’s 
concept of the absolute as contrary to the Christian God.61 Any similarity is merely formal in 
nature. 
Lastly, if prone to misunderstanding, why did Van Til choose this manner of expression? 
Letham has rightly warned against possible dangers related to the language used. However, 
Tipton has pointed to the apologetic contexts in which Van Til was working to highlight certain 
advantages of this particular summary of the Trinity. He argues that Van Til purposely brought 
the incomprehensibility of the Trinity to the foreground in order to expose univocal reliance 
upon a non-Christian notion of the law of non-contradiction, one to which God must conform. 
Van Til creatively summarized the doctrine of the Trinity in order to guard against unbiblical 
rationalism and univocal thought. Moreover, God, as fully conscious and personal in his unity 
and diversity rules out any uninterpreted ‘facts,’ since God creates out of his exhaustive and 
personal consciousness and pre-interpretation.62 Van Til uses the term, ‘person,’ in two different 
senses—with regard to unity and diversity. It is better to think of Van Til’s contribution as a 
supplement, not a replacement of the traditional formulations.63 Once misconceptions are 
dispelled, it becomes merely another tool by which systematic theology can confront unbelief. 
However, because of the longstanding traditional formulation, caution should be taken in using 
the ‘one person’ concept. 
                                                          
60 E.g., G. Watts Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1969), 110, 140. 
61 Van Til, Idealism, 7-34; Defense of the Faith, 229-231. 
62 Tipton, “The Function of Perichoresis,” 301-302. 
63 Tipton, “Function of Perichoresis,” 289, 295, 298. 
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 This brings us to Van Til’s broader view of God and creation in terms of a personalistic 
worldview, flowing out of his emphasis on the exhaustively personal nature of the Trinity. All 
worldviews must deal with personalism at some point. Van Til states that: 
In the last analysis every theology or philosophy is personalistic. Everything 
“impersonal” must be brought into relationship with an ultimate personal point of 
reference. Orthodoxy takes the self-contained ontological trinity to be this point of 
reference. The only alternative to this is to make man himself the final point of 
reference.64 
 
This can readily be seen, even in materialistic worldviews where there is a struggle to account 
for ‘mind,’ consciousness, and ‘personality’ within an otherwise impersonal system.65 Non-
Christian thought assumes that a personal fact must be ‘unipersonal’ in that any personal fact or 
action is ultimately surrounded by impersonal reality.66 This begs the question of whether there 
can be such a personal fact or action if there is no other to relate to on a personal level. Making 
man the final reference point rather than the Triune God results in seeking to explain reality in 
temporal terms.67 Van Til sums up man’s situation: 
A finite personality could function in none other than a completely personalistic 
atmosphere, and such an atmosphere can be supplied to him only if his existence depends 
entirely upon the exhaustive personality of God.68 
 
Elsewhere, Van Til defines ‘personalism’ as: 
That form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic 
aspects of experience and which finds in the conscious unity, identity and free activity of 
personality the key to the nature of reality and the solution to the ultimate problems of 
philosophy.69 
 
                                                          
64 Van Til, “Introduction,” 66. 
65 Cf. Alvin C. Plantinga, Where the Real Conflict Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
66 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 230; Christian Epistemology, 78. 
67 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 96-97, 129. 
68 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 97. 
69 Van Til, God of Hope, 304. 
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Again, we see how his description is informed by his understanding of the ontological Trinity in 
terms of unity, plurality, and personality. The ontological Trinity stands behind creation as the 
personal and relational atmosphere for the meaning of reality, including the interpretation of 
special revelation. Consequently, the structures and relations within created reality necessarily 
reflect the ontological Trinity. 
 A related concept is Van Til’s lesser known representational principle. This affirms that 
relations within the ontological Trinity and between the ontological Trinity and man are 
exhaustively personal, with the latter relation (free) founded upon the former (necessary). 
Moreover, relations among humans are exhaustively personal on the ontological basis of the 
Trinity.70 Each person of the Trinity is exhaustively representational of one another. As a result, 
Van Til argues that “it was impossible for God to create except upon the representational plan.”71 
In other words, God’s creation and plan is necessarily consistent with his Triune, personal 
nature. Consequently, as a creature in the image of the Triune God, man is in a representational 
relationship with God. Of course, as a finite creature, this representation in terms of thinking, 
feeling, and doing is not exhaustively representational of God, but analogously so. Man cannot 
help but exist and function in an atmosphere of representational personalism.72 
This principle affirms both, God’s aseity and his condescension in terms of both being 
personal in nature. The biblical concept of covenant especially captures the nature of his 
condescension.73 The Triune God is “covenantally operative in all of the facts of the world.”74 
This includes the fact that Scripture is to be conceived of as exhaustively personal—as special 
                                                          
70 Tipton, “Triune Personal God,” 118, 141. 
71 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 78-79. 
72 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 208; cf. Theistic Ethics, 49. 
73 Van Til, “Covenant Theology,” 306. 
74 Van Til, Scripture, 67. 
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revelation involving the personal relation between the divine and human.75 With regard to both, 
general and special revelation, every fact man encounters, puts him face to face with God and 
hence, must “deal covenantally with every fact of history.”76 He argues that “the covenant idea is 
nothing but the expression of the representational principle consistently applied to all reality.”77 
In sum, the representational principle brings together the doctrines of Trinity and covenant, along 
with their ontological and epistemological implications.78 The only metaphysical alternative, 
according to Van Til, is utter impersonalism. “A completely Christian theistic epistemology can 
allow for no impersonalism anywhere along the line of the transaction between God and man.”79 
 One implication Van Til draws out in many of his works is the unavoidable covenantal 
relation that all men have with God. Man cannot but exist and function in an ethical 
environment. “To speak of man’s relation to God as being covenantal at every point is merely to 
say that man deals with the personal God everywhere.”80 He ultimately classifies men as either 
covenant breakers or covenant keepers. Covenant breakers are those who are fallen in Adam. In 
rebellion against God, they confuse the Creator-creature distinction and tend to reason as if 
uncreated (cf. Rom. 1:18-32; Gen. 3:5, 22). Incidentally, Van Til argues that one philosophical 
characteristic of this rebellion is the notion that ultimate coherence lies in a general ontology, 
which envelopes both man and God (if any ‘God’ were to exist at all). Covenant keepers are 
those who are redeemed in Christ, the one who keeps covenant, obeying where Adam fell, and 
serves as their representative head (Rom. 5:12-21). In this broad sense, all men are covenantally 
responsible to God at every point. This revelational atmosphere is inherently authoritative as it is 
                                                          
75 Van Til, Scripture, 24, 27. 
76 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 97; Theory of Knowledge, 29. 
77 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 96. 
78 Cf. Tipton, “Triune Personal God,” 159-165. 
79 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 68. 
80 Van Til, Common Grace, 69-70; cf. Christ and the Jews, 25-26. 
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the revelation of God.81 This is ultimate personalism of the Trinity is opposed to the non-
Christian notion of impersonal ethical determinism or man’s self-determined ethic in the midst of 
an ultimately impersonal environment.82 On the presupposition of the ontological Trinity, there 
is no room for man to construct an ethic in a void of impersonalism, for there is no 
impersonalism to be found.83 
Recently, Bosserman has argued that Van Til failed to carry forward his representational 
principle with respect to why God is necessarily tri-personal in nature.84 This stems from almost 
agnostic-sounding passages found in Van Til’s works which emphasize God as ‘multi-personal’ 
and ‘uni-personal,’ but not as tri-personal.85 With all his emphasis on the ontological Trinity as 
the necessary presupposition for the Christian worldview, it is surprising that he did not delve 
more directly into this matter, though it is clear that he affirms only three persons. If the Trinity 
is the key interpretative concept for all reality in terms of unity and plurality, then it cannot be a 
unity or plurality in general.86 Though he often speaks against forms of unity in general, it is the 
issue of plurality which seems to receive the least attention in Van Til.87 Moreover, in terms of 
paradox, he focused on how apparent contradictions (like the one and three of the Trinity) ‘limit’ 
one another, but not on how they require one another, failing to follow his own method of 
implication to its logical conclusion.88 Bosserman helpfully discusses how various multi-
                                                          
81 Henry Krabbendam, “Cornelius Van Til: The Methodological Objective of Biblical Apologetics,” WTJ 
57 (1995): 130-133. 
82 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 84-85; Theistic Ethics, 33-35. 
83 Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 97. Elsewhere, Van Til speaks of the error of seeing the human personality 
as an accomplishment of man in the midst of an impersonal environment (Psychology, 105).  
84 Bosserman, The Trinity, 152.  
85  E.g., Systematic Theology, 364; Christian Epistemology, 97. 
86 Bosserman, The Trinity, 157. 
87 Perhaps, this is due to his emphasis on God as ‘one person.’ 
88 Bosserman, The Trinity, 165, 171. 
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personal alternatives to the tri-personal nature of God (e.g., unitarian, binity, and quadrinity) 
introduce impersonal elements which undermine the representational principle.89 He concludes: 
…to add or subtract from the number of three divine persons is to compromise an 
ultimately personalist view of reality, by making God identical with, or subordinate to, an 
impersonal context. Such a God could not speak with authority…because He would not 
“know” himself solely with reference to His own person.90 
 
God must be one and three from a covenantal personalist view of reality. 
Van Til unfolds his brand of personalism on the assumption that the idea of covenant is 
fundamental to the idea of exhaustive personal relationship found in the ontological Trinity. In 
doing so, he boldly asserts that “since the internal relationships of the triune God are covenantal, 
God’s relation to mankind is also covenantal.”91 Curiously, he does not give explicit justification 
for this assumption. Whatever the reason, it is likely that he is not proposing any novel doctrine 
out of step with traditional reformed theology.92 In light of his discussion, it would seem that he 
is merely stressing the continuity between the personal relations ad intra and God relating 
personally ad extra. In other words, he is saying that God does not relate to man in a way which 
is inconsistent with his own personal Triune nature. He is not saying that the personal relations 
of the Trinity ad intra are somehow correlated or dependent on creation, with the persons 
necessarily relating to one another in ways identical to covenantal relations between God and 
man. Rather, how God relates personally ad extra is consistent with how he relates ad intra—the 
                                                          
89 Bosserman, The Trinity, 178-182. 
90 Bosserman, The Trinity, 181.  
91 Van Til, “Covenant Theology,” 306.  
92 E.g., In discussing the Pactum Salutis, Bavinck says that “the pact of salvation makes known to us the 
relationships and life of the three persons in the Divine Being as a covenantal life, a life of consummate self-
consciousness and freedom” (Herman Bavinck, Sin and Salvation in Christ [vol. 3 in Reformed Dogmatics; ed. John 
Bolt; trans. John Vriend; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2006], 214) (emphasis mine). 
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difference being that the latter is between infinite, indivisible and inseparable persons and is 
necessary while the former is with finite creation and free.93 
In light of how Van Til articulated his notion of personalism, there are at least two 
significant hermeneutical implications. First, all of our interpretive efforts are done in an 
exhaustively personal atmosphere—not personality in general, but in relation to the Triune God 
of Scripture. As such, we are immediately confronted with God’s authority and man’s ethical 
relationship to his Creator at every point. All hermeneutical work is personal and ethical in 
nature.94 All knowledge is inherently personal and covenantal in nature. Indicative of this fact is 
that man, in Christ, is being renewed in knowledge (cf. Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10).95 Moreover, one 
can see the consistency of man’s personal knowledge and the knowledge God has with regard to 
his simplicity—his knowledge and attributes are coterminous with his eternal and exhaustive 
Triune relations. True knowledge implies proper relating. This necessarily confronts impersonal 
and detached notions of meaning.96 This raises the question, in light of the personal and ethical 
environment of man in relation to God, can meaning be established prior to or separate from 
application? It would seem that a sharp distinction between meaning and application is 
unwarranted, for it would treat meaning as a relatively ‘neutral’ concept, apart from proper 
relating of that meaning to God. 
In discussing the attitude of “modern man” (i.e. autonomous man) toward Scripture, Van 
Til highlights a tendency to think that the human personality is somehow violated by an all-
                                                          
93 Cf. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 227-229. There has been recent debate over whether God takes on 
‘covenantal properties’ that are ‘new’ in his condescension or are they ‘prior’ to his condescension. The debate 
revolves around Oliphint’s book on divine condescension (God With Us). One should consult articles by Helm, 
Dolezal, Oliphint and Shannon posted on: reformation21.org and Helm’s blog at paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.co.uk. 
94 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 117. 
95 Van Til, Apologetics, 94-97. 
96 Poythress takes Vanhoozer and Hirsch to task for implying that “human authors’ intentions are 
meaningful apart from God’s personal involvement in their acts” (Poythress, review of Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There 
a Meaning in This Text?, 128). 
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knowing and powerful Creator. Hence, autonomous man rejects God’s exhaustively personal 
control in favor of freedom, yet one self-identified in an impersonal environment.97 Van Til 
concludes that: 
…both in religion and science the modern temper is impersonalist in its conception of 
some abstract super-personal law and personalist in that in practice even this impersonal 
law is interpreted in terms of the standards that are within man himself apart from God. 
Thus there is no personal confrontation of man with either God or Christ. Both of these 
become impersonal ideals that man has set before himself.98 
 
These ethical observations related to the ontological Trinity resonate with the concerns of 
theological interpretation of Scripture (TIS).99 Zimmerman argues that theological hermeneutics 
provides the principles for “interpretation to be truly ethical and character forming, the very 
things that both philosophical hermeneutics and radical postmodern hermeneutics strive for.”100 
These observations related to the Trinity also speak to the concerns of speech-act theory 
(SAT)—ethics and responsibility inherent in interpretation with respect to the divine author 
speaking through his word.101 Vanhoozer’s work in this area has emphasized the importance of 
the Trinity, as the ultimate personal communicator, in connection with man’s response to 
Scripture, exploring the personal and ethical nature of this response through the metaphor of 
‘Theo-drama.’102 However, for all his helpful insight, Vanhoozer primarily emphasizes the 
economic Trinity as a paradigm for communication, choosing not to explore the relevance of the 
ontological Trinity for hermeneutics.103 With his emphasis on the ontological Trinity, Van Til 
creatively summarized important aspects of theology proper which may prove to be helpful in 
Vanhoozer’s concern to unmask ‘interpretive idolatry.’ In particular, the ontological Trinity 
                                                          
97 Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 70.  
98 Van Til, “Introduction,” 28. 
99 See chapter three. 
100 Zimmerman, Recovering Theological Hermeneutics, 322.  
101 E.g., Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 367-441. 
102 Cf. Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine, 41-43, 63-68; Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 161, 456-459. 
103 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 168.    
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more clearly exposes forms of correlativism in methods which make God’s personal 
communication, recorded in Scripture, dependent upon creation, including history and human 
authors / readers. Van Til’s emphases further refine and complement biblical concerns of both 
SAT and TIS, related to the Trinity. 
Second, Van Til’s personalism has relevance for what is often referred to in 
hermeneutical discussions as the ‘I-it’ / ‘I-thou’ dichotomy. Van Til saw this distinction as an 
unbiblical metaphysical assumption with roots in the dualism of the Greeks (form-matter), Greek 
influenced scholasticism (nature-grace), and Kant (nature-freedom)104—one unknown to the 
Reformers.105 Perhaps the most obvious implication is that exhaustive personalism precludes any 
dichotomy between impersonal and personal knowledge. For example, Buber uses this scheme to 
argue that God’s revelation bypasses ‘impersonal’ information and propositions through a truly 
personal encounter.106 This dichotomy often pits science (‘I-it’) against revelation (‘I-thou’).107 
Again we find the assumption of a more ultimate metaphysic which subordinates and displaces a 
biblical ontology, informed by the ontological Trinity.108 However, even the so-called ‘I-it’ 
dimension is wholly under God’s authority, to which man is ethically responsible if one assumes 
the ontological Trinity as integral to a proper metaphysic.109 Van Til goes to great length to show 
that whether we are dealing with general or special revelation, the personal component is always 
and everywhere present as God is personally involved in nature, man, and with respect to 
                                                          
104 Frame, Van Til, 356-357; Van Til, Sovereignty of Grace, 87. 
105 Van Til, Sovereignty of Grace, 56. 
106 Martin Buber, I and Thou (2d ed.; trans. Ronald Gregor Smith; New York: Scribner’s, 1958), 109-120; 
cf. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (trans. Olive Wyon; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946), 5-6; The 
Philosophy of Religion (trans. A.J.D. Farrer and Bertram Lee Woolf; New York: Scribner’s, 1937), 183-191. 
107 Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 5, 10, 13.  
108 E.g., Van Til, New Modernism, 40-41; Christ and the Jews, 35. Van Til argues that this more ultimate 
metaphysic includes the notion of ontological correlation between God and man transcends the Creator-creature 
distinction (cf. Christ and the Jews, 47-48). Buber’s assumed metaphysic expresses itself through allegorizing the 
history of the OT à la Philo (influenced by Greek philosophy), eschewing Christ as the hermeneutical key to the OT 
(Christ and the Jews, 22, 56). 
109 Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 104-105. 
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himself.110 Van Til saw this dichotomy as essentially an unbiblical counterfeit of the covenantal 
relationship between God and creation. He calls this broad covenantalism between God and 
creation the “Christian I-Thou scheme.” True personal dialogue is “covenantal interaction with 
the God of Scripture,” not one which is inherently opposed to information or science.111 
Interestingly, Zimmerman, like Vanhoozer, opts to focus on the economic Trinity, the 
incarnation, and human relations to the neglect of the ontological Trinity when discussing the 
personal ‘I-thou’ relation.112 Certainly, it is important to give attention to the incarnation and the 
human relational context of the interpreter, but not to the exclusion of the ontological Trinity nor 
its relationship to each of those doctrines. Indicative of this neglect are statements about God’s 
relation to reality which border on being ‘necessary.’ For example, in his discussion of 
Bonhoeffer, Zimmerman says that God “entered ontology in the incarnation” and cites 
approvingly that “there is only one reality and that is the God-reality in the reality of the world 
which was revealed in Christ…participating in Christ we are at the same time in God-reality and 
in world reality.”113 Perhaps, consideration of the ontological Trinity would clarify such 
comments.   
In sum, our view of God implies a definite conception of his relation to creation and of 
everything in creation, which necessarily includes consideration of his Triunity.114 To be 
consistent with the content of Scripture, it is incumbent that our hermeneutical method takes 
these considerations into account. 
Archetype for Communication  
                                                          
110 Cf. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 121-222. 
111 Van Til, Christ and the Jews, 36, 55-56. 
112 Zimmerman, Recovering Trinitarian Hermeneutics, 304-305. 
113 Zimmerman, Recovering Trinitarian Hermeneutics, 280, 283, 307. 
114 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 32, 247.  
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 Van Til sees the ontological Trinity as the necessary archetype for all communication, 
apart from creation. God’s self-sufficient personality is the foundation and background for man’s 
personality.115 It naturally follows that “for God, the object and the subject of knowledge are 
coterminous as far as his own person is concerned.”116 This truth also follows from God’s 
omniscience and incomprehensibility. There is no disjunction between the subject and object of 
knowledge, nor is there mystery concerning his own exhaustive self-knowledge and his 
knowledge of all things. The subject and object of knowledge in God are also equally ultimate. 
God is the ultimate subject and object.117 As the archetype for human knowledge, all created 
relationships (i.e., object-object, subject-object, and subject-subject), find their source and 
foundation in the ontological Trinity. They cannot exist independently of the free will and plan 
of the Triune personal God.118 Discussing the existence and relation between the subject and 
object of knowledge, Van Til comments on human interpretation: 
…the existence and meaning of the human interpreter must be brought into a relation of 
subordination to God as the ultimate interpreter…in him [God], existence and 
interpretation are coextensive…it follows from this that any human interpreters would 
have to be derivative interpreters or reinterpreters…the interpretation that man would 
give to anything in this world can therefore never be comprehensive and exhaustive.119  
 
Unless a perfect coherence exists in the ontological Trinity as the foundation, our knowledge in 
terms of subject and object is incoherent. Human interpretation can never exhaust the meaning of 
anything, including Scripture. The key issue regarding the subject of knowledge is whether one 
sees human consciousness as functioning apart from God or not. If one assumes independence, 
human subjectivity will inevitably undermine any hope for certain interpretation.120 It is not a 
                                                          
115 Van Til, Psychology, 70-73, 161.  
116 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 230. By ‘object’ he means the thing known and by ‘subject’ he means the 
knower.  
117 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 133. 
118 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 57-59, 122. 
119 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 60 (emphasis his), cf. 66. 
120 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 136, 221-222. 
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matter of the object being opposed to the subject, nor objective knowledge being opposed to 
subjective knowledge per se, as if they are naturally in tension with one another. Rather, both 
aspects of knowledge find their perfect coherence in the self-knowledge of the Triune God, with 
human knowledge corresponding to that foundation on a creaturely level of being. Hence, 
neither the subject nor object trumps the other, nor does objectivity trump subjectivity. Man, as 
subject, knows an object insofar as that knowledge corresponds to God, as Subject, who knows 
himself and that object. In other words, man knows derivatively as a creature in the ultimate 
context of the knowledge of his Creator. In terms of redemption, Van Til sees sin affecting both 
the created object and subject, with the redemption of both being brought into a right relationship 
with each other and ultimately God through Christ. Man needs special revelation and God’s 
Spirit to enable this right relationship.121 Van Til concludes: 
The whole contention of the Christian theistic position is that what is called the subject-
object relation, that is, the possibility of having knowledge of any object whatsoever, is 
unintelligible except upon the presupposition that every subject of knowledge, since 
subjects are from this point of view also objects, owes its existence and its connotation, in 
last analysis to God.122 
 
 In discussing non-Christian conceptions of the subject-object relation, Van Til again 
points out that a general ontology is being assumed prior to the consideration of the Trinity. For 
example, naturalistic and idealistic systems deal with the subject-object relation without contact 
with personality (i.e. without relation to God and his relation to man). In discussing Brunner’s 
view of human psychology, he argues that without God as the starting point, revelation, for 
instance, must come to man through subject-object relationships which are ultimately impersonal 
categories. Consequently, revelation cannot be received for what it is—personal communication 
                                                          
121 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 122-123, 184. Van Til points out that even in redemption, the 
objective aspect (Christ) and the subjective aspect (Holy Spirit) are never separated (Psychology, 151, 154). 
122 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 131; cf. 217. 
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in an exhaustively personal atmosphere.123 Van Til argues that Brunner seeks personal 
correspondence with God through correlation, such that God’s consciousness and being are 
ultimately related to man, rather than within the ontological Trinity.124  
Regarding the New Hermeneutic, Van Til sees an ontological correlativity being assumed 
between the subject and object of faith, which replaces the idea of both being related in the 
ontological Trinity with God and man being related ontologically in terms of subject and object 
on the same level of being.125 This is where the primacy of the ‘I-thou’ seems to take hold with 
regard to the subject-object relation. The ‘I-thou’ scheme seeks to lead to a deeper layer of 
reality than that of mere subject and object.126 This deeper layer is prior to such conceptual 
categories as subject and object.127 So, for communication to take place between God and man, 
an ‘event’ must take place which transcends subject-object categories, engaging the interpreter’s 
subjectivity beyond cognition wherein the text “actively grasps him as its object.”128 “Truth has 
us ourselves as its object.”129 Yet, this ‘event’ of language is construed as ‘being,’ which is 
somehow shared by both God and man, with both being interdependent.130 Van Til’s interaction 
with the New Hermeneutic reveals an ontological focus, which speaks to present hermeneutical 
questions.  
For all its insights concerning the subjective involvement of the interpreter, especially as 
it pertains to being ‘interpreted’ by a text (something all the more relevant when dealing with a 
divinely authoritative text), the New Hermeneutic reveals stark differences with the doctrine of 
                                                          
123 Van Til, New Modernism, 249-250. 
124 Van Til, New Modernism, 254. 
125 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 18. 
126 Van Til, Christ and the Jews, 47.  
127 Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” 83.  
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the ontological Trinity. First, it assumes a metaphysic of ‘being’ which not only compromises the 
Creator-creature distinction, but also the inner personal relations of the ontological Trinity, 
including objectivity and subjectivity. It assumes an ontology which is more ultimate than the 
theological categories of the ontological Trinity. Second, the question of what exactly is 
communicated in an ‘event’ which transcends conventional linguistic categories persists. As Van 
Til emphasized, the Triune God is ‘self-contained fullness,’ highlighting the fact that God is able 
to reveal positive qualities he actually possesses, not being a transcendent ‘blank’ or merely an 
extrapolation of finite reality.131 Third, ‘being’ is conceived of as an ultimate unity without 
ultimate diversity, leaving personal relatability dependent upon man’s encounter with ‘being’ or 
‘God.’ The hermeneutical concern for communicative engagement with contemporary readers 
through the Bible finds an answer in the fully communicative ontological Trinity, who does not 
need such engagement to become communicative, but was so from all eternity in himself.132    
One hermeneutical implication from this is that since Trinitarian knowledge involves 
both the object and the subject in perfect, personal coherence, one can expect to find similar 
analogous insights in modernist and postmodern hermeneutics, while at the same time, recognize 
that neither is correct at the ultimate metaphysical level.133 Frame has observed that every 
epistemology which seeks to do justice to knowledge in terms of subject, object, and criterion 
(logic) apart from the ontological Trinity tends to deify or absolutize one of the three aspects. For 
instance, exalting the subject in communication is found in various forms of subjectivism, while 
exalting the object is found in forms of empiricism. Without the Triune God, there is no 
                                                          
131 Frame, Van Til, 54. By ‘positive’ we mean actual content as opposed to pure negation. 
132 Westphal’s answer to this concern is notably lacking in Trinitarian emphasis (“Philosophical / 
Theological View,” 86). 
133 Cf. Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 67. 
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guarantee that these three aspects will ultimately cohere.134 Each, like the persons of the Trinity 
are distinct, but inseparable.135 The archetypal object (God) as the context for all knowledge is 
also exhaustive personal subjectivity.136 Van Til’s emphasis on the equal ultimacy of subject and 
object avoids hermeneutical idolatry which either deifies one over the other, or seeks to 
transcend them both in favor of a more ultimate metaphysic. Both run contrary to one informed 
by the ontological Trinity. 
 Poythress has not only affirmed archetypal coinherence of subject and object in God’s 
Triune self-knowledge,137 but has also pointed out that Trinitarian coinherence between speaker, 
speech, and hearer (associated with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, respectively) grounds our 
own speech. Each provides a perspective on the whole of communication. Not only does this 
Trinitarian coinherent triad provide intelligibility and grounding for human communication, it 
also highlights the fact that none of the three components are intelligible in isolation. Any theory 
of interpretation which pits one against the others ends up distorting the truth and deifying one 
aspect at the expense of others.138 
It is worth noting one more contemporary concern to which the ontological Trinity as an 
archetype for human communication can help nuance. Vanhoozer has explicitly stated his 
concern to “take God’s Trinitarian self-communication as the paradigm of what is involved in all 
true communication.” Also, he contends that “the undoing of interpretation rests on a theological 
mistake.”139 However, he proposes to combat secular literary theories (“anti-theologies”) by 
emphasizing the economic Trinity in redemption. Certainly, this is not inappropriate, but it is 
                                                          
134 Frame, Knowledge of God, 110. 
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incomplete in terms of ontology, and begs more ultimate questions, such as: where does personal 
speech originate? In a chapter on the metaphysics of communication, it is surprising that 
Vanhoozer would neglect to mention the ontological Trinity beyond an implicit reference.140 In a 
later work, he relegates the immanent Trinity to a mere footnote, given his emphasis on God’s 
self-revelation on the stage of history.141 Yet, he makes the point that the gospel is unintelligible 
apart from Trinitarian theology, for only such a theology “adequately accounts for how those 
who are not God come to share in the fellowship of the Father and Son through the Holy 
Spirit.”142 It would seem that Van Til’s emphasis on the ontological Trinity could round out 
Vanhoozer and provide nuances which speak to his concerns about intelligibility and keeping 
‘those who are not God’ distinct from the self-sufficient Trinity. 
Perspectivalism 
 Though he does not explicitly use the term, ‘perspectivalism,’ the concept is present in 
Van Til’s writings.143 As we saw in chapter one, perspectivalism seeks to do justice to both, the 
finitude of man and the unified nature of God’s system of truth rooted in his Triune nature. Van 
Til’s way of looking at the Christian system of truth is to look at various aspects as related to one 
another in unity.144 This unity is essential in maintaining a proper defense against non-Christian 
thought. While perspectival triads can be seen in his approach to such topics as ethics,145 
epistemology,146 revelation,147 and others, their theological roots lie in his doctrine of the 
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Trinity.148 Each person of the Trinity is a perspective on the entire Godhead, while remaining 
eternally distinct (versus modalism).149 In terms of the unified Christian system of truth, one 
doctrine is related to another and to the whole. One doctrine cannot be elevated by cancelling out 
the others, but rather each informs the others. Even the attributes of Scripture (necessity, 
authority, clarity, and sufficiency) are perspectivally related in that each implies the others, and 
the nature of Scripture as a whole can be seen from each of the four perspectives.150 This is 
another case of God’s special revelation having Trinitarian qualities. Moreover, creation exhibits 
Trinitarian characteristics. This can be seen in terms of the one and many phenomenon already 
discussed. Because God’s archetypal knowledge is Tri-personal, our ectypal knowledge involves 
multiple perspectives.151 This does not mean the endorsement of multiple, contradictory 
meanings,152 but rather the further explication of the one, full sense of any Scripture.153    
A Van Til-influenced, perspectival hermeneutic would exhibit a number of distinctives. 
First, it would recognize the value of perspectives for finite man seeking to understand God’s 
word as coming from the infinite and personal One, whose comprehensive ‘perspective’ is 
exhaustive of all perspectives, being both one and many.154 Second, not only does it make the 
interpreter more ontologically, epistemologically, and ethically self-conscious, it helps us to 
better understand the ‘full sense’ of any one text. Legitimate perspectives in Scripture (e.g., 
doctrines, themes, and analogies)155 can provide different looks at the entire canon. In this sense, 
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perspectives promote the unity and deeply contextual nature of Scripture, with conscious roots in 
the ontological Trinity. Rather than denying absolute truth, perspectives exhibit the fullness of 
truth encountered by finite interpreters.156 Third, the use of multiple perspectives serves to 
prevent theological ‘blind spots’ from forming due to a dominant focus on certain ones to the 
neglect of others. This may contribute to more fruitful dialogue with other theological 
perspectives, while exposing forms of reductionism and heresy.157 
Recently, some evangelical scholars have employed similar perspectival-like triads in 
hermeneutics. Kӧstenberger employs history, literature, and theology as his hermeneutical triad 
of choice. While this triad provides complementary insight into the interpretive enterprise, it is 
not self-consciously Trinitarian. As such, it lacks explicit ontological and epistemological 
foundations. Desiring to balance each aspect in the face of various forms of imbalance in the 
history of interpretation, Kӧstenberger curiously suggests that while theology is the goal of 
interpretation, appreciation of history and literary features are essential and foundational.158 
Clearly this assertion needs to be nuanced. Is it consistent with the ontological Trinity to 
privilege history as more foundational than theology in interpretation? In light of our survey in 
chapters two and three, such ontological concerns must be addressed in order to meet the demand 
of contemporary hermeneutics. 
Treier, argues that TIS uses multiple lenses to integrate multiple perspectives into a 
fuller, unified picture of God and his call in Scripture. This not only aids our finite and fallen 
capacities through expanded appreciation, but also corrects them.159 However, while the 
                                                          
156 Poythress, Symphonic Theology, 45-46. 
157 E.g., some are mono-perspectival reductions, which make one perspective into a god-like origin for 
everything else (Poythress, Redeeming Philosophy, 87). 
158 Andreas J. Kӧstenberger and Richard D. Patterson, Invitation to Biblical Interpretation: Exploring the 
Hermeneutical Triad of History, Literature, and Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 2011), 67-79. 
159 Treier, Theological Interpretation, 203-205. 
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metaphors of ‘lenses’ and ‘maps’ are helpful to a point, they do not provide the deeper 
foundation of the ontological Trinity. In order to defend against opposing worldviews and 
articulate a distinctly Christian hermeneutic, it is necessary to address metaphysical assumptions. 
Trinitarian considerations on this level would only contribute to the otherwise Trinitarian-
oriented TIS movement.160 
Conclusion  
We have seen how Van Til’s summary of the ontological Trinity, in terms of four main 
categories, provides insight and application to contemporary hermeneutics. In particular, these 
insights speak to concerns of both SAT and TIS, but in ways that develop and nuance them. As 
with all of Van Til’s emphases in his doctrine of God, there is benefit in assessing issues related 
to metaphysics from a consistently Christian worldview. Not only is this a pressing matter due to 
how hermeneutics has come to be defined (chapter two) and how its relationship to metaphysics 
has been construed (chapter three), but also in how few have offered such a self-conscious, 
Christian ontology to meet the need.   
We have looked at macro-hermeneutical observations of Van Til throughout our 
discussion in light of contemporary hermeneutical concerns (i.e. scope and metaphysics). We 
also addressed the three main contours of Van Til’s doctrine of God with their respective 
implications for interpretive method. In the next chapter, we will more specifically seek to apply 
insights from Van Til’s doctrine of God to a relevant contemporary issue: the NT use of the OT. 
 
 
                                                          
160 Treier not only emphasizes the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity for interpretation, but also sees 
the need for articulating the right relation between TIS and biblical theology. He mentions that some are fearful that 
TIS might involve a theology based on a philosophy ‘in-general’ (Daniel J. Treier, “Biblical Theology and/or 
Theological Interpretation,” SJT 61.1 [2008]: 20-29). Van Til’s thought would not only address Trinitarian concerns, 
but also combat forms of ‘philosophy in-general’ found in various hermeneutical approaches. 
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Part Three: Van Til’s Doctrine of God Applied 
Chapter Seven: The NT Use of the OT 
Introduction 
 In part one, we saw how hermeneutics is inextricably linked with metaphysical 
assumptions. Van Til’s relevance comes out of his concern to articulate and defend Christianity 
as a worldview, including a biblical metaphysics. In part two, we discussed the centerpiece of his 
Christian worldview—the doctrine of God, the basis for a Christian ontology. In particular, we 
looked at three main contours which Van Til emphasized in evaluating apologetic method. It is 
our contention that not only does every ontology imply an epistemology,1 but every ontology 
also implies a hermeneutic. To put a hermeneutical twist on a phrase from Van Til, ‘we cannot 
choose hermeneutical methods like we do hats.’2 Our method of interpretation must match the 
content of Scripture.3 This consistency involves taking into account the revealed nature of God.  
 It is important to note that the Bible teaches that fallen man’s tendency is to confuse God 
with creation, seeking to reason autonomously in the place of God (cf. Genesis 3; Romans 1), 
according to some more ‘ultimate’ criteria than what God has revealed. We discussed this in 
terms of how a general ontology is often assumed in hermeneutics which precludes theological 
consideration, and ends up correlating God with creation at some point. This creates tension 
between interpretive method and the theological content of Scripture. In what follows, we will 
seek to apply Van Til’s macro-hermeneutical concerns to the contemporary debate over the NT 
use of the OT. It is our aim that this brief case study will shed light on the issue by approaching it 
                                                          
1 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 15. Lillback suggests that “at the heart of the hermeneutical crisis there 
is an epistemological crisis that denies men the certainty of divine knowledge” (Peter A. Lillback, “The Infallible 
Rule of Interpretation of Scripture: The Hermeneutical Crisis and the Westminster Standards,” in Resurrection and 
Eschatology: Essays in the Honor of Richard B. Gaffin Jr. [eds. Lane G. Tipton and Jeffrey C. Waddington; 
Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2008], 313). 
2 Cf. Van Til, Christian Epistemology, xiv.  
3 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 4-6; Reformed Pastor, 45; Psychology, 148-149. 
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from a different angle—one which self-consciously takes the implications of a biblical ontology 
into account. 
NT Use of the OT: An Overview 
 It would be impossible to deal with the complexity of this issue in the present chapter.4 
For our purposes, we will only highlight aspects which more directly intersect with Van Til’s 
macro-hermeneutical concerns. One helpful way to navigate is to recognize the central questions 
involved in the discussion. Lunde suggests that the central issue in making sense of the NT use 
of the OT concerns the relationship between the OT and the NT authors’ intended meanings.5 Of 
the other ‘orbiting’ questions which revolve around this central question,6 the ones more directly 
related to method will concern us here: what was the source of the NT authors’ hermeneutical 
methods? Are we able to replicate such methods? We will look at questions regarding meaning 
and method in turn. However, the two are interrelated. Hence, there is inevitable overlap, and 
neither can be discussed in a purely discrete fashion. 
Relation between human authors’ intended meanings?  
 Not only does this question involve the relationship between OT and NT authors’ intent 
in terms of correspondence, it also involves the relationship between original and modern 
meaning (e.g., the first century for the NT authors and their audience). Among evangelical 
scholars, there have been three main views of this relationship.7 
Single Meaning, Unified Referents 
                                                          
4 For a good introduction, see: G.K. Beale, ed., The Right Doctrine From the Wrong Texts? Essays on the 
Use of the Old Testament in the New (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1994). 
5 Jonathan Lunde, “An Introduction to Central Questions in the New Testament Use of the Old Testament,” 
in Three Views of the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (eds. Kenneth Berding and Jonathan Lunde; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2008), 10-12. 
6 E.g., Sensus Plenior, typology, and contextual sensitivity. 
7 The following three main views represent general categories, not all their variations. 
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 First, some have argued that there is no difference between what was intended by the OT 
author and what the NT author intends.8 This ‘single intent’ extends to the referents of the text. 
In other words, “in addition to prior reference, the OT writer is to be understood as ultimately 
having the same people or events in mind when he writes his text as the NT author does when he 
refers that text to Jesus and the community defined by him.”9 Did the OT authors know the 
future meaning of their texts? Did the NT authors go beyond the human intent of older Scripture? 
In essence, the answer is ‘yes’ to the former and ‘no’ to the latter question.10 Kaiser has argued 
that this single intended meaning of the human author can be accessed by the ‘usual’ literary 
conventions, but without introducing any prejudice or pre-understanding.11 Moreover, this intent 
can only include revelation prior to the historical context of the original author.12 Christian 
theology is bracketed out for a later stage in the process, and not to be used until that point.13 In 
each of these emphases,14 there is a concern to provide controls which secure meaning in the 
human intent of the original author, often in contrast to other approaches—primarily, 
subjectivism and Roman Catholic tradition under the guise of Sensus Plenior.15 
 There are a number of problematic features to this approach to meaning. First, there is a 
de-emphasis on the divine author to the point that rather strikingly, the human author’s intent is 
equated with the divine author’s intent. This seems to stem from Kaiser’s emphasis on general 
                                                          
8 Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., “The Single Intent of Scripture,” in Right Doctrine, 55-68. For example, the OT 
prophets only claimed ignorance to the timing of their prophecies, not their content. 
9 Lunde, “Introduction,” in Three Views, 40. 
10 Kaiser, “Single Meaning, Unified Referents,” in Three Views, 65. 
11 Kaiser, “Single Intent,” in Right Doctrine, 67-68. 
12 Kaiser, Exegetical Theology, 133-134. 
13 Kaiser, Exegetical Theology, 140. 
14 This includes Hirsch’s distinction between ‘meaning’ (unchanging) and ‘significance’ (changing) 
(Kaiser, “Legitimate Hermeneutics,” 117). For a discussion of problematic aspects of this distinction for the NT use 
of the OT, see: Douglas J. Moo, “The Problem of Sensus Plenior,” in Hermeneutics, Authority, and Canon, 198-200. 
15 Erickson, Evangelical Interpretation, 11-12. For the classic Catholic treatment of this concept, see: 
Raymond E. Brown, The ‘Sensus Plenior’ of Sacred Scripture (Baltimore: St. Mary’s University, 1955); “The 
‘Sensus Plenior’ in the Last Ten Years,” CBQ 25 (1963): 262-285. 
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hermeneutics in establishing objective meaning.16 He asserts that “the superiority of the 
Scriptures over other books does not come in the manner we interpret it but in its matter and 
grand source.”17 Yet his method (‘manner’), based on general hermeneutics, shows itself to be 
inconsistent with the message (‘matter’) of Scripture, especially if the divine author’s intent is 
considered to be the same as the human author’s intent.18 Erickson observes that “here is the 
adoption of a methodology without due attention to the compatibility of its presuppositions with 
those of the Christian biblical tradition.”19 By largely treating the Bible like any other book, 
Kaiser sets up a playing field which makes it impossible to affirm the biblical relationship 
between human authorship and divine inspiration he seeks to endorse. Erickson observes: 
…a built-in contradiction continues to surface. The antisupernaturalist (or at least 
nonsupernaturalist) assumptions eliminate any meaning conveyed by a divine coauthor of 
which the human author would not be consciously aware.20 
 
By anchoring meaning in the human author, it becomes necessary to establish objective control 
and comprehension of that meaning on a human level, which, as we discussed earlier (chapter 
four), seeks to ‘transcend’ the limits of human reason—both, regarding the human author and 
reader. 
Second, OT authors end up being endowed with superhuman comprehension in order to 
save objective meaning from subjectivism and uncertainty. While this seeks a sort of 
comprehensive knowledge in the human mind, it ironically limits modern meaning for the human 
reader. Unchanging meaning is locked in the past, while only a changing ‘significance’ is left for 
                                                          
16 Kaiser, “Legitimate Hermeneutics,” 112-118. 
17 Kaiser, “Legitimate Hermeneutics,” 116. 
18 Erickson, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 13, 18-19. Kaiser boldly asserts that “God did not exceed the 
intention of the human author either through a retrojection of the whole of the canon on an earlier text or by means 
of a hidden freight of meaning which awaited our discovery of it centuries later” (Walter C. Kaiser, “A Response to 
Authorial Intention and Biblical Interpretation,” in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible, 445-446). 
19 Erickson, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 30. 
20 Erickson, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 30-31. 
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the modern reader. It has been suggested that this lesser ‘significance’ may even prove to be an 
open door for responding to the text in a way which exhibits a different value system than the 
one found in Scripture.21 Kaiser’s reliance upon Beecher’s concept of ‘generic prophecy’ proves 
unpersuasive.22 With it, he hopes to affirm that the prophets saw the whole complex of future 
events and all parts with their various intervals involved in their prophecy, yet with the caveat 
that they may apply indifferently to various parts or the whole. Can we say that the prophet 
knows the whole of his prophecy if his knowledge is ultimately ‘generic’ and may include 
certain applications to various parts or the whole? It would seem like he is confusing what is 
often labeled as the ‘prophet perspective’ (i.e. seeing a complex of events as happening 
together)23 with a comprehensive and determinate one. Other questions remain. For instance, 
what about prophecy regarding the future which has yet to be fulfilled for the contemporary 
reader?24 
Third, only taking into consideration that which was known or available to the human 
author of an OT text, besides being an inexact science,25 actually decontextualizes a text (along 
with a portion of the canon) from the completed canon. Theological meaning associated with an 
OT text must be detached from the canon in order to be rightly understood.26 This is problematic 
if divine authorship is to be maintained. One wonders if theology, considered merely as a 
secondary tack-on, will ever find true compatibility with that which it has been excluded from 
                                                          
21 Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 247.  
22 Cf. Willis J. Beecher, The Prophets and the Promise (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1975), 130. 
23 Anthony A. Hoekema, The Bible and the Future (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1979), 9; cf. Bruce 
Waltke, An Old Testament Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2007), 822-824. 
24 Erickson, Evangelical Hermeneutics, 29. 
25 E.g., books of the OT with which there is debate over dating, authorship, editing? In addition, how much 
do we know about the human authors of Scripture, in terms of their intent in using previous canonical material (e.g., 
which portions?) and what their historical context was and how much it influenced their intent (cf. Poythress, 
“Dispensing With Merely Human Meaning,” 481-496).  
26 This would seem to be inconsistent with what Kaiser says elsewhere concerning the theological 
presuppositions of the OT authors which necessarily point forward to NT fulfillment (“Response to Bock,” in Three 
Views, 153-154). Are such theological presuppositions to be bracketed out in understanding OT intent or not? 
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the start.27 Contrary to avoiding the analogy of faith until the end of the exegetical process, 
Payne suggests that in limiting meaning to the human author’s intent, “we would have no basis 
for using the analogy of Scripture to check present-day interpretations that conflict with other 
teachings of Scripture.”28 
Fourth, after being decontextualized from the canon, an OT text, in essence, is re-
contextualized within the more ultimate limiting factor—in this case, history. On a human level, 
this is something to which the author and reader are bound. Kaiser’s method demands historical 
restrictions on meaning which are inconsistent with his doctrine of divine inspiration. In short, 
divine intent ends up being ultimately bound by historical constraints. 
Fuller Meaning, Single Goal 
Enns has endorsed a view which sees NT authors intending new meanings in OT texts 
which were not necessarily intended by the original authors. If Kaiser sees no distinction 
between OT and NT authors’ intent, Enns sees a separation between the two. Enns affirms the 
role of divine inspiration with both OT and NT authors, but this does not mean there is no 
difference in intent. There are things which the NT authors intend regarding the OT that are not 
actually found in the OT. In other words, reading the OT by itself, using the grammatical-
historical method, does not lead to the NT reading of it.29 According to his view, the NT authors’ 
intent does not match the OT context.30 The NT authors were not concerned with staying true to 
the OT authors’ intent. Rather, they were concerned to explain what the OT means in light of 
                                                          
27 This would be akin to a sort of hermeneutical ‘block-house’ method discussed in chapter four. 
28 Philip Barton Payne, “The Fallacy of Equating Meaning with the Human Author’s Intention,” in Right 
Doctrine, 81. 
29 Peter Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics and an Evangelical Doctrine of Scripture: Moving Beyond a 
Modernist Impasse,” WTJ 65 (2003): 271, 283; Inspiration and Incarnation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2005), 
115. 
30 Peter Enns, “Fuller Meaning, Single Goal,” in Three Views, 215; Inspiration and Incarnation, 115, 156-
160. 
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Christ.31 In other words, they were concerned with modern meaning (in the first century), not so 
much with original meaning.32   
This approach is also problematic. First, while seeking to get beyond intended meaning 
being trapped in the past via the Hirschian ‘meaning / significance’ distinction, it ends up 
disconnecting OT and NT intent, and then reconnecting them via an extra-biblical historical and 
hermeneutical context.33 This raises an important question: where does the hermeneutical 
authority of Scripture ultimately reside? Enns seems to provide an answer to this when he says, 
“there is no absolute reference point to which we have access that will allow us to interpret the 
Bible stripped of our own cultural context.”34 Certainly, the Bible is culturally conditioned, but 
its meaning is not culturally bound. In terms of biblical hermeneutics as a dialogue with God as 
the ultimate authority, Enns’ approach seems more like a dialogue with a second opinion. He 
conceives of extra-biblical evidence as a “vital ‘conversation partner’ for thinking through what 
the Bible is.”35 
Second, Enns’ use of the incarnational analogy is not only ambiguous, but also breaks 
down at points. Generally, this analogy affirms that like Christ who is fully divine and fully 
human at the same time, so also is the Bible. Though the analogy is helpful if this general point 
is maintained,36 he speaks of it in a way which would lead one to think that the Son did not 
merely take up humanity in service of his sovereign mission, but actually was dependent upon it 
                                                          
31 Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 116.  
32 Though he claims to not abandon the proper instinct to respect original intent, he ends up focusing on 
another context in order to make sense of the NT use of the OT—namely, an extra-biblical, Second Temple Jewish 
context (Inspiration and Incarnation, 114-117).  
33 Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 132. 
34 Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 169. 
35 Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics,” 287.  
36 Cf. Herman Bavinck, Prolegomena (vol. 1 in Reformed Dogmatics; ed. John Bolt; trans. John Vriend; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2003), 380, 432-443; Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., God’s Word In Servant Form: Abraham 
Kuyper and Herman Bavinck on the Doctrine of Scripture (Jackson, Miss.: Reformed Academic Press, 2008), 15, 
40, 46.  
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in order to make sense of his mission. For instance, his emphasis on the extra-biblical, historical 
and cultural context of Jesus and the NT authors as the key to understanding their use of the OT 
shows that “the Bible is not unique to its environment.”37 This leads Carson to conclude that 
Enns endorses an Arian understanding of Scripture (i.e. human trumps the divine).38 Contrary to 
Enns, Tipton helpfully summarizes the value of the incarnational analogy: 
The incarnational analogy ought to yield both a theology of Scripture and a hermeneutic 
that take into account the primarily theological and hermeneutical significance of the 
Holy Spirit’s agency, on the one hand, and the subordinate theological and hermeneutical 
significance of human agency on the other hand. The primacy of the divine in 
pneumatology finds a clear analogue in the primacy of the eternal person of the Son of 
God.39 
  
A proper use of the incarnational analogy will recognize that the humanity of Christ is not 
primary, nor are the two natures equally ultimate. Rather, the Creator-creature distinction 
remains fully intact in the hypostatic union. Here, Enns fails to do justice to the doctrine of 
enhypostasia, as endorsed by the church at Constantinople II (553). 
Third, according to Enns’ view, biblical theology fails to “serve as buffer between the NT 
and the interpretive practices of the world in which the NT writers lives.”40 In other words, he 
cuts the cord of organic revelation, in which earlier parts are inherently related to later parts, so 
that NT authors do not develop the original intent of OT texts.41 Rather, an ‘inorganic’ context 
becomes the link that holds the meaning of the OT and the NT together. This sets up an unstable 
                                                          
37 Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 20. 
38 Carson, Collected Writings, 270. It may also be noted that though Enns accuses evangelicals of Docetism 
(denying the humanity of Scripture), one could charge him with a functional Ebionitism in return (denying deity of 
Scripture).  
39 Lane G. Tipton, “Incarnation, Inspiration, and Pneumatology: A Reformed Incarnational Analogy,” n.p. 
[cited 15 June 2015]. Ordained Servant Online: http://www.opc.org/os.html?article id=109 (emphasis mine); cf. 
G.C. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1954), 311.  
40 Peter Enns, “Response to Professor Greg Beale,” Them 32 (2007), 10-11. 
41 Beale, Erosion of Inerrancy, 105. 
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dichotomy between contexts of revelation and the climax of that revelation in Christ, leaving the 
latter a climax of something to which it has no substantive relation.   
Single Meaning, Multiple Contexts and Referents 
Third, Bock argues for a single unity of meaning between OT and NT authors when texts 
are cited. However, in this unity of meaning, the OT texts take on new dimensions as they apply 
to new contexts and referents that unfold in the larger canonical context.42 In many cases, the OT 
authors were not fully conscious of these new referents. This view seeks to allow the original 
context of an OT passage to resonate with the NT context in terms of canonical development, 
with the former as the starting point, setting trajectories for the latter.43 Hence, there is a 
consideration of both contexts in the larger context of the canon. In order to do justice to issues 
of intent and context, the theological presuppositions of the OT and NT authors must be 
considered. Though there is some difference of opinion on exactly what these presuppositions 
were, this approach recognizes their integral role in method.44 Some directly point to the doctrine 
of God in terms of inspiration, the unity of special revelation, and a sovereign plan for the 
progress of history.45 The concern “is that the movement of a text through its scriptural, temporal 
                                                          
42 This is similar to Vanhoozer’s notion of “thick description’” (Is There a Meaning In This Text?, 313-
314). 
43 Darrell L. Bock, “Single Meaning, Multiple Contexts and Referents,” in Three Views, 106-107. 
Similarly, Francis Watson argues for what he calls ‘dialectical unity’ (vs. ‘discrete witness,’ implying independence) 
of the testaments in which the voice of each “can only be properly heard on the assumption of their 
interdependence” (“The Old Testament as Christian Scripture,” SJT 52.2 [1999]: 227-228). 
44 Bock, “Single Meaning,” 111; cf. Kline Snodgrass, “The Use of the Old Testament in the New,” in Right 
Doctrine, 37-40. For a summary of seven main presuppositions involved in NT authors’ interpretation of the OT, 
see: G.K. Beale, Handbook on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament: Exegesis and Interpretation (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2012), 95-102. 
45 One of the helpful contributions of N.T. Wright is his emphasis on the importance of ‘story’ for 
understanding knowledge and worldview, highlighting the role of interpretation regarding ‘facts’ (vs. uninterpreted 
or atomistic facts). However, he is unclear on the role of authorial intention in textual interpretation. While affirming 
a concept of sensus plenior, he does not explain how God’s relationship to meaning factors into his ‘critical 
realism.’ He seems to prefer a sort of ‘hermeneutical syncretism,’ in which he draws together aspects from a variety 
of approaches (cf. Moritz, “Critical but Real,” 180-192; Wright, New Testament People of God, 31-144). Carson has 
criticized Wright’s emphasis on the functional authority of Scripture through the kingdom of God (i.e. authority as a 
‘sub-branch’ of other theological categories), which does not address the question of what is the essence of 
scriptural authority in itself (vs. God’s authority through it) (Carson, Collected Writings, 299-300; cf. N.T. Wright, 
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development of salvation history must always be kept in mind as work with meaning in the early 
church citation.”46 This means that development between earlier and later OT texts must be 
taken into account when seeking to understand the NT use of them. Recognition of this 
development within the OT may explain the ‘strange’ use of earlier OT passages. It has been 
argued that NT authors cite such passages with the later development in mind, making their use 
of them consistent with the passage in its larger context.47 Indeed, what often seems to be an 
‘atomistic’ treatment actually proves to be more deeply contextual,48 through the consideration 
of larger context, development, and theological and eschatological expectations of the authors.49 
In short, meaning develops throughout the canon, but does so in ways which complement and 
expand upon it, not in ways which flatten or contradict it. This view embraces the standard 
evangelical notion of the grammatical-historical method, but is not limited to a strict version of it 
in light of the canonical dynamics in meaning. 
Admittedly, I find this third view the most persuasive in that it places an emphasis on 
canonical context, theological presuppositions,50 and an appreciation for the fullness of meaning, 
which transcends the human author, but does not contradict original intent. However, in this 
view, there is often little explicit attention paid to the divine author’s relation to meaning, at least 
                                                          
The Last Word: Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture [London: SPCK, 
2005], 17, 22, 37). 
46 Bock, “Single Meaning,” 141.  
47 G.K. Beale, “The Cognitive Peripheral Vision of Biblical Authors,” WTJ 76 (2014): 263-293; Cf. Moisés 
Silva, “The New Testament Use of the Old Testament: Text Form and Authority,” in Scripture and Truth, 161; 
Graeme Goldsworthy, Christ-Centered Biblical Theology: Hermeneutical Principles and Principles (Downers 
Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2012), 148-149.  
48 Dodd convincingly shows that OT citations in the NT were being used as signposts to larger, assumed 
OT contexts (C.H. Dodd, According to the Scriptures: The Sub-Structure of New Testament theology (London: 
Nisbet, 1952). 
49 William Sanford LaSor, “The Sensus Plenior and Biblical Interpretation,” in A Guide to Contemporary 
Hermeneutics, 61; L. Russ Bush, “Apostolic Hermeneutics: ‘Proof Texts’ and the Resurrection,” CTR 2.2 (1988): 
291-307. 
50 However, as Beale points out, larger hermeneutical assumptions related to the continuity or discontinuity 
of the testaments factor into which theological presuppositions are emphasized or not (Handbook, 96-97).  
236 
 
according to a biblically informed ontology and epistemology. The following discussion will 
flesh out this concern according to emphases in Van Til’s doctrine of God. 
A Van Tillian Critique of ‘Meaning’: the Deeper Question 
Behind our brief evaluation of the three views, there is a deeper question than the central 
one suggested above. Namely, what is the relationship between God and the OT and NT authors’ 
meanings? In the current discussion, there are very few references to ontology, even in the midst 
of epistemological considerations. Van Til’s emphasis can help to address many of the concerns 
and questions regarding the above views. By focusing on the divine author as the context for the 
human authors, their message, and subsequent audiences, one finds biblically stable ground on 
which to stand. 
First, in light of Van Til’s extensive discussions of the Creator-creature distinction, the 
question of the relationship between the OT and NT in terms of authorial intent is dependent 
upon God’s intention mediated through them. Each of the three views fails to make this explicit 
to one degree or another, with Kaiser most blatantly confusing the Creator-creature distinction in 
his understanding of authorial intent. God’s personal intent through a text of Scripture 
necessarily involves that intent being related to his exhaustive self-knowledge, and of all things, 
according to his comprehensive plan for creation. Ultimately, God is the context for meaning.51 
Poythress points out that divine intent includes not only his revelation through the human author 
to the original audience, but also to subsequent audiences. His intent includes both, particular 
texts and the whole canon.52 Before stability of meaning is established, it is important to note 
that all involved in understanding the NT use of the OT (e.g., humans, texts, and so on) 
                                                          
51 Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 86-90. 
52 Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 109-122. 
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necessarily depend on God for meaning. Rather than canceling out the actual intent of the human 
authors in the process, God’s intent establishes it.  
Another Creator-creature category highlighted by Van Til is the incarnation, especially in 
its Chalcedonian formulation. As we saw with Enns, the incarnational analogy can be helpful in 
setting forth the relationship between the divine and human qualities of Scripture, but it can also 
provide a corrective for Christological heresies expressed in hermeneutical form. The most 
salient dangers among evangelicals in trying to understand and find controls for meaning in the 
NT use of the OT are hermeneutical ‘Arianism’ or ‘Nestorianism’ (Enns) and ‘monophysitism’ 
(Kaiser)—a tendency to ignore the divine author, separate divine and human intent, or confuse 
them, respectively. Consideration of the divine and human authors involves a recognition that we 
are dealing with two levels of being in order to avoid a ‘taking away’ from one in order to 
establish the other. Only God exhaustively knows the relationship between the divine and human 
natures in the person of the Son, and only he knows that relation as it is present in Scripture. 
However, does this leave us then with a kind of hermeneutical agnosticism in our understanding?  
Van Til spent much time articulating the biblical relationship between general and special 
revelation, seeing the latter as God’s authoritative (inspired and inerrant) interpretation of reality. 
Just as God is absolute, self-contained, and self-attesting, so also is his word.53 Contrary to Enns, 
“the Bible itself must determine for us what the Bible is.”54 General revelation and special 
revelation are not opposed to one another nor do they function without one another, as they come 
from the same authority. However, after the fall, there is a sinful tendency to pit the two against 
one another,55 often under the guise of doing justice to the historical and cultural context. Special 
                                                          
53 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 158. 
54 Goldsworthy, Hermeneutics, 271. 
55 Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 273. 
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revelation, as divine interpretation, is not opposed to what actually happened in the past, but is 
opposed to correlating God’s interpretation of reality with creation in a way which undermines it. 
The question of authority factors into the situation. God’s word is revealed in history, but its (and 
history’s) origin is not in history. According to Scripture, history is not the master category for 
interpretation. This is not to say that history is not involved, but that the divinely inspired canon, 
with its own inner-hermeneutic, is the master category. Historical ‘facts,’ much like ‘evidences’ 
in apologetics are always in touch with and informed by their philosophical and theological 
foundations.56 Non-inspired interpretation (e.g., Second Temple Judaism Midrash, Qumranic 
pesher, or contemporary methods) cannot impose any category of theological understanding not 
derived from the canon itself.57 NT interpretation of the OT, as special revelation, is distinct and 
authoritative for all interpretation. Hence, it is not like first century interpretive methods in this 
sense.  
Oliphint, citing Muller, has observed that the basic protestant hermeneutical principle in 
the seventeenth century was that Scripture’s unity must be given priority over the interpretation 
of particular texts. He describes this priority as “ontological” and rooted in the aseity of God. In 
other words, we are “not to impose an extrabiblical conception of God on the text so it will say 
what we, in our preconceived assumptions, want it to say.”58 From another direction, this raises 
the question: do some views of the NT use of the OT compromise the aseity of God? 
VanGemeren has observed that OT prophetic interpretation in Scripture begins and ends with 
God who is free from any correlation with human interpretation (e.g., false prophets).59 This is 
                                                          
56 Van Til, Apologetics, 19. 
57 McCartney, “New Testament’s Use,” 116. 
58 Oliphint, God With Us, 27-28; cf. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 3:451-452. 
59 Willem A. VanGemeren, “Prophets, the Freedom of God, and Hermeneutics,” WTJ 52 (1990): 98. This 
would oppose attempts to seek ontology in the encounter between God as the ‘source’ of meaning and the reader as 
the ‘condition of its possibility’ (hence, correlating God and man in meaning) (e.g., Scott Huelin, “Toward a 
Theological Ontology of Textual Meaning,” CSR 34.2 [2005]: 223-226). 
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just one example of the ontological priority of the aseity of God within the divine interpretation 
revealed in Scripture.   
Second, Van Til’s emphasis on the incomprehensibility of God opposes grounding 
meaning in the comprehension of the human authors, or in readers for that matter. Meaning and 
hermeneutical control only become problems if they are grounded in man and his finite 
limitations. Inevitably, one runs into the complications of the rationalistic-irrationalistic dialectic, 
as well as a reductionistic view of meaning discussed in chapter four. Kaiser’s approach tends 
toward the autonomous ideal of human comprehension, creating more problems than it solves. 
The uncertainties regarding intent and historical gaps find their intelligibility and comprehension 
in the mind of God, not man. Van Til’s emphasis on the connection between the mode and 
content of God’s knowledge prevents the reduction of meaning to the human level. In addition, 
God’s comprehension does justice to legitimate postmodern concerns about human limitations 
without losing touch with objective meaning, avoiding the rationalistic pitfalls of modernism. 
Following Van Til, finite, creaturely interpretation is not a problem to be overcome. Rather, it is 
an issue of creaturely submission to God’s special revelation (and its own inner-hermeneutic), 
with its content providing the necessary ontological presuppositions.   
Positively, Van Til’s emphasis on the incomprehensibility of God coupled with his 
articulation of the ontological Trinity can inform an appreciation for the fullness of meaning 
found in a text, which is not truncated by grounding it in the human author alone. In his 
discussions of mystery and apparent contradictions, along with his perspectival approach to the 
Trinity, Van Til lays out ontological foundations which can be employed in service of 
understanding OT texts in light of their NT use without stifling legitimate intertextual 
connections or leaving blind spots created by allowing one finite perspective (e.g., human intent 
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of author or reader) to limit other legitimate perspectives divinely intended in Scripture (e.g., NT 
author’s intent concerning an OT text).  
To answer the question posed earlier, we are not left with an agnostic stance about the 
divine intent of Scripture. While not possessing divine comprehension, we most clearly see 
God’s intent, from a finite, analogous perspective, in the larger canonical context—organically 
transcending the original human author, but not violating original intent.60 Within the canon, we 
have divinely revealed theological presuppositions which we are to embrace in order to 
understand particular texts in their contexts, both narrow and broad. The theological 
presuppositions are not completely hidden from us as they are derived from OT trajectories and 
expectations.   
Third, Van Til’s Trinitarian emphasis helps to evaluate questionable distinctions and 
dichotomies.61 First, Kaiser’s concern to isolate and provide control for meaning through 
Hirsch’s distinction ends up steering attention away from the divine aspects of meaning—
namely, knowing in relation to God. This inherently relational meaning rooted in the ontological 
Trinity would seem to undermine the sharp distinction between meaning and ‘significance.’ To 
correspond to God’s knowledge (on a creaturely level), one must take into account how God 
relates to what he knows and analogously match that relation on a creaturely level. This implies 
that knowing the meaning of a text of Scripture as the intent of God through the human author’s 
intent involves applying or responding to it properly (e.g., knowing as ‘covenant-keepers’ or 
‘covenant-breakers’). Second, the ontological Trinity involves coinherence between the one and 
many. Meaning is inherently contextual and resists hermeneutical isolation, whether in the 
                                                          
60 Cf. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 263-265; Richard B. Gaffin Jr., “The Redemptive-
Historical View,” in Biblical Hermeneutics: Five Views, 89-110; Beale, “Positive Answer,” 401. 
61 Cf. Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation, 82-83. 
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human author or in a bracketed out portion of history or the canon. Third, it would seem that 
Kaiser endorses a concept of meaning which privileges the one over the many. Meaning is an 
unchanging ‘one,’ with the ‘many’ as changing and dependent upon history and creaturely 
context. This ends up ignoring the Trinitarian fullness of meaning and the one and many being 
equally ultimate in the intent of God.   
Can we follow the NT authors’ methods of interpreting the OT? 
  We will consider two main approaches to answering this question. Each view involves 
important macro-hermeneutical concerns which resonate with Van Til’s emphases in 
apologetics. After summarizing the two and providing some brief critique, we will consider more 
explicitly how Van Til speaks to the issues raised.   
 Negative Answer 
 Longenecker has argued that the exegesis of the NT is not normative and should not be 
followed to the degree that it deviates from standard, contemporary historical-grammatical 
exegesis.62 His approach is built on the assumed distinction between the transcultural truth or 
message of NT authors and the cultural, time-bound methods they used to communicate and 
support that message in the first century. In light of this distinction, he sees the former to be 
normative and the latter as not normative for exegetical method.63 The NT is not meant to be a 
‘textbook’ for hermeneutics and should not be treated as one. In other words, the NT authors got 
the right doctrine, but from the wrong texts. This approach is not entirely uncommon among 
evangelical scholars, though in varying degrees.64 
                                                          
62 Richard N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period (2d ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 198; “Major Tasks of an Evangelical Hermeneutic,” BBR 14.1 (2004): 54. 
63 Longenecker, “Evangelical Hermeneutic,” 48. 
64 E.g., Peter Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics,” 281-282; Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews 
(NIGNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), 63; Sidney Greidanus, Preaching Christ from the Old Testament 
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1999), 186-191, 269. 
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  What accounts for the cultural, time-bound methods used in the NT? Longenecker 
highlights four main types of Jewish exegesis present in the first century: literalist, midrashic, 
pesher, and allegorical. He concludes that while there is some presence of literalist and 
occasional allegorical use of the OT, pesher is representative of Jesus’ early disciples, and 
midrashic exegesis is prevalent in Paul and the author of Hebrews.65 The latter two (along with 
allegorical) are characterized largely by non-contextual usage of the OT.66 Moreover, it is argued 
that Jesus himself adhered to the same methods and actually taught them to his disciples.67 
While the issues involved are admittedly complex and require more detailed attention 
than what is possible here, we will look at some concerns related to Longenecker’s approach. 
First, many have questioned the uniform nature of Jewish exegesis during the Second Temple 
period,68 specifically with regard to its non-contextual nature.69 Others have noted that the NT is 
more contextual in its use of the OT than much rabbinic exegesis.70 On a mere research 
methodology level, it would seem that such diversity should guard against the decisive 
conclusions which Longenecker reaches. This brings us to another related concern. Apart from 
the diversity issue, the presence of similarity does not necessarily entail dependence.71 
                                                          
65 Richard N. Longenecker, “Negative Answer to the Question,” in Right Doctrine, 380-383. Pesher is 
characterized by seeking to identify one’s present situation with what is depicted in OT Scripture (i.e. ‘this is that’), 
while midrash is characterized by a desire to contemporize earlier revelation with regard to the historical context of 
the interpreter (i.e. ‘that has relevance for this’). 
66 Longenecker, “Negative Answer,” 381-385. 
67 Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis, 36-62; Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 132. 
68 Noel K. Weeks, Sufficiency of Scripture (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1988), 183-193; Jacob Neusner, 
The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before 70 (3 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1971); Beale, Erosion, 92-96; Enns 
even recognizes the lack of uniformity when he observes that “there are Judaisms but no ‘Second Temple Judaism” 
(P. Enns, “Pseudepigrapha,” in Dictionary of the Theological Interpretation of the Bible (ed. K. Vanhoozer; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2005), 652. 
69 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 388-389; cf. D. Instone Brewer, Techniques and Assumptions in Jewish 
Exegesis before 70 C.E. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992). 
70 Moo, “Sensus Plenior,” 193; Silva, “New Testament Use,” 159. 
71 Noel K. Weeks, “The Ambiguity of Biblical ‘Background’,” WTJ 72 (2010): 233. 
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 Second, it would seem that the general notion is that the apostles’ methods were 
culturally bound to the first century in a sort of relativism, necessarily dependent on the 
determining influences of their environment.72 However, Longenecker and others, at the same 
time, seem to take a detached stance in their critique which Weeks calls an “illogical 
Modernism.” It is illogical in that their assessment and hermeneutical standards (e.g., 
grammatical-historical) are not applied to the present.73 In other words, the relativism necessarily 
involved in the past is not operative in the present. They proceed to attach definitive significance 
to their own methodology. Hays contends that Longenecker wrongly grants an arbitrarily 
privileged status to first century interpretation of the OT which is deemed inappropriate for 
today, leaving Scripture in a past we cannot participate in.74 Beale has argued that Enns, on the 
one hand, cautions against using modern standards of determining truth and error to evaluate 
whether Scripture contains truth or error, and on the other hand, fails to account for what 
standards of truth and error were present in the past. Hence, his position becomes non-
falsifiable.75 
 Third, notions regarding the use of the OT by Jesus and Paul raise concerns. First of all, 
Jesus is depicted as one who is just as culturally determined as the apostles in his use of the OT. 
This is another problem with the way Enns confuses his incarnational analogy. He uses it to 
emphasize the humanity of Scripture in the culturally bound method of Jesus and the apostles, 
but presses it to deny that the divine nature is expressed through Jesus’ hermeneutic in particular, 
                                                          
72 Cf. Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, “The Truth of Scripture and the Problem of Historical Relativity,” in 
Scripture and Truth, 175.  
73 Weeks, “Biblical Background,” 235. 
74 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 
181. 
75 Beale, Erosion, 54. Following Van Til, we might add that only God’s knowledge and interpretation of 
truth is non-falsifiable. 
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as it is truly expressed in other ways (e.g., miracles).76 This clearly goes against traditional 
formulations of the incarnation which guard against separating out the human from the divine in 
terms of Christ’s actions and teaching.77 Indeed, one of the things Jesus taught (i.e. his message) 
was that the OT Scriptures spoke of him (Luke 24:25-27, 44-47; John 5:39, 46-47). Both 
Longenecker and Enns agree that the method of the apostles expressed in the NT was the method 
taught to them by Christ himself.78 What was the nature of this method? While there are some 
formal similarities, Jesus’ exegesis of the OT differed significantly from his Jewish 
contemporaries in that he displayed a greater fidelity to the sense of OT passages, namely with 
regard to the OT finding its fulfillment in him.79 This approach involves the larger redemptive-
historical context, including the groundswell of trajectories and expectations within the OT itself, 
not adding new meaning that is somehow disconnected from what the OT says.80 The same 
methodology is seen in the apostles.81  France concludes that “the source of the distinctive 
Christian use of the Old Testament was not the creative thinking of the primitive community, but 
that of its founder.”82 
 Concerning Enns’ treatment of Paul’s exegesis, Carson insightfully asks why is it that 
Paul and his non-Christian Jewish colleagues reach different conclusions from the same texts—if 
they employed the same method? Are only his conclusions different because of his conversion or 
is it that they stem from a hermeneutical change as well, one that “warrants the Christological 
                                                          
76 Beale, Erosion, 120; cf. Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 17-21, 114-115, 132; “Fuller Meaning, 
Single Goal,” 202-204. 
77 Cf. Donald Macleod, The Person of Christ (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 1998), 188-189; Berkhof, 
Systematic Theology, 322-323. 
78 Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis, 36, 61-62; cf. Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation, 132. 
79 R.T. France, Jesus and the Old Testament (Vancouver: Regent, 1998), 200-201.  
80 Contra Enns, who sees such trajectories not in the OT but in extra-biblical Jewish texts of the Second 
Temple period (Inspiration and Incarnation, 120). 
81 France, Jesus and the Old Testament, 223-226. 
82 France, Jesus and the Old Testament, 226. 
245 
 
readings of the Old Testament he adopts?”83 It would seem that the difference is a hermeneutical 
one, not merely regarding the fruits of it. A Christian reading of the OT involves a number of 
theological presuppositions which feed into the interpretation of it, and is dependent upon the 
Spirit’s work (1 Cor 2:6-16; 2 Cor 3:14-16). One could argue that believers today not only 
experience the enabling work of the Spirit to see Christ in the OT, but also stand in the same 
redemptive-historical vantage point in relation to the OT as the NT authors (i.e. between the 
comings of Christ).84 As Hays and others have shown, the apostolic message and doctrine cannot 
be cleanly extracted from apostolic exegesis, for the message is rooted in Spirit-led intertextual 
reflection.85 Hays concludes: 
Scripture interpretation is the theological matrix within which the kerygma took shape; 
removed from that matrix, it will die. Longenecker would like to pluck and preserve the 
flower of apostolic doctrine, but severed from its generative hermeneutical roots that 
flower will surely wither.86 
 
Could the Spirit inspire the NT authors in a way which comes to the right conclusions from 
going down the wrong paths? To claim to follow the former, while opposing the latter is like 
saying, “I will follow you wherever you go, so long as you go in my direction.”87 
 Fifth, there seem to be problems with Enns’ argument for following the apostles’ 
hermeneutical goal without following their methods. Herein is the difference between himself 
and Longenecker. Where Longenecker draws a distinction between exegetical methods, Enns 
draws a distinction between methods and goals. The former distinguishes between types of 
methods which can be employed today and which ones cannot, favoring the literal, grammatical-
historical method. The latter distinguishes between methods and goal, endorsing only the use of 
                                                          
83 Carson, Collected Writings, 279-280. 
84 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 399. 
85 Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 182. 
86 Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 182. 
87 McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 65. 
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the apostles’ hermeneutical goals for today (Christo-telic hermeneutic).88 Enns wants to maintain 
an apostolic hermeneutical standard which is still relevant. Yet, goals are not unrelated to 
methods. “Methods are chosen according to what produces results in line with what is already 
known or what makes sense of a text.”89 The NT authors’ goal determined their method. That 
goal was the center of redemptive history—Jesus Christ’s person and work. Moreover, the NT is 
the hermeneutical goal of the OT.90 It is ironic that Enns endorses McCartney’s emphasis on 
goal, but fails to acknowledge its inherent connections with method, something for which 
McCartney argues.91 
 Another problem with separating conclusions or goals from methods is the apologetic 
fallout. How can we defend theological truths which are not inherently connected to method or 
interpretation present in Scripture? Apart from divine inspiration on par with the NT authors 
themselves, how would we proceed?92 Indeed, Van Til was concerned with not severing this 
vital connection between content and method.   
Another blind spot present in the argument for a ‘Christo-telic hermeneutic’ is that it is 
usually portrayed as following the apostles’ pattern of interpretation in hindsight. The apostles, 
upon being convinced that the eschaton had dawned in Christ’s coming and subsequent 
resurrection, went back to the OT with a Christ-centered focus, which was not present in the OT 
itself prior to the change in themselves.93 However, one of the very texts Enns uses in support of 
this point (Luke 24:45) has a context which undermines such use. Before the opening of the 
minds of his disciples to understand the OT, Jesus told them that they were responsible for 
                                                          
88 Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics,” 282. 
89 McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 66. 
90 McCartney, “New Testament’s Use,” 116. 
91 E.g., Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics,” 276n31.  
92 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 404. 
93 Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics,” 275, 277; Inspiration and Incarnation, 119-120; cf. Norman R. 
Ericson, “The NT Use of the OT: A Kerygmatic Approach,” JETS 30.3 (1987): 341. 
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understanding the OT as pointing to himself before his resurrection because his person and work 
were already in the text of the OT (v.25-26, 44) (i.e. not a brand new meaning absent from the 
OT text).94 To take this a step further in terms of connections with theology proper, Van Til 
argued that because Christianity is a unified system of truth, a definition of Christ’s work would 
necessarily involve a certain doctrine of God.95 Hence, not only does the OT inherently speak of 
Christ’s work, it is also connected to a particular doctrine of God, and in turn, should influence 
interpretive method—even in making sense of the NT use of the OT.  
 Positive Answer 
 Many scholars have argued that we should follow the hermeneutical methods of the NT 
authors, not merely their conclusions or Christ-centered goal. It is suggested that even the more 
puzzling uses of the OT found in the NT can be explained when the larger context of Scripture is 
taken into account.96 However, it is recognized that NT authors cite the OT in a variety of 
creative ways which do not readily fit into how the grammatical-historical method is often 
understood today.97 Often, multiple contexts are involved, with the OT context (narrow and 
broad) of a passage resonating with the context of the NT citation in ways which go beyond, but 
also reinforce the use of the cited text.98 These ways include the following: direct fulfillment, 
indirect fulfillment, typology, analogical, illustrative, symbolic, abiding authority, proverbial, 
rhetorical, prototype, alternate textual use, assimilated use, and ironic use.99 Yet, in each use, 
there is a contextual connection on some level which renders the NT use organically related to 
the meaning of the OT text. This qualified concept of sensus plenior, contrary to various abuses, 
                                                          
94 Carson, Collected Writings, 281-282. 
95 Van Til, Apologetics, 18. 
96 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 389. 
97 Bock, “Single Meaning,” 149-150. 
98 C.f. G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson, eds., Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament 
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker, 2007), xxiii-xxviii.  
99 Beale, Handbook, 55-93; cf. Bock, “Single Meaning,” 118-121. 
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does not violate “the integrity of earlier texts but rather develops them in a way in which is 
consistent with the Old Testament author’s understanding of the way in which God interacts with 
his people.”100 LaSor uses the analogy of a seed containing everything related to its subsequent 
development and being organically related to its eventual branch, leaf, and flower.101 This 
approach steers clear from ‘scientific’ methods which seek to either collapse the historical 
development of textual meaning or separate a text from it, and from subjectivist methods. 
Similarly, with typology and other patterns, there is an appreciation for history which avoids 
non-contextual allegory, but at the same time appreciates legitimate expansion of meaning in 
light of redemptive history. The “extension of the data base being exegeted does not mean we are 
no longer exegeting but only that we are doing so with a larger block of material.”102 Put 
differently, typology, biblical theology, and systematic theology is merely doing different types 
of exegesis at the canonical level.  
It is acknowledged that our following of the interpretive method of the NT authors is not 
itself divinely inspired. Hence, our certainty regarding exegetical conclusions is not on the same 
level. However, we must not confuse certainty with method from our side of things.103 This 
would be akin to saying that we cannot follow the method of the inspired writers because we do 
not have divine certainty. However, this is only a problem if we are seeking to have such divine 
certainty for ourselves in the first place. In essence, a false dilemma is set in place: only follow 
the inspired methods if you can have divine certainty (as a creature).104 This would seem to 
preclude following a divine pattern and growing in it with God’s help, without seeking to get 
                                                          
100 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 393; Moo, “Sensus Plenior,” 201-211.   
101 W.S. LaSor, “Prophecy, Inspiration, and Sensus Plenior,” TynBul 29 (1978): 55-56; cf. Vos, Biblical 
Theology, 7, 16-18. 
102 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 401. 
103 Beale, “Positive Answer,” 399, 402.  
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beyond the Creator-creature distinction. It is important to note that while the writers of Scripture 
are unique, they were not endowed with divine qualities. Rather, we affirm dual authorship of 
Scripture. In every case, the Creator-creature distinction is maintained. 
Beale argues that it is not only improper to separate method from conclusions derived 
from method, but the issue has bearing on theology and theological method in general. The NT 
use of the OT is the key to the theological relation between the testaments, which is necessarily 
broader than the select citations of the OT found in the NT.105 Using the larger contextual 
method, patterned after the NT authors, we can grow in our understanding of the divine intent, 
creatively summarizing what is already expressed in the canon, much like the apostles, with the 
help of the Spirit. In sum, we should follow the methods of the NT authors.       
 I find the positive answer view to the question about method more persuasive and less 
problematic than the negative answer. Van Til’s macro-hermeneutical insights clearly resonate 
with the fundamentals of this view. For example, this view seeks to appreciate and follow the 
methodology of the NT authors as part of the divinely inspired inner-hermeneutic across the 
canon, rather than seeking to impose a method based on a framework, foreign to the canon. That 
being said, I do feel that there is room for further refinement. For instance, there is some concern 
whether the treatment of epistemological issues is consistent with a biblical ontology stemming 
from the nature of God and his relation to creation. In particular, how consistent are Hirsch’s 
approach to meaning and Wright’s ‘critical realism’ with not only the nature of the divine author 
(see chapters 1-3), but also the ‘positive answer’ view regarding method. Van Til’s emphases can 
help to defend against unbiblical presuppositions present in the ‘negative answer’ view, and 
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provide a more nuanced understanding of worldview, thus strengthening the case for the 
‘positive view.’ 
A Van Tillian Critique of ‘Method’: the ‘that’ and the ‘what’ involved in one another 
 In addition to the critique offered above, Van Til’s emphasis on the inherent connection 
between method and the message of the Bible will now be considered with regard to some of the 
deeper issues raised.  
First, Longenecker’s fundamental distinction between transcultural truth and culturally 
bound method concerns a deeper issue which Van Til often addressed, albeit in a different 
context. Longenecker’s separation of message and method in the NT raises three deeper 
hermeneutical questions. Apart from the problems associated with a ‘canon-within-a-canon’ 
mentality, if we cannot follow the hermeneutic present in Scripture because of this separation, 
then where do we get the hermeneutic which establishes it?106  Closely connected is the issue of 
authority. By what authority is this separation the lens through which the method found in the 
NT is understood? Longenecker is fairly straight forward in his response to this last question, 
citing Vermes: 
We have, as a result, three cognate schools of exegesis of the one message recorded in the 
Bible, and it is the duty of the historian to emphasize that none of them can properly be 
understood independently of the others.107 
 
As his works shows, there is a loss of methodological authority among certain cultural and 
historical influences, with no one ‘school’ more authoritative than the others in terms of 
contextualizing the message in the first century (i.e. the NT) and today. There is also a distinct 
tendency to confuse and correlate special revelation with general revelation in the post-fall 
                                                          
106 This assumes that there is a self-sufficient and self-contained principle of interpretation apart from that 
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107 Longenecker, Apostolic Exegesis, xxii; cf. Geza Vermes, “The Qumran Interpretation of Scripture in Its 
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situation, leaving redemptive history recorded in the canon ultimately indistinguishable from 
history in general.108 This brings up a related tendency seen in contemporary hermeneutics—to 
separate theology from history, especially as it pertains to method. When this is done, the pride 
of place often goes to history as a more ultimate reality.109 As Van Til has demonstrated, all facts 
of history find their meaning in relation to God and his plan. Therefore, all history is not only 
dependent upon God as Triune Creator, but also derives its meaning and intelligibility from him. 
From the beginning, general revelation was to be informed by special revelation, and all the 
more since the fall.110 God’s word as canon is the divinely authoritative, self-contained 
interpretation of reality.111 We simply cannot withhold theological reflection when considering 
history and understand that ‘history’ properly. As it relates to the issue at hand, Silva aptly 
concludes:  
If we refuse to pattern our exegesis after that of the apostles, we are in practice denying 
the authoritative character of their scriptural interpretation—and to do so is to strike at the 
very heart of the Christian faith.112 
 
If we do not receive our hermeneutic from Scripture, then where do we get it? If God’s word is 
self-attesting because God himself is, then this includes a self-attesting hermeneutic present 
within it.  
A second related question concerns the relationship between method and content. If 
method can be removed from content without affecting that content, what informs the method? It 
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in his critique of N.T. Wright (Nicholas Perrin, “Some Reflections on Hermeneutics and Method: A Reply to Guy 
Waters,” WTJ 68 [2006]: 142, 146). Wolfhart Pannenberg seeks to ground the resurrection in historical scholarship, 
apart from revelation, rendering it uncertain at best, waiting for the end of history to verify or falsify such claims (cf. 
The Apostles’ Creed in the Light of Today’s Questions [trans. Margaret Kohl; London: SCM Press, 1972], 108-109; 
Metaphysics and the Idea of God [trans. Philip Clayton; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990], 166).     
110 Van Til, Scripture, 120. 
111 Van Til, Reformed Pastor, 74-75, 189.  
112 Silva, “New Testament Use,” 164. 
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is in the answer to this question that unstated presuppositions come to bear in Longenecker’s 
approach. Not addressing this question, he seems to be working from what he might deem as 
‘self-evident’ assumptions or at least ones which convey that as we study such matters, we all 
start with the historical facts in the first century and allow the evidence to lead us to the right 
assessment of methods present in Scripture. However, Van Til’s insistence is that because of 
God’s very nature, our methods are involved in our conclusions.113 Ontologically speaking, 
“one’s theory of being and one’s theory of method are interrelated.”114 Even if we grant the 
historical arguments regarding ‘facts’ related to the comparative study of Second Temple Jewish 
exegesis and what is found in Scripture, we must still consider one’s philosophy of fact rooted in 
the Fact that determines them all—the Triune Creator. As Van Til has argued, the Bible gives us 
both, history and a philosophy of history.115 While there is considerable attention paid to 
Longenecker’s dealings with the ‘facts’ of history by his critics, there is considerably less 
attention paid to deeper assumptions related to a philosophy of history, involving the interplay 
between ontology and method.116 
Third, if methods are borrowed from extra-biblical sources to convey the message, but 
are not part of that message, does this not leave them virtually ‘neutral’ in their adaptability? 
What governs and informs hermeneutical method if disengaged from the message? What 
standard is used, if not the Bible and its message? This is where Van Til’s insistence upon both 
the pre-interpretation of God (as Creator) concerning all reality and creation as exhaustively 
personal (related to the ontological Trinity) render such supposed neutrality a mirage. If method 
is not neutral in its adaptability or contextualization, and is inherently involved in its 
                                                          
113 Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 4-6; Defense of the Faith, 122.  
114 Van Til, Systematic Theology, 28. 
115 Van Til, Apologetics, 20.  
116 Cf. Van Til, Apologetics, 18. 
253 
 
conclusion,117 then in Longenecker’s argument, we have a two-fold error in terms of context. 
Rather than recognizing a distinct and authoritative context for divine intent for both message 
and method, he decontextualizes both through separation, and then seeks to re-contextualize the 
message in a non-canonical context (i.e. later historical contextualization down to the present 
day).118 He even goes as far as to say that it is impossible to retrieve the methods found in the 
NT because “they lack the power to convince in different cultures, circumstances, and situation 
of today.”119  
Due to the inherent connection between method and message, one wonders how 
Longenecker’s approach ends up distorting the ‘transcultural’ message (through de-
contextualization) he seeks to preserve. One way is by denying the presence of a built-in 
hermeneutic rooted in theological presuppositions derived from the progressive revelation of 
God. Such redemptive-historical progress is not merely retroactive in direction, but also pro-
active through the forward looking trajectories of the OT. To borrow from Enns’ terminology, 
the first and second ‘readings’ are organically related in both message and method. Another way 
it distorts the message is by making it dependent upon extra-biblical sources for re-
contextualization and modern meaning. An example of this can be seen in Longenecker’s use of 
the ‘new wine’ and ‘fresh wineskins’ metaphor from Matthew 9, which is ultimately 
unconvincing and ironic.120 Not only does he end up correlating the biblical message (‘new 
                                                          
117 We see evidence of this in how scholars have recognized theological presuppositions of the NT authors 
related to their method. While one may see some overlap with what can be seen in the Qumran community and first 
century Jewish exegesis, this does not necessarily entail dependence. A stronger case can be made for the origin of 
these presuppositions being in the OT itself, with the NT unique in its divine inspiration and authority, and extra-
biblical manifestations of them as testifying to the very presence of those ideas in the OT. This just shows that in the 
latter case, exegetes were working with the same texts. 
118 Van Til observed that in general, non-Christian thought is atomistic (Apologetics, 154-155). Such 
atomistic understanding is often falsified by context—whether in terms of scriptural context or God as the ultimate 
context for understanding reality (cf. Frame, Knowledge of God, 53).  
119 Longenecker, “Evangelical Hermeneutic,” 55. 
120 Longenecker, “Evangelical Hermeneutic,” 55. 
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wine’) and extra-biblical cultural context (‘fresh wineskins’) in terms of authority, but he also 
undermines his very purpose in using the metaphor. For as the context shows, Jesus is opposing 
the ‘old wineskins’ of Judaism (i.e. the matrix of first century Jewish religion and its attendant 
hermeneutic) which does not recognize Christ as the bridegroom having come. Actually, the 
‘fresh wineskins’ would correspond more with the inner-hermeneutic of inspired Scripture that 
Jesus himself appeals to in his own teaching and what he taught to his disciples 121 
Related to the issue of relying upon an extra-biblical context in interpretation is Van Til’s 
evaluation of unbelieving Jewish interpretation of the OT law.122 According to Van Til, their 
fundamental hermeneutical flaw consisted in the reliance upon an ‘unwritten Torah’ as a way to 
provide modern meaning for the ancient, written Torah. It ended up functioning as an unwritten 
authority on par with Scripture, and a sort of ‘continuous revelation.’ He points out that this 
approach involves deeper questions of epistemology and metaphysics.123 It is tied to their 
understanding of God’s revelation and man’s response to it (epistemology), as well as their 
concept of God and his control of history and man’s response to this control (metaphysics). He 
argues that their unwillingness to see that the OT spoke of Christ exhibits a desire to preserve the 
autonomy of man’s ethical consciousness rather than to submit to the ultimate ethical authority 
of God’s word.  
Conclusion  
We have seen how the issues of meaning and method have been conceived and 
understood with regard to the NT use of the OT. Views have been proposed within 
                                                          
121 Cf. D.A. Carson, “Matthew,” in Expositor’s Bible Commentary (12 vols.; ed. Frank E. Gaebelein; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1984), 8:227-228; R.T. France, The Gospel of Mark (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 142.       
122 Van Til, Christ and the Jews, 70-85. 
123 McCartney has argued that hermeneutical method is a product of worldview, including method being 
bound up in one’s view of what a text ought to say (“New Testament’s Use,” 103-107). 
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evangelicalism which, upon evaluation, exposed the need to ask deeper questions related to 
metaphysics. Van Til’s potential contribution to this issue is the need to evaluate and promote a 
hermeneutic rooted in the self-contained authority of Scripture. Some of the more problematic 
features of certain views were able to be addressed according to Van Til’s doctrine of God, 
drawing from the three main contours discussed in chapters four through six.  
It is clear that a Christian hermeneutic consistent with the theology it affirms will include 
a strong canonical emphasis. This emphasis reflects the nature of Scripture as God’s self-
contained interpretation of reality, implying that it is also self-interpreting (reflecting the nature 
of God as both, Creator and ontological Trinity).124 It also involves seeing meaning as ultimately 
God’s intention which transcends the comprehension of man (incomprehensible). Moreover, a 
canonical emphasis will take into account redemptive-historical development found through the 
canon. Though indirect in much of his treatment of method, Van Til seems to show an acute 
awareness of redemptive history in his discussions of revelation,125 the New Hermeneutic,126 and 
non-Christian Jewish hermeneutics.127   
This hermeneutical approach is not opposed to or in violation of history per se, but rather 
seeks to understand it according to its created nature and place in the plan of God. The self-
interpreting word of God, while involving history, is not dependent upon it in terms of intent and 
meaning. Hence, any hermeneutical method which assumes a prior and more ultimate 
metaphysic (e.g., ‘history’)128 than the one revealed in Scripture sets a playing field on which the 
                                                          
124 This would include the potentially fruitful categories under both of these truths which were explored—
Creator-creature: fact/possibility/interpretation, inerrancy, analogy, antecedent being, person of Christ, 
sovereignty/election, and the fall as rebellion against the Creator-creature distinction; Ontological Trinity: one and 
the many, personalism, archetype for communication, and perspectivalism. 
125 E.g., Van Til, Systematic Theology, 126-127, 209-212. 
126 E.g., Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 214. 
127 E.g., Van Til, Christ and the Jews, 36, 56. 
128 Van Til mentions this particular assumption as a tendency of unbelieving thought (“Intellectual 
Challenge,” 40, cf. 11). 
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message of Christianity is denied from the start—if one reasons consistently from this false 
starting point. For example, if apostolic exegesis is dependent upon ‘history’ for its method and 
meaning, it is rendered merely a product of its time, severed from divine intention and control. 
Van Til, in discussing hermeneutical methods of his day, observed: 
…the grandest self-deception of modern times is found among Christian theologians who 
build their theological structure on top of the sinking structure of modern science and 
philosophy.129 
 
Such is the case with a ‘history’ metaphysically conceived of apart from and prior to the 
ontology revealed in Scripture. 
The Bible contains an authoritative inner-hermeneutic, which functions as a “regulative 
principle of hermeneutics,” not just for itself, but also as a lens of special revelation through 
which reality is rightly understood. This is merely one implication of Sola Scriptura.130 No extra-
biblical criteria are needed for it to function as such. Nor is there an extra-biblical authority to 
which the Bible must correspond to in order to be and function as God’s word. The central 
message of Scripture, Jesus Christ, is self-identifying as revealed in Scripture.131 He is not 
dependent upon creation in order for him to be explained, nor is he dependent upon any outside 
criteria to which he must measure up to in order to explain himself. Though revealed in the 
incarnation and through inspiration of the human authors of Scripture, the message conveyed did 
not depend on the creature for its meaning.  
Our task is to seek to match the Bible’s own hermeneutic, with the help of the Spirit. 
Much like a child tracing on paper the inner-structure of a leaf with a pencil with the help of a 
                                                          
129 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 43. 
130 Lillback, “Infallible Rule of Interpretation,” 301-302, 305, 323. By Sola Scriptura, we mean that 
Scripture is the primary authoritative norm for doctrine, with doctrinal and hermeneutical tradition as a useful, but 
subordinate and derivative norm. 
131 Van Til, New Hermeneutic, 65, 158, 215. 
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parent, so we are to proceed. While our interpretation and theological formulation is provisional 
in that we are not inerrant and authoritative on the same level as Scripture, God’s word and its 
inner-hermeneutical rule is not provisional.132 
Methodology, whether apologetic or hermeneutical, can be fruitfully evaluated according 
the doctrine of God revealed in Scripture. The aim is consistency between theology and method, 
with the goal of thinking God’s thoughts after himself about hermeneutics. Also included in this 
evaluation is the detection of rational and irrational elements indicative of the fallen mind which 
may be present in a given hermeneutic to one degree or another. Due to his emphasis on a 
biblical ontology rooted in the doctrine of God, Van Til’s critique of the New Hermeneutic is 
replete with references to the unstable combination of rationalism and irrationalism. The main 
contours of Van Til’s doctrine of God help to provide a test of consistency for contemporary 
hermeneutics from a Christian worldview, in order to avoid undermining the very message it 
seeks to interpret.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
132 Lillback, “Infallible Rule of Interpretation,” 330. 
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Conclusion 
Cornelius Van Til’s work in the field of apologetics has relevance for contemporary 
hermeneutics in terms of the interplay between doctrine and method. We may summarize our 
findings along chapter lines as follows.  
In chapter one, we saw how Van Til has been brought into the hermeneutical discussion, 
but often quickly dismissed without due consideration. We briefly surveyed some examples of 
macro-hermeneutical statements found throughout his works, and discussed some hermeneutical 
contributions of those who have been consciously influenced by him in their work. We 
concluded with the question: if Van Til has a place in contemporary hermeneutics, where? 
In chapter two, we began answering this question by first discussing how ‘hermeneutics’ 
has come to be defined in the literature. We found that, while implicit throughout the history of 
biblical interpretation, the contemporary definition is explicitly holistic in nature, on par with 
worldview. This includes considerations of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In particular, 
there has been a desire to provide a general theory of understanding which can account for 
meaning while still recognizing limits of the human mind. This raised the question: what are the 
necessary presuppositions to account for such a theory of understanding? Worldview and 
presuppositions were the focus of Van Til’s work in apologetics and direct us to his place in the 
discussion.   
In chapter three, we took a closer look at the curious relationship between metaphysics 
and hermeneutics. We found a distinct tendency in the literature to assume a general ontology as 
prior to and more ultimate than the theology found in Scripture. In addition, when it comes to 
biblical interpretation, there has been a tendency to decontextualize, making it dependent upon 
history and culture. It is evident from this survey that there is a need for a Christian hermeneutic 
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articulated at the level of worldview. Van Til has provided a significant contribution to this need 
through his work on apologetics. He argued that methodology is involved in ontology. Theology 
proper was the foundation for Van Til’s conception of a biblical ontology. This provides the 
necessary presuppositions for a biblical theory of understanding. Lastly, we acknowledged recent 
developments in contemporary evangelical hermeneutics. We argued that Van Til’s thought can 
be considered complementary to concerns of both SAT and TIS, while also providing further 
refinement.  
In chapter four, we began tracing the main contours of Van Til’s doctrine of God, 
beginning with the Creator-creature distinction. This distinction is paramount for the Christian 
worldview, providing a two-level ontology, as opposed to the one-level variety most often 
assumed in hermeneutics. This distinction also informs concepts of ‘fact,’ ‘possibility,’ and 
‘interpretation’—whether they are conceived as created or uncreated. This affects whether the 
interpreter or text is ultimately de-contextualized and re-contextualized in a different 
metaphysical environment from the one revealed in Scripture. One cannot do justice to the 
‘facts’ biblically without God as the Fact providing the philosophy of ‘fact.’ Without a two-level 
ontology, man treats God as a ‘co-interpreter’ of ‘brute facts,’ which are ultimately 
uninterpretable. A two-level ontology is opposed to a hermeneutical ‘blockhouse method’ which 
seeks to build Christian theology on top of a general ontology uninformed by that theology. It is 
also opposed to any shaping of meaning based on the assumption of indeterminate facts. In 
Scripture, we find finished, authoritative interpretation which requires ‘receptively 
reconstructive’ interpretation rather than meaning ‘construction.’ A two-level ontology entails 
two levels of interpreters—Creator and creature.  
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Since the fall, man tends to deny and suppress the Creator-creature distinction in favor of 
a one-level ontology, even in hermeneutics. Assuming the autonomy of the human mind, fallen 
man seeks to go beyond the creaturely limits of reason and ends up with an unstable mix of 
rationalism and irrationalism. Van Til sought to expose this ‘rationalistic-irrationalistic dialectic’ 
in evaluating various philosophies from a Christian worldview. With respect to hermeneutics, the 
debate is not so much between modern and postmodern schools, but rather between the deeper 
issues of autonomy and monistic metaphysics in both. It was argued that Van Til’s notion of a 
‘rationalistic-irrationalistic dialectic’ can provide a helpful diagnostic tool for evaluating 
hermeneutical theory and methodology from a Christian worldview.       
In chapter five, we explored a second main contour in Van Til’s doctrine of God—
incomprehensibility. This truth moves interpretation away from reductionist preoccupation with 
the human author and reader, and toward an appreciation for the divine author as the ground of 
meaning. Interpretation and knowledge are dependent upon God’s certain comprehension as 
opposed to mere human limitations or probable consensus. Some hermeneutical implications 
from God’s incomprehensibility are as follows: the need to address the mode of thought, God is 
the ultimate reference point for knowledge and interpretation, Scripture comes to us already 
exhaustively intelligible to God, intelligibility involves application, there is no ultimate mystery, 
and hermeneutics must be subject to Scripture rather than being done ‘from the outside.’ 
In chapter six, we discussed the third main contour in Van Til’s doctrine of God—the 
ontological Trinity. The one and many of the Trinity is equally ultimate, without subordination. 
This is opposed to ‘being-in-general,’ which seeks to provide unity to the plurality of things 
either through meaningless abstraction or through allowing a principle of relationality to function 
as logically prior to the ontological Trinity. The ontological Trinity is also opposed to any notion 
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of a personal encounter with a text which is itself impersonal (e.g., ‘propositional’) prior to this 
encounter. The ‘personalism’ of the Trinity precludes any ‘I-it’ / ‘I-thou’ dichotomy. The Trinity 
implies that interpretation is exhaustively personal and ethical in nature. Moreover, the ultimate 
coherence of the subject-object relationship is found in the ontological Trinity (not one at the 
expense of the other). The Trinitarian origin and nature of the canon, as a whole, lends itself to 
‘perspectival’ study. Since man comes to Scripture with a limited, finite perspective, multiple 
(yet, legitimate and compatible) perspectives should be sought in order to appreciate the depth of 
meaning found in the canon.  
In chapter seven, we provided a brief case study, applying insights from Van Til’s 
doctrine of God to one contemporary hermeneutical issue among evangelicals: the NT use of the 
OT. In light of the main questions raised, we looked at how a Van Tillian critique of meaning 
and method might inform the issue. 
In terms of meaning, a Van Tillian hermeneutic would press the deeper question: what is 
the relationship between God and the OT and NT author’s meanings (vs. merely the relationship 
between the OT and NT author’s meanings)? This would take into account God’s intention 
mediated through the intentions of the human authors in both the OT and NT, while preserving 
the Creator-creature distinction. Authority in interpretation follows—with the canon’s divine 
origin (God) as the master category, not history or man. Van Til’s articulation of the 
incomprehensibility of God opposes grounding meaning in the comprehension of the human 
authors or readers, which is finite. If comprehension is sought on the human level, a rationalistic-
irrationalistic dialectic ensues, often tending toward reductionism in meaning. Emphasis on 
incomprehensibility promotes an appreciation for the fullness of meaning. For example, we 
looked at how the ontological Trinity provides a foundation for legitimate forms of perspectival 
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analysis of the content of scripture. This is opposed to allowing one finite perspective (human 
intent of the author or reader) to limit other legitimate perspectives divinely intended in Scripture 
(e.g., NT use of the OT). A Van Tillian Hermeneutic would emphasize canonical considerations 
as essential in appreciating other legitimate perspectives, because it is in the divinely inspired 
canon that we most clearly appreciate divine intent, which transcends human intent. Moreover, 
Van Til’s Trinitarian emphasis highlights our knowing in relation to God. Knowing is inherently 
tied to application. Also, meaning is inherently contextual due to the nature of the ontological 
Trinity, in terms of unity and diversity being equally ultimate. This is opposed to conceiving of 
meaning as an unchanging ‘one’ with the ‘many’ as changing due to its dependence on history 
and creaturely context.    
In terms of method, a Van Tillian hermeneutic would give particular attention to how 
method and content are involved in one another. By keeping in mind the close relationship 
between the two, three particular questions arose in our discussion of Longenecker. His 
distinction between the transhistorical truth and culturally bound methods (endorsing the former 
but not the latter as normative for today) begged the question: where do we get the hermeneutic 
which establishes this distinction? Secondly, if method can be removed from content without 
affecting that content, what informs the method? Thirdly, if methods are borrowed from extra-
biblical sources to convey the message, but are not part of that message, does this not leave them 
virtually ‘neutral’ in their adaptability? Van Til’s doctrine of God exposes such ‘neutrality’ as 
illusory. Longenecker’s approach unwittingly exhibits a two-fold error in terms of context. First, 
he decontextualizes the method from the message. Then, he re-contextualizes the message in 
non-canonical context. Not only does he deny the presence of a built-in hermeneutic with its 
necessary theological presuppositions found in Scripture, he also makes the message dependent 
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upon extra-biblical sources for re-contextualization and modern meaning (not unlike unbelieving 
Jewish interpretation of the OT).  
The strong canonical emphasis of a Van Tillian hermeneutic would more clearly 
highlight God’s intention in terms of meaning. It would not be opposed to or in violation of 
history, but would rather seek to understand it as created. The self-interpreting canon certainly 
involves history, but is not ultimately dependent on it for its meaning. A Van Tillian hermeneutic 
is opposed to any assumed metaphysic prior to or more ultimate than the one revealed in 
Scripture. The canon reveals an authoritative inner-hermeneutic, which functions as a lens 
through which reality, including history, is rightly understood. While our interpretation and 
theological formulation is finite and provisional in nature (i.e. growing), God’s interpretation and 
attendant inner-hermeneutical rule is not. 
Van Til’s doctrine of God as articulated along its three main contours provides not only a 
helpful diagnostic tool for evaluating contemporary approaches for consistency between 
theology and method, it also further articulates concerns of SAT and TIS, providing necessary 
theological grounding in the process. This grounding proves to be a more ontologically and 
epistemologically self-conscious one than what is found in both, SAT and TIS, with careful 
examination at the presuppositional level. This would seem to meet the demands of the 
contemporary discussion. Van Til’s contribution also calls for a proper awareness of antithesis—
the contrasting spiritual opposition between believers and unbelievers, whatever hermeneutical 
theory is in view. Any legitimate insights should be appreciated in terms of common grace and 
‘borrowed capital,’133 yet with a cautious eye toward the principle of antithesis. There is more 
work to be done, both in formulating a more nuanced Christian hermeneutic, and in evaluating 
                                                          
133 Cf. Chapter one, page 32. 
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not only more reader-response approaches, but even grammatical-historical ones used by 
evangelicals. 
This study has established that Van Til is relevant to developments in contemporary 
hermeneutics. These developments not only include worldview considerations in general, but the 
relationship between ontology and hermeneutics in particular. Van Til’s unique approach to 
apologetic methodology stressed consistency between theology and method, especially 
concerning the doctrine of God found in Scripture. This approach has proved to be transferrable 
and particularly suited to face pressing hermeneutical issues that emerged from our survey. The 
three contours of his doctrine of God highlighted in this study established certain foundational 
biblical truths necessary for worldview considerations. Positively, they provide the necessary 
foundations not only of a Christian apologetic, but also a Christian hermeneutic. Negatively, they 
provide a helpful framework to evaluate attempts to answer the deeper hermeneutical questions 
related to meaning and method. Not only is Van Til’s doctrine of God relevant to contemporary 
hermeneutics, it also implies its own hermeneutical method, a presuppositional, ‘Van Tillian’ 
hermeneutic.    
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